The Twilight of the Waderas

The coup of July 5 and the fiasco of the elections planned for October 1977 highlighted the fact that the wadera could no longer guarantee the establishment the results that it wanted in an election. It made it obvious to even the most dull-wilted observer of the political scene that the feudals, with a few exceptions, were the political hostages of their haris.

Under martial law, the feudals of Sind lost their political power, and having lost their hold on their peasantry as well, a search for a new relationship with the establishment began. The new middle class also suffered, as it no longer enjoyed the patronage of the state. The socioeconomic change which had begun in the mid-sixties continued, but in the absence of politics no interaction between the various classes and the establishment was possible, and hence there were no modifications and adjustments in the administration to accommodate change. The gulf between the people and the state increased and with it, inefficiency, corruption, unemployment and lawlessness.

Things came to a head during the MRD movement of 1983. The feudals and the middle class joined hands, but as the movement developed, it became obvious that the middle class had much more political backing than was envisaged. It was not a coincidence that the, greatest confrontation took place in the expanding market towns of Moro and Qazi Ahmed, and in traditionally backward areas where change had been the most rapid, such as Dadu and Mehar.

The impotence of the administration to deal with the “law and order” situation arising out of the movement was clearly demonstrated, even in areas where it had full feudal support. As a result, it lost whatever little credibility it still had. Subsequent arms action in certain areas of Sind forced a number of activists to seek refuge in the forests with dacoits. It is rumoured that they tried to politicise the dacoits, but in the process were either Iiquidated by them or became dacoits themselves.

The collapse of the administration, the power demonstrated by the middle-class, the growing law and order situation, all created a sense of insecurity in the feudals of Sind, and as a result it became necessary for them to keep a much larger number of armed retainers than they had previously required. Since the impotence of the administration had been demonstrated, disputes common to rural life began to be settled through the power of the gun. Thus, there are areas where the age-old system of getting water by “wara,” or turn, has been done away with. The landlord with the most guns had his way.

Such a situation has its own dynamics. The number of guns required to keep one landlord ahead of the other increases every day. The Afghan connection caters to this need and the Kalashnikov has become a common sight in Sind. Many gangs, originally formed only to protect landlords, have now also taken to dacoity, and they terrorise the population. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that it is not uncommon to see local MPAs driving around surrounded by three or four jeeploads of armed men, many of them with guns of a prohibited bore.

This situation makes it difficult for government functionaries to assess land revenue or abiana. In certain cases where revenue has not been paid, the government finds it impossible to take any action for its recovery. It is commonly believed that government officials have developed cordial relations with the new power in Sind, the dacoits, and in the present conditions it would be unnatural to expect otherwise.

Small landlords, businessmen and professionals who cannot command guns to protect themselves are regularly kidnapped and held for ransom, with the result that they are moving out of the area. Some political people in Larkana see in this forced exodus of capital and business an attempt at the reassertion of feudalism.

But the peasant cannot leave. Nor can the small trader or artisan. Nor can the doctors and engineers who belong to the villages, for they cannot get jobs anywhere else in the country. The feudal system which once linked their parents to the establishment is on its last legs. The political activity of the seventies, which did the same thing, is dead and buried. So to fill the void created by the death of previous institutions many villages have formed organisations and got them registered as welfare associations. Their elected office-bearers lobby with government organisations for the establishment of schools, dispensaries, roads, bridges, water supply and sanitation. They contact NGOs and concerned professionals for technical help and assistance. They look after law and order in the village and its environs. Some of them have even set up health and education services themselves, and run them partially at their own cost. In some cases they have also captured the union council, defeating the wadera of the area.

These village associations are few and far between. However, their number is bound to increase rapidly as they are, for the present, the only hope of consolidating change and creating new relationships which reflect the existing socio-economic situation. They fully realise that the key to their success lies in their capturing the union councils.

Meanwhile, the situation in Sind will steadily get worse, until the demise of feudalism is institutionalised, and the new classes that have emerged are accommodated politically: an accommodation which will have to be in proportion to their power.