The MQM Factor
For the first time since the creation of Pakistan, the Urdu-speaking Sindhis, or mohajirs as they are called, have sought to identify themselves with the larger interests of Sind. Their new leadership, born and bred in Sind, has declared that the people of their province have a prior claim on the resources, jobs, business opportunities and educational facilities of the province. It has even been suggested that there is a need for the redefining of Sind’s relationship with the centre.
Also for the first time since the creation of Pakistan, the original Sindhis have accepted the refugee population as an integral part of Sind’s political make-up. There is a realisation that no meaningful change is possible in the province without the involvement of the urban areas, which constitute 40 percent of Sind’s population and are dominated by the Urdu-speaking Sindhis.
This change of attitudes in the two predominant groups of the province, their differences notwithstanding, is bound to have far-reaching repercussions, not only on the politics of Sind, but for national politics as well. To understand these repercussions it is essential to understand the Punjab situation and its relationship to Sind, and the background of the current movements in both the Sindhi and Urdu speaking populations.
Contrary to some oft-promoted views, the Punjab is not a feudal society. At the turn of the century, the British created the largest system of irrigation in the world in central Punjab and transformed hundreds of thousands of acres of desert wasteland into green fields. Peasants from the more populous East Punjab were settled there. As a result, agriculture came to be controlled not by big feudal lords but by middle peasants and small landlords. The creation of such a large agricultural community almost overnight necessitated the development of transport, markets, middlemen, banking institutions and a system of administration for revenue collection and government.
The development of these institutions, along with educational institutions, was undertaken by the government. As the land was colonised by immigrant peasants at the government’s initiative, the only authority to which the peasants owed allegiance was the government itself. Although clan and sub-clan ‘chaudhries’ did exist, the nature of their control over their people was very different from that of the waderas of Sind, the maliks of the Frontier or the sardars of Baluchistan, who exercised control over the means of production as well. Thus the social and physical mobility of the Punjab peasantry was ensured.
For the setting up of such an enormous irrigation system, the British imported managerial, engineering and artisanal skills from eastern Punjab. Workshops and training centres were set up for the locals as well. Thus, in a period of twenty years over 100,000 steel fabricators, masons, carpenters, surveyors, mechanics, site supervisors, managers and contractors were created. The centres where they were trained continued to train people for the operation and maintenance of the irrigation system. It is for these reasons that we find Punjabi artisans, especially welders and fabricators, working all over India in the 1920s, and the growth of a light engineering industry in Lahore and Gujrat at the turn of the century.
Given these conditions, and in the absence of a sound political programme, it was natural that the Punjab quickly took over control of the civil administration in Pakistan, and its bureaucrats and policemen controlled the administration in the smaller provinces as well: Punjabi artisans, contractors and managers had already moved into Sind for the construction of the Sukkur Barrage in the 1930s, and stayed on to manage and operate the new irrigation works. In addition, a large number of Punjabis settled on the barrage lands at that time.
Ayub Khan’s green revolution of the 1960s had a major impact on the Punjab. The introduction of new varieties of wheat and rice, the installation of 25,000 tube-wells, the mechanisation of agriculture and the government’s liberal financial support for these programme resulted in an increase in the annual compound rate of growth from slightly over 1 percent in the ‘50s to 5 percent in the ‘60s.
However, this green revolution resulted in the “capitalisation” of agriculture. As loans were available only to large farmers – since they alone could provide the necessary guarantees – the condition of the small farmers deteriorated. As a result, they had to sell their land to their larger neighbours. Because of mechanisation, the numbers of landless labour and rural unemployed also increased rapidly. This capitalisation of agriculture generated large profits for the big farmers and they invested a major part of these into the urban economy. It is estimated that in 1964-65 alone Rs 3600 million, or 15 percent of the gross output, were transferred from the rural to urban areas. Due to these reasons people were forced to move from the rural areas of the Punjab to the cities.
As a result of this “green revolution”, a major political upheaval should have taken place in the Punjab; that it did not is due to four factors. One, with money from the rural areas, Punjabi artisanal skills and entrepreneurship expanded its base and a small scale engineering industry mushroomed to cater to the complex needs of capitalistic agriculture. This industry expanded in other directions and as a result industries for surgical instruments, electronics and other consumer items were also created. These industries owed nothing to government policies and one can say that they were created in spite of them. Two, the size of the Pakistan army increased rapidly and a large number of Punjabis were accommodated in the armed forces. Since the armed forces are financed by federal revenues, it can be argued that all the areas of Pakistan participated in financing jobs for the Punjab. Three, Punjabis migrated in a big way to Europe and the Middle East where their skills were in great demand. And four, the Punjab expanded into Sind.
All the barrage lands, many hundred thousand acres of them, which were developed in Sind during the Ayub era were parcelled out to Punjabi farmers or to the civil and military bureaucracy, who imported peasants from the Punjab to operate them. In addition, Punjabi artisanal skills and trading interests related to the agricultural sector and its new technologies established themselves firmly in Sind’s rural areas. In government services in Sind the number of Punjabis increased, and when One Unit was disbanded in 1969, seventeen thousand Punjabi government servants were absorbed in Sind’s provincial services. The Karachi job market accommodated the educated Punjabi and the middle and upper echelons of autonomous and semi-government organisations came to be manned by them. In the 1970s, Karachi’s building industry experienced a boom, and Punjabi contractors, masons, lohars and carpenters migrated in large numbers to the city. In recent years it is the Punjabi trader and industrialist who has, through official patronage, increased in number to become a controlling force in the Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
This expansion was made possible not only because the policy makers and administrators were Punjabis, but also because the feudal of Sind, who were their political allies, were anxious to prevent the development of a Sindhi speaking middle class in the rural areas, which would challenge their power. In addition, the Urdu speaking Sindhis continued to support the policies of the centre as the continuation of the status quo in rural Sind left them, along with the Punjabis, in virtual control of the job market in Sind and the province’s trading activities.
The policies of the Bhutto era brought about fundamental changes in the socio-economic situation of Sind. For one thing, the feudal, instead of being the allies of the civil and military bureaucracy, became its partners in government. Within a few years, a Sindhi speaking middle class emerged and in rural Sind, roads, telecommunications, development agencies, banks insurance companies and small agro-based industries, many manned by Sindhi speaking Sindhis, came into being. In the professional institutions in the province such as the bar, engineering and medical associations, a strong Sindhi speaking lobby emerged, and in the universities Sindhi speaking teachers and students multiplied rapidly.
The emergence of this middle class strengthened the national movement in Sind and introduced new life into organisations long engaged in trying to preserve, protect and promote Sind’s unique cultural and linguistic heritage. In the official media, the use of Sindhi increased and an effective Sindhi press was reborn after years of suppression and struggle. The feudal tolerated these development – though with suspicion – as they saw themselves as supervising this change and felt that only by supporting it could they continue to control the voting power of the rural areas.
In the years of its expansion during the Bhutto era the new Sindhi speaking middle class came into conflict with well-entrenched mohajir interests in the professions, government offices and educational institutions. To a great extent, it was able to overcome this conflict successfully because it had the establishment’s support both at the centre and at the provincial level. Its accommodation in the power structure, however, was totally at the expense of the Urdu speaking Sindhi, and not at the expense of the Punjabi, whose influence and power in Sind continued to grow. The political relationship between the two groups was one of suspicion and conflict, and after the establishment of martial law it became worse, the Sindhis having supported the Pakistan People’s Party and the mohajirs the Pakistan National Alliance.
With the coup of July 5, 1977, the Sindhi feudal lost their political power and the Sindhi speaking middle class the patronage of that power. Rural Sind was orphaned and in its search for a solution to its isolation it sought to recreate the situation of the Bhutto era by supporting the four points of the MRD. During the 1983 movement, the feudal and the Sindhi speaking middle class joined hands for the restoration of democracy. The ‘failure’ of the movement, the non-participation in it of Sind’s urban areas and the Punjab, and the subsequent understanding between Sind’s feudal and the establishment, forced the Sindhi speaking middle class to review its politics.
New attitude surfaced and the middle class leadership in rural Sind acquired a respectability and power it had never had before, much to the concern of the old feudal leadership. There was a growing awareness that for the success of any movement in Sind, in the near future at least, the involvement of Sind’s urban areas was essential. It also became clear that though an alliance with the feudal was essential for the promotion of nationalist interests in Sind, there was at the same time a conflict of interests with the feudal system, and that only by institutionalising its demise could real democracy be established and the middle class come to power.
In addition, there was a realisation that the main support to the feudal system in Sind came from the civil and military bureaucracy and, due to present government policies, from the expanding commercial, land and job interests of the Punjab, which still needed room to grow. Although these sentiments had been expressed by the more radical sections of Sindhi nationalists over the past two decades, it was only after 1983 that they became mass political attitudes. Thus, a search for new political allies has begun and the Urdu speaking Sindhi is being sounded out cautiously. Already, in various organisations such as the Sind Unity Board, citizens peace committees in Karachi and the Sind Graduates Association, the two groups sit together to talk, as they have a unity of interests. In the recent gathering at Sann to celebrate the birthday of G.M. Syed, the possibility of an understanding between the Sindhi and Urdu speaking Sindhis was discussed. It is not surprising that the feudal sections of the gathering (represented by Hamida Khuhro) considered the Urdu speaking Sindhis to be their main enemies, while the middle class sections (represented by Abdul Wahid Aresar) considered them to be their natural allies.
The Urdu speaking Sindhis who nominate the life of the urban areas of the province are the only group in Pakistan who have never been a part of the feudal or tribal system in the country. The hard core of this group consists of white collar workers, school and university teachers, journalists, professionals and petty traders. In addition, a substantial amount of artisanal skill has also developed in them and the majority of small unregistered manufacturing units in the Karachi and Hyderabad katchi abadis of middle income areas are owned and operated by them. Some of them are also middle level businessmen and industrialists.
Given their background and occupational structure, their politics has been governed by a fear of regionalism, competition in the white collar job market and, more recently, government policies related to trade and industry. Due to these considerations they have, until recently, attached themselves to Islam pasand parties which recognise no nationalities in Pakistan, and have supported the pro-feudal policies of the civil and military bureaucracy so as to prevent the emergence of a Sindhi speaking middle class. At the same time, being non-feudal, they have attached themselves with fervour to national movements demanding democratic rights. However, their political involvements have always ended in increased disillusionment as one cannot succeed in the struggle for democracy by supporting feudalism and a concept of Pakistan in which oppression plays an integral part.
During the Bhutto era, due to the expansion of the Sindhi speaking middle class and the system of weightage and political patronage in its favour, the Urdu speakers felt isolated. They failed to understand that this weightage (the notorious quota system) was necessary to promote the interests of a traditionally discriminated group in the province. This lack of understanding was promoted by the arrogance of the ruling party officials and by the leaders of parties the mohajirs had voted for, who, due to their party interests in the rest of the country, could not take up their grievances. Also, the mohajir trading and industrial interests suffered as a result of the policies of the Bhutto government.
Consequently, in 1977 the Urdu speaking urban Sindhi became the vanguard of the PNA movement against the PPP. From the PNA platform he was assured a better, corruption-free administration and a society where quotas and weightages would be done away with, and where Islamic brotherhood would replace regionalism and nationalities. He was assured that there would be freedom of press and expression and that, with the new economic policies, numerous job opportunities would open. He was told that his cities, especially Karachi, would acquire urban services and no one would remain homeless.
However, all this was not to be. After the establishment of martial law the system of quotas and weightage continued and through new regulations a certain percentage of jobs were set aside for retired army officials. A large number of seats in the academic institutions were also reserved for nominees of the civil and military bureaucracy. Because of the patronage of army officials the Sind job market began to cater increasingly to outsiders.
Instead of the emergence of Islamic brotherhood there was the growth of regionalism, and instead of freedom there was oppression. The cities of Sind were neglected and the only development in health and education was an exploitative, incompetent and, for the vast majority, unaffordable private sector. The transport system was handed over to a mafia and the administration became the tool of major financial concerns, whose interests clashed with those of the people.
A white collar class backed by professionals and teachers cannot constitute a political movement. Whenever the urban areas of Sind have participated ‘successfully’ in a political movement they have had the full support of the bazaars and the small entrepreneurs in the cities. Both these have also been badly affected by the policies of the Zia government. The profits of the bazaar have declined because of the emergence of markets full of cheap smuggled goods, controlled by outsiders. Profit margins have also fallen because of having to cater to corrupt excise and police officials and, in many areas, to the local musclemen. In addition, dacoities on the roads are common, making the movement of goods difficult and expensive and markets, especially in the smaller towns, are forced to close before nightfall.
The policies of the present government have also adversely affected the interests of both the formal and informal sector small entrepreneurs. The import and export policies of the government have withdrawn all protection for goods made in Pakistan and so the goods manufactured by Karachi’s light engineering industry, for example, have been replaced by Japanese, Taiwanese and Chinese products. Again, the import of raw materials for the manufacture of industrial goods has been placed in a few hands and these monopolies only increase the price of raw materials by creating artificial shortages. Similarly, exports are also controlled by a few business houses who dictate their terms to the producer. In addition, there are constant power failures, rampant corruption and excessive taxation. The Karachi industrial sector has been so badly mauled by the pro-commerce policies of the government that it is trying to create a new chamber of industry in the city, thus reducing the present Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry to simply a chamber of commerce. This move is being resisted by the bureaucracy and by business houses not only in Sind, but all over Pakistan.
The PNA leadership which the Urdu speaking Sindhis supported in the anti-Bhutto movement has, over the years, allied itself with the Zia government and is seen by its former supporters as a party to the ‘conspiracy’ against them. In addition, the major leftist parties have not bothered to try to understand the class nature of the Urdu speaking Sindhi and his Gujrati speaking allies – probably because it does not fit in with their text-book approach to the class question in Pakistan. Also, the major national parties, who are still tied to the apron strings of the feudal and the establishment, have not presented the kind of programmes of national development with which Sind’s urban population can identify itself.
In these circumstances, new political attitudes have also surfaced among the Urdu speaking Sindhis. There is a realisation that their old leadership has always been an agent of large feudal and business interests and has used them to protect the status quo. There is an understanding now that the concept of Pakistan which they have supported in the past is meant only for protecting the privileges of the civil and military bureaucracy and its feudal and monopoly capitalist allies, and that in the present political make-up in Pakistan they cannot be the beneficiaries of such a concept.
After the failure of the 1983 MRD movement, the Urdu speaking middle class came of age, and it realised its own importance in the politics of Sind. It also realised that the cake of Sind was not big enough for the whole of Pakistan and if it had to be shared, it could only be shared with its rightful owners, the original Sindhis. These attitudes were further strengthened after the recent Karachi and Hyderabad riots and the administration’s indifference to the plight of Sind’s urban centres.
Thus, there is a remarkable similarity between the political attitudes of the Sindhi and Urdu speaking middle classes in the province. Both are anti-feudal and anti-capitalist. Both suffer from unemployment in their ranks and as such feel that the people of Sind should have priority over Sind’s resources, jobs, business opportunities and land. Both have come of age, for instead of being hangers-on of feudal and capitalists they now have a powerful lower-middle class leadership whose feet are firmly entrenched in the soil.
These similarities should, under normal circumstances, bring them closer together and consolidate the middle class revolution in Sind, resulting in a redefining of the province’s relationship with the centre. However, this may not be so, for there are serious differences between them as well, in addition to powerful internal and external enemies.
The demand for the recognition of a mohajir nationality has upset the Sindhi speaking population. They feel that the acceptance of this demand may be the first step towards the bifurcation of Sind and creation of a mohajir province. In addition, in the absence of adequate weightage in their favour, the Sindhi speaking Sindhis will be swamped out of administration, jobs, business and industry by the better-educated mohajirs. To negotiate a formula for sharing power, or even for cooperation in the present political environment, where the recognition of a mohajir nationality is being pressed for, is a very difficult matter.
Apart from these considerations, the coming together of these two middle classes will be fatal for the interests of the civil and military bureaucracy, the feudals of Sind and the big business interests of the country. Given present government policies, the smaller business interests in the Punjab and sections of the Punjabi middle class will also be affected. Therefore, it is possible that to sabotage the middle class revolution in Sind, these vested interests will try to promote the ‘Karachi Suba’ concept, thus giving a few more years to the present system. It is also possible that sections of the urban leadership may, under pressure, accept the creation of this ‘suba’, only to discover that without the rest of Sind they are far poorer and much less important than before.
The Sind situation is a part of a larger crisis in Pakistan. Its solution lies in doing away with the system of ‘batai’, thus institutionalising the end of feudalism, and in protecting and promoting the considerable production capabilities of the small entrepreneurs and artisans in the cities. It must be understood that these entrepreneurs in Karachi, Hyderabad, Darra Adam Khel (where they manufacture guns) and in the towns of the Punjab, have sufficient managerial and technical skills to have survived a system of government that, through its economic and administrative policies, has constantly persecuted them. Only by releasing this tremendous production potential from captivity can a stable economy capable of providing jobs and facilities to the people of all provinces be developed in the post-feudal era.
