Keynote for Karachi Conference 2013

If the 2011 pre-census house count is to be believed then Karachi is the fastest growing city in the world. Between 1998 and 2011, its population more than doubled from about 10 million to over 20 million ¹. No city in history has grown so much in so short a time. Given this demographic change, it is difficult to talk about the cities fascinating past, conflict ridden present and without doubt a prosperous future and bring it altogether. However, I will try and link the three together.

To begin with I will try and question some commonly held views regarding the city’s origins and identify some aspects of its evolution that need to be further studied. I will then come to the causes for its present turmoil and then to a possible future.

It is generally believed that Karachi was a small fishing village before the British conquest and that its name has been derived from Kolachi, a Baluch tribe. Settlements by the name Kolachi exist all over Pakistan with different pre and suffixes. If we take Karachi as the district, then it has stone-age, Neolithic and Indus valley sites. But some may say that is not Karachi. So, I will restrict myself to talking about the area consisting of the colonial city and its suburbs and the port.

Karachi was established as a fortified trading settlement in 1729 on 35 acres. This fact is well-known and documented in great detail in Naomal Hotchand’s autobiography². The site for the settlement was carefully chosen for it strategic location. To the north of the fortification was the Lyari River, to the south a Mangrove marshes, and to the west was the sea. Thus, the fort could only be attacked successfully from the Sea and for that gun boats were required. According to Naomal Hotchand, the site chosen was called Dibro and it had a few huts on it. To its north-west was a pool of water known as Kolachi jo kun. It should not be difficult to identify the location of this pool.

At the time of the British conquest, Karachi contained 34 temples, 21 mosques, 13 shrines and 30 sea going ships and more than a 100 other big boats. It also contained gambling dens, a custom house and a well-established system of taxation and governance. Its economy was dependent on trade, most of it was export related and in 1842 this export was over Rs 2.5 million. This trade was with Africa, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and with the ports on the western coast of India. The population at the time of the British Conquest was about 15,000 and this does not include the population of its “extensive suburbs” ³. This, Karachi was not a small fishing village by any accepted standards of categorizing settlements.

The settlement was created in 1729. But within what is today its “metropolitan area” there were already important places of Hindu and Muslim worship and pilgrimage. According to folklore, the Maha Dev Temple in Clifton is mentioned in the Mahabharat; the Punjmukhi Hanuman Maharaj Mandir in Soldier Bazaar was built in the 7th century and we know are told that the Krishna Mandir in Manora was built in 1665.

There are also a number of pre-1729 Muslim shrines within the Karachi metropolitan area. These include those of Syed Noor Ali Shah at Teen Hatti (8th century); Abdullah Shah Ghazi and Yousuf Shah Ghazi at Clifton and Manora respectively (9th century); Pir Hasan Ghazi Shah at Judia Bazaar (10th century); Noor Ali Shah Ghazi at Bombay Bazaar (10th century); and Haji Sukhi Sultan Manghopir at Manghopir (13th century) ⁴.

Many of these pre-1729 temples and shrines are located on the periphery of the old city and many of them are on mounds. The old city is also on a mound. Given the geology of the areas around these mounds, one can easily conclude that they are artificial. Given the proximity of places of worship and pilgrimage to the old city, it has been my belief that older settlements lie under the Karachi Fort or the old city quarters as the fort area is currently referred to.

There is also some controversy regarding the origin of the name of the city. It is generally believed that it is derived from Kolachi. Folklore also supports this view. In Sur Ghato Shah Abdul Lateef uses the name of Kolachi for the area where the Moroereo legend was enacted in the creeks and bays of Karachi. Moroereo is buried in Manghopir and his brothers in Gul Bai. Their descendants live in the coastal villages of Karachi where every year the protagonists of the legend are remembered through festivities and by the rendering of Sur Ghato in different forms ⁵.

The earliest mention of the Moroereo legend in literature is in a Persian text of the 11th century ⁶. The incident occurred at the time of Raja Diborai whose capital, according to local folklore, was at Bath Island. British texts of the 19th century mention extensive remains of a settlement at Bath Island. This is probably now buried under the government officers’ residences.

Folklore has to be respected. However, the name Karachi and its variants have been used since ancient times for the Bay of Karachi. In Pehlavi texts (230 BC), it is mentioned as Kharachhi; ⁷ in the 16th century Arabic and Turkish texts the name of the Bay has been mentioned as Karazi, Rasal Karazi and Kaurashi. In Kalhora records it is mentioned as Kharachar and in records of the Khan of Kalat as Kalati Bunder ⁸.

The term Ramaia has also been used in British and Greek texts for the area that constitutes Karachi today. There are reasons for the use of this term. Again according to local folklore, Rama and Sita visited Hinglarj after Sita had been rescued from Ravan. On their way to Hinglarj, the spent a night on the site of what eventually became Ram Bagh. Today, the name has been changed to Aram Bagh. There is a need to do more research on the origins of the name and its meaning. Such research will add to the history of Karachi and open up many more avenues for further research.

There are other events on which much further research is required. One such event is the rebellion against British rule in 1857. This rebellion was led by Ramdin Pandey, a subedar in the East-India Company army. He was from Baraley and he along with his comrades was blown from the mouth of cannons. These executions took place at where the High Court and the Empress Market stand today. A large number of the rebels were exiled to Kala Pani where the vast majority of them died and are buried there. Members of the Hindu community living in Chanesar Goth were among those who were sent to Kala Pani ⁹. There is a legend among them that where the rebels were executed, flowers would miraculously appear every morning at Empress Market, much to the embarrassment of the British rulers. Subsequently, the Empress Market was built over the site and the flowers stopped appearing. Very little have been written about this rebellion except for news items in the newspaper Sindh Qasid of that time and a new book in Urdu written by Khawaja Aslam ¹⁰. However, I have been informed that there is considerable material including the names of the martyrs and of the persons sent to Kala Pani.

A number of things came together to create the post-British conquest Karachi. One was physical infrastructure: The Port, the Railways and the Punjab and Sindh irrigation systems. The story of the Port lies concealed in the Karachi and Bombay Port Trust archives and it awaits a book. The story of the Railways lies in the British library, out of reach to most local scholars. The story of the canal colonies has been told by Imran Ali ¹¹ and Syed Ali Naqvi ¹² in their books. However, more focus on how the perennial irrigation systems affected Karachi is needed along with their link with the development of the Port and Railways.

There are other important events that have impacted on the development of the city. One of these was the American Civil War (1861-65). Before the war American cotton was used in the textile industry in Europe. Due to the war, it was no longer available and so the British promoted the cultivation of cotton in the Punjab and Sindh. This cotton was exported from Karachi and made the city the largest exporter of this material by 1868. Thanks to the development of perennial irrigation in Sindh and Punjab and the Railways linking Karachi with its hinterland, the city also became the largest exporter of wheat in India by 1870 ¹³.

Another major event was the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. Before this, the ships from Europe had to circumvent the Cape of Good Hope for reaching India. In this process, they bypassed Karachi. With the opening of the Canal, Karachi became the first port of call for ships coming through the Suez Canal to India.

The opening of the Canal and the increased production of cotton and wheat for international markets created investment and job opportunities in the city’s expanding economy. As a result, Gujrati speaking businessmen; Parsi investors; Memon shopkeepers; Goan educationalists and white-collar workers; Kutchi potters and fishermen; and Salwati masons; migrated to the city in large numbers. This changed the demography of Karachi pushing the older residents such as the Kalmatis, Jolhios, Numaris and Lassis of the rural areas of the city into the background.

The story of Karachi’s strategic importance has however been written about and discussed in considerable detail but how this strategic importance and the city’s role in the British-Afghan wars and in the First and Second World wars impacted on its physical and social development is still an untold story.

The demographic, cultural and political impact of Partition on the city has been discussed in detail and from different points of view. However, the social and demographic repercussions of Karachi’s separation from Sindh from 1948 to 1969 have not been discussed. If Karachi had remained the capital of Sindh instead of its being shifted to Hyderabad, I feel we would be living in a different city today and most of the younger Urdu speakers would also be speaking Sindhi. I often wonder what I and my family, and those of my close Sindhi friends, would be like today if this separation had not taken place.

There is also, especially in my generation, a nostalgia for the pre-1977 Karachi of night clubs, cabarets, discos, and bars. Many persons say that I am responsible for promoting this nostalgia by documenting what existed before Islamisation transformed Karachi. I am willing to take the blame. However, it has to be understood that this culture was one of a colonial port city governed by a colonial created elite who were the custodians of this culture. In my view, it could not possibly have lasted given the emergence of populist politics.

Neighbourhoods under Empire were ethnic and clan based and the province and the city was governed by a powerful neutral umpire. Hence, there was peace. With freedom movements came politics and with politics ethnic and class conflicts emerged along with battles for turf. All freedom movements have had a strong element of radicalism, progressive thinking and activism. The same is true for Karachi. The migrant intellectuals who came to Karachi at Partition from India were progressives. They had no problem with debating descent and enjoying the colonial port culture. Karachi’s social and entertainment functions, along with its intellectual debates, were enhanced because of them and fed into the city’s political discourse.

Diversity is very often the first casualty of democracy. Under Colonial Rule, different communities could live together since there were no political interests apart from freedom from colonial rule. With politics, different interests clash and cannot be accommodated unless there is institutional space for consensus building. Such space was not available in Karachi due to constitutional deviations and military interventions.

The conflict against the port city colonial culture in Karachi began soon after partition. It gained strength over time. It surfaced in a big way in the PPP-PNA divide of 1977 leading to the end of Karachi’s night life, entertainment industry, bars and the culture of dance and music. It also led to the establishment of Zia’s dictatorship.

In Karachi in the Zia era, dictatorship and its ideology suppressed all other forms of thinking and living. This story has not been told, neither from the point of view of the elite or the working classes. I will talk about it for it is important to understand the Karachi of today.

My research shows that it is more than possible that if the democratic process had continued, then through a process of negotiation and pragmatic give and take, a new culture, the synthesis between the cultures of the two political opponents, could have evolved though less liberal than before. Discussions between the operators of the banned entertainment facilities, political opponents of the Bhutto regime, and the Karachi establishment, were already taking place before Ziaul Haq’s military coup of July 1977, made any such compromises impossible.

Here, it is important to look at how the policies of the Zia government, aided by the Afghan War, have shaped the Karachi of today. Soon after coming to power, the Zia government began the process of consolidating the hold of the religious parties on the Pakistan state and society. The majority of his cabinet was composed of members of the religious parties who had led the anti-fahashi (vulgarity) and ayashi (corruption) movement against the Bhutto government.

To “Islamise” society and introduce piety, zohar prayers were made compulsory in government institutions and space was provided for them. This was also adopted by many non-government and private organisations so as to seek favour with the government in power, and also to satisfy the demands of their newly empowered “religious” members. In addition, zakat and ushr were made compulsory. This was resisted by the Shia community in whose fiqh zakat is voluntary. A major Shia-Sunni disagreement took place over this issue and finally it was decided that the Shia community would not pay compulsory zakat. Through the Zohar prayers and zakat enactment, Pakistanis working together came to recognise each other as Shia, Sunni, Ahmedi, Christian or Hindu. This set in motion a process of discrimination and fragmentation.

However, the most serious repercussions of the policies of the Zia government were related to education. Extra curricula activities in public sector high schools, colleges and universities were banned and so were the student’s unions that had produced Pakistan’s most radical and democratic leadership, outstanding journalists, literary figures and sportsmen and women. As a result, music, drama, film and political and cultural events vanished (even sports) completely from Karachi’s educational institutions. Debates were permitted but their subjects had to be approved by the areas’ deputy commissioner and later by the institutions administration. Overtime the subjects of the debates became increasingly related to Islamic ritual and theology rather than Islamic history and current social and political issues. The private sector institutions (except some for elite ones), under pressure from the government and its supporters, also discontinued all extra curricula activities. A case in point is the Pakistan cricket team. Previously, it was drawn from the universities and colleges of the country but due to the banning of extra curricula activities, it is today drawn from the street. This is not to de-migrate the present cricket team which is in many ways superior to that of the pre-Zia eras.

School and college curriculums were also revised. At the high school level, the teaching of international history and geography were discontinued. Pakistan Studies and Islamiat courses were restructured and considered sufficient for an understanding of global issues. An evaluation of the curriculum of these subjects, identifies that it was insensitive to the religious diversity of Pakistan, that it incited the students to militancy and violence and encouraged bigotry and discrimination towards fellow citizens (especially women and religious minorities) and towards other nations. It also glorified war and the use of force ¹⁴.

Budgets for cultural activity and related institutions were drastically curtailed and important institutions like the PIA Arts Academy, NEFDEC and Lok Versa simply became paper organisations. State patronage to the urs of Sufi saints and folk heroes (in vogue since pre-British time) was withdrawn and banning music at these festivals was unsuccessfully attempted. Under the new media policy, classical music and dance was banned on radio and television and folk music was discouraged. Meanwhile, a long list of prominent writers and thinkers was drawn up and their appearance on television and radio, along with the poetry and songs of progressive poets and musicians, was also banned. Suleman Shah was a famous Sindhi folk singer. He sang with ghunghroos on his wrists which he played while he sang and danced. He was not allowed to wear the ghunghroos on television since they were not considered appropriate for a man. However, he continued to sing without them. I encountered him at an airport lounge. I did not know him but I went up to him and said that I missed his ghunghroos. He put his arms around me and wept and said “I have to put up with this disgrace for the sake of my stomach”. I also wept with him.

At the neighbourhood level, a system of Nazim-e-Salaat was introduced. The nazim was an individual appointed by the local mosque. He roamed the neighbourhood at dawn informing people through a microphone, that it was time for prayer and that they should come to the mosque. People who did not come were contacted politely in the evening and requested to attend prayers. Again, as a result, the fiqh of different households was identified and the distances between neighbours of different religious systems, increased, especially true in low and lower middle income settlements.

Political parties in the Zia era could not hand out patronage since politics of the era was all about the “restoration of democracy”. In the absence of politics, people turned to their ethnic and clan relationships for patronage. Since power lay with the religious establishment, the clan and ethnic organisations had to seek its support. This strengthened the religious establishment further.

Due to the enactments of the Zia era, the religious establishment became the custodian of public morality. In lower and lower middle income neighbourhoods and on the city’s public space and institutions, they were able to impose their will. Schools of music and dance, which were common before the Zia era, closed down (4 in Saddar). All left to work abroad except for notable exceptions, such as the Tehreek-i-Niswan. Theatre performances vanished or could only be held for the elite and upper middle classes in the cultural centres of foreign missions such as the Goethe Institute and Pak American Cultural Centre. The new culture created enormous problems for working women (since working was discouraged by state supported neighbourhood communities), and they disappeared as waitresses, chamber maids in hotels and as entertainers. In 1977 Karachi had 123 cinemas. They were reduced to 22 by 1989 ¹⁵.

Pakistan’s elite and upper middle classes are “westernised” but because of their enmity to Bhutto’s “socialist” populism they supported the Zia government. However, they could not approve of the changes that were taking place in the institutions where their children studied. Consequently, they stopped sending their children to public sector universities and colleges as a result of which these institutions ceased to be multi-class. They also stopped participating in public life and visiting museums, zoos and multi-class public spaces. They created their own world separate from the rest of Karachi and depoliticised themselves. The removal of the elite from the public sphere resulted in a decline in standards of education and in the maintenance and growth of public sector real estate and recreational facilities. In the process Karachi was deprived of the possibility of acquiring an aware and interested elite, which is an enormous asset for an expanding and developing metropolis. The elite as a class are no longer elite, they have become just rich people uninterested and uninformed about rest of the city.

The Zia era coincided with the period of urban consolidation for many cities, similar in many ways to Karachi, in South and South-East Asia. These cities during the period of the Zia era developed effective state institutions that have been able to cater to the needs of a young population (living increasingly in a cosmopolitan world) as an alternative to the system of patronage by clan and religion based groups. They have been able to support the evolution of new social values and freedoms for their societies that were in the process of freeing themselves from feudal influences and retrogressive traditions. Karachi too in 1977 was in a similar position. However, due to Zia’s religious populism and the politics of the Afghan War, this did not happen in Karachi. New institutions were not created but the old ones were destroyed. Emerging social values were suppressed and monolithic and retrogressive norms were imposed on the city destroying its diversity, leading to its fragmentation and to suspicion and conflict between its different religious and ethnic groups. These trends were, and still are, promoted by the politics and culture of the Afghan War and the left over policies of the Zia era. The progressives, meanwhile, have not only been hounded out but replaced.

The movement against Zia was for the restoration of democracy (for the vote) and not against the culture of his regime. As such, the governments following him and society at large have remained hostage to the state culture and its formal and informal institutions that he created.

The institutions created by Zia have grown with the regional conflicts that surround us and Karachi’s pivotal role in them. The war economy, NATO, contraband, heroine, Afghan transit trade, its operators and clients, and the proxies of various regional and international interests control the city. Their businesses determine the shape of the city. These are issues that are well-known and openly discussed. Much of my research revolves around this and I have spoken so often about it. So, I will not elaborate on them except to say that they have undermined the institutions of governance leading to the condition we face on a daily basis.

But, meanwhile, what has happened to the city? It is now four distinct cities. One is the central business district and its working class (mainly Baloch and Kutchi neighbourhoods) dominated by Gujrati speaking businessmen and shopkeepers. Two, the inner crescent consisting of Urdu speakers with increasing middle class migrants from Sindh. Three, the outer crescent consisting of working class settlements separated from each other on the basis of ethnicity and religion and consisting of a large and increasing minority of Pushto speakers. Finally, the elite areas of cooperative societies, Defence and Clifton. Sindhi goths are scattered all over these four “cities” and are being absorbed into them through various forms of coercion.

These really are different cities having different modes of transport arrangements, different types of educational institutions, houses, commercial centres and even economies. They do not interact and share common public spaces apart from the beach and a few parks far away from where most low income groups live. Even voting patterns are different as shown by the work of Haris Gazdar ¹⁶.

This absence of interaction is a major constraint for the development of appropriate professional curriculum and practice and as a result there is major gap between the reality of the city and the perception and work of its academics and professional institutions. Because of this, there is a strong though unwitting anti-poor bias in policy and planning.

Government and NGO developed statistics also define the physical and social situation of the city. For instance, eighty percent of Karachiites live in plots of 120 square yards or less. Houses on plots of 400 to 2,000 square yards account for only 2 percent of the housing stock. However, they occupy 20 percent of Karachi’s residential area. In addition, 36.7 percent of Karachi’s land is utilised for residential purposes. 27 percent have been developed formally and 8.1 percent informally. 62 percent of Karachi’s population lives on the 8.1 percent informally developed land ¹⁷. These figures show the level of inequity and discrimination in policy and planning against the poorer sections of the population and this is an important cause of Karachi’s conflicts and violence.

Yet, Karachi is a rich city. It contains 32 percent of the total industrial establishment of Pakistan; generates 15 percent of the country’s GDP; 25 percent of federal revenues and 62 percent of income tax. 74.8 percent of Sindh’s total industrial output is produced in Karachi and it generates 78 percent of formal private sector jobs in the province. The conflict between the MQM and the PPP on the local government structure for Karachi is really a conflict over the control of the city’s enormous resources. The MQM wants a decentralized form of governance because this is the only way it can control the city where the Urdu speakers whom it represents are the largest group. The PPP, on the other hand, cannot win a majority of seats from Karachi but can control the province where it is in a majority. Hence it prefers a centralized system since it is the only way that it can control Karachi’s land, job and revenues.

However, neither the old system and nor Musharraf’s decentralized system can solve the problems of common Karachiites. These problems are related to making an ID card; getting a birth certificate; getting a death certificate; getting a child into school; getting a parent into hospital; getting a friend released from police custody; getting a place for a grave; solving conflicts related to renting, family conflicts and property matters; acquiring utility connections; and/or getting a piece of land or loan to build a house. For all these the disadvantaged (who are the majority) contact their ethnic or religious organisations and this in turn strengthens them, gives them votes in the elections and further promotes fragmentation and conflict.

I will not touch upon issues related to physical infrastructure because I think they are well-known though not the causes for them. These include housing, transport, health and education. But the important question is where is the city going?

The most important development is the emergence of a bourgeoisie. A large and increasing middle class, fiercely upwardly mobile, education and recreation hungry is increasingly dominating the physical and social space available in the city. Its changing lifestyle and social structures are seeping through to all sections of society if not yet in reality then in terms of aspirations. The trends are towards increasing number of unmarried adolescents; break-up of extended families and clan based settlements; working women (without whom the kitchen can no longer function); desire for recreation; acquisition of a motorbike for freedom from public transport and for flexibility; the right to marry a person of one’s choice (as visible by the enormous increase in court marriages); and the presence of women in public space. In short, there is a major conflict between the dictates of tradition and trends and aspirations ¹⁸.

Five trends are of considerable importance for the future. One, old low income settlements are consolidating. They are acquiring middle class values and they are upwardly mobile. Unlike before they contain beauty parlours, Cyber cafes, cable TV, marriage halls, schools, colleges, libraries, and community centres. They contain sport clubs and their residents arrange pick nicks at the Beach and sometimes far away at the Kingher Lake. They also contain singers and performers. Almost all of this activity is arranged by community organizations and local activists. The more conservative elements in the community try to curtail these attempts and often succeed.

Two, there is an increasing interest and involvement of educated upper and middle class individuals and groups in the city’s social and physical development. If this continues, may be a bridge between the different “cities” of Karachi can be created. Three, the birth of formal sector entertainment and cultural events. So far, these are for the elite and upper middle classes. One of the reasons for this are the locations where these events are held. For instance, it has been observed that if an event is held at the expo centre as opposed to the Arts Council or the FTC, the lower middle and working classes do attend. Four, a rapidly increasing under-class is being created as a result of being forced out of their rural habitat as a result of social and economic change and also due to natural and conflict related displacements. And five, the emergence of NGOs of which Karachiites are very proud. However, NGOs are not the solution to Karachi’s problems. Their work can develop models and create islands of excellence. What Karachi needs is state involvement in developing social and physical infrastructure, especially related to technical education which is almost non-existent in a city of 21 million. As such, I feel that NGOs and CBOs should get together for promoting a major public sector reform.

Given the social and demographic changes that have been described above, Karachi (like the rest of Pakistan) needs the promotion of new societal values that can resolve the conflict between tradition and aspirations. It also needs promotion of multiclass public space and support to community events related to folklore and culture that are already taking place and make them multiclass and multiethnic. Community attempts at setting up libraries, sport clubs and events also need to be supported by local government, academia and NGOs. A big social revolution would take place if women friendly transport could be developed.

But what does the future hold for the city? It is a great city. It feeds and provides jobs to 20 million people directly and supports Pakistan’s economy to the tune of 15 percent of the GDP. Few cities in the world are capable of doing this. In the battle between India, China and the West for the control of Indian Ocean trade and economy, it is of immense strategic importance especially for its land locked neighbours to the North. It is also the city from where Thar coal, Iranian and Central Asian gas to India and by sea to beyond, will be controlled and managed, along with that of Balochistan’s enormous mineral wealth. As the only port in the vicinity of these resources, it is, and will remain, the best place for investment.

The politics of ideology, the values of the freedom movements are being replaced by those of economic pragmatism and Karachi will benefit from it. But no peace without equity and justice is possible in the world we are heading towards. So, the city needs vision. Not the KSDP 2020 World Class City one but maybe that of a commuter and pedestrian friendly city.

Justice in a multiethnic city is a difficult thing to achieve. Migration will continue into Karachi. Luckily, most of it in the future will be from within the province. The important question for future peace in Karachi depends on how we will manage the politics of multi-ethnicity, especially when it is related to access to formal sector jobs, education, and governance.

¹ Cox. W (2012); World Urban Areas Population and Density: A 2012 update; New Geography, 05 March 2012
² Memoirs of Seth Naomal Hotchand 1804-1878; OUP Karachi 1982
³ Baillie A.F.; Kurrachee: Past, Present and Future; OUP Karachi 1975
⁴ Damboi, Usman: Karachi Tareekh kay Aaeena Mein: 2014 edition
⁵ Hasan, A: Evaluation of the Community Development Work in Rehri Carried out by the Coastal Ecosystem Unit, IUCN, 1994
^6
7 Hasan, A: Evaluation of the Community Development Work in Rehri Carried out by the Coastal Ecosystem Unit, IUCN, 1994
⁸ Khuro, H and Moraj, Anwar; Karachi the Megacity of Our Times; OUP Karachi, 2010
⁹ Told to the author by Chanesar Goth elders in 1983
¹⁰ Khawaja A; 1857 ki Jang-i-Azadi; Almi Printers, Karachi, 2011
¹¹ Aslam I; Punjab Under Imperialism 1885-1947; OUP Delhi, 1989
¹² Naqvi S.A.; Indus Waters and Social Change; OUP Karachi, 2013
¹³ Feldman, H.; Karachi Through a Hundred Years (1860-1960); OUP Karachi, 1970
¹⁴ Nayyar A.H. and Salim A: The Subtle Subversion; SDPI Islamabad, 2004
¹⁵ Cinemas in Karachi: www.mazhar.dk
¹⁶ Gazdar, H and Mallah, H.B.; Informality and Political Violence in Karachi; Urban Studies, November 2013
¹⁷ Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020; City District Government Karachi, 2006
¹⁸ For details see Hasan, A; Demographic Change and its Social Repercussions: The Case of Karachi; International Development Planning Review, Volume 31, Number 03, 2009