Government, International Agencies and OPP Collaboration for the Replication of OPP‘S Low Cost Sanitation Programme

c) Conclusions drawn from the Sukkur replication project

• External development becomes a priority where a natural disposal point is not available. This external development work can only be undertaken by government agencies at their own cost. Without such development people cannot carry out internal development.
• Various government organisations are not aware of each others’ plans and responsibilities due to which development is hindered. Similarly, they are not aware of the funds that are available to their sister organisations and thus cannot coordinate work between them.
• Changes and adjustments to programme procedures and directions can always take place to suit new approaches and objectives, if the individuals involved have the will to understand each others’ point of view, and are decided about objectives and processes.
• If middle level government functionaries are involved from the very beginning in dialogues and discussions on new approaches and their benefits, they become their supporters and promoters, provided they are assured of an important role in decision-making and implementation. In addition, if one component of a project shows signs of success, departments that can operate other components are quick to associate themselves with the project. In Sukkur, the OPP discovered an immense longing within government departments to do some useful work, and also discovered that they could not find much useful work to do in the circumstances in which they operate and the procedures they have to follow.
• Transport vehicles are a major source of conflict and jealousy between departments and individuals and instead of facilitating work, end up in obstructing it. Wherever possible, transport should be hired and that too for specific periods when it is required. This is what OPP has done for its Sukkur visits, and it is not only a cheaper solution but saves the time spent in the maintenance and looking after of vehicles.

8.3 The World Bank Collaborative Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme Pilot Project at Hyderabad

a) Background

In 1990 studies for the preparation of the Shelter for Low Income Communities Project of the government of Pakistan were undertaken. The studies were funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) and the government of Japan, and administered by the World Bank. An inception report was produced in October 1990. It was basically a review of literature and organisations and an identification of shelter related problems and issues.

In April 1991, project preparation reports were completed. One of the possible projects identified was called Collaborative Katchi Abadi Improvement Programme (CKAIP). The programme envisaged a collaboration between SKAA, municipal corporations in Sindh, and the app in upgrading squatter settlements and using the OPP methodology in the process.

Between April 1991 and March 1992, detailed discussions took place between the app, representatives of the government of Sindh, and the World Bank representatives and consultants. The main consultants for the project were TPO Sullivan and Partners. In addition, numerous visits to Orangi and other katchi abadis where OPP programmes had been replicated were undertaken collectively by the sponsors and the app staff. Finally, in April 1992 an agreement was signed between the OPP and the other actors of the project.

b) Insights gained and conclusions drawn from negotiations with World Bank and SDC

During the year long negotiations between the app and the World Bank-SDC, and the various collective visits to katchi abadi upgrading projects, the difference of perception, attitudes and work procedures between app and the international agencies surfaced. There were also differences between the SDC and World Bank. The SDC was more sympathetic to the OPP’s point of view and often supported it. Some of these differences and insights gained by the app are detailed below.

• The World Bank-SDC wanted to begin more than one pilot project. They had hoped that work could begin in 3 Sindh towns. However, the OPP felt that it could only handle one project and that if that project was properly developed, it could serve as a training and demonstration area for other towns. It was finally decided to have only one pilot project.
• The World Bank-SOC wanted government involvement at all levels of upgrading. They felt that government staff should be employed for motivating people, organising them and giving them technical advice. The OPP on the other hand was adamant that this function could not be performed by government functionaries but only by community members supported by NGOs.
• The World Bank-SOC saw the project office as a government institution under the FIMC or SKAA. The OPP saw it as a community office run temporarily by the OPP. Again, the OPP insisted that the office should be autonomous, located in one of the settlements being upgraded and easily accessible to local members.
• The World Bank-SOC felt that the social organisers appointed to the project office should he paid by 5KM and/or the Hue. The OPP argued that they would thus end up becoming government employees and as such incapable of resisting the pressures that government functionaries are subjected to. In addition, they would be viewed by the community with suspicion and hostility. As such they would not be able to fulfill their role as community organisers. However, the World Bank-SOC was not willing to let the OPP pay the salaries to the social organisers on their behalf. Finally, it was agreed that the salaries would be paid directly by the Shelter Project.
• The World Bank-SOC felt that a big seminar should be organised at the commencement of the project in which all the actors, including the community, should participate. The OPP disagreed. It felt that this would jeopardise the project as the community would see a lot of money being spent and a lot of foreigners participating in the seminar. They would immediately say that this money could have been used for development purposes instead. In addition, they would feel that the style of the project was not one that was conducive to the development of self help and self finance. The same differences between the two parties surfaced with regard to the nature of the project office. The OPP wanted an austere non-airconditioned office in the settlement. The World Bank-SDC envisaged a more elaborate affair.
• The World Bank consultants felt that it was necessary to give “perks and benefits” to government officials so that they would collaborate properly with the project. These perks and benefits were to be in the form of transport vehicles and other facilities. The OPP on the other hand felt that this was not only unnecessary but would lead to jealousies and conflicts and have an adverse effect on the project. The government counterparts should be motivated to perform their duties by being made to realise the importance of the programme and not through “fringe benefits’.
• The monitoring arrangements proposed by the World Bank-SOC representatives were very detailed and complex. They involved talking to the community regarding the OPP performance as well in the absence of OPP representatives. The OPP pointed out that as a result, the community would see the OPP and the World Bank-SDC as two separate and antagonistic entities and would play the one against the other. This would erode the effectiveness of the OPP and weaken the community participation aspect.
• The monitoring reports can he a source of misunderstanding between various actors. OPPs experience of such reports has not been positive. From these monitoring reports various actors manage to draw wrong conclusions and attribute motives to other actors that are sometimes not accurate. As such these reports can promote differences rather than reconcile them. The two monitoring reports to-date, regarding the Hyderabad project, can also be interpreted to promote differences between the various parties involved in the project.
• The OPP feels that there is no need for a monitoring cell. It raises overhead costs considerably and since it is not involved in the day-to-day operation of the project, it can miss out or misunderstand a number of sensitive issues. The project staff should be trained to monitor its work itself. What is needed, however, is someone who can gently carry out a coordinating function between the various actors in the project and help in the establishment of better relations and the identification and tackling of sensitive issues. In this way the learning-by-doing process will be strengthened.
• The foreign consultants and World Bank-SDC representatives were concerned with issues that the OPP has discovered are quite irrelevant to the upgrading process. These issues relate to the tenure status in the settlements and detailed ethnic and socio-economic information that consultants require, regarding the residents. This issue is discussed in detail later in paragraph 9.9 of this paper.
• On a certain site visit the World Bank consultants preferred to take their own interpreters so as to be able to talk to the residents of katchi abadi independently of the OPP. The abadi residents later commented to the OPP that it was obvious that the foreigners did not trust the OPP staff. This is a sensitive issue and can have adverse effects on the upgrading process.
• It is commonly believed by the non-World Bank-SDC project staff members that the total administrative cost of the Hyderabad project office works out to a small fraction of the monitoring budget. This belief is a source of cynicism, amusement and/or heart burning. What repercussions this will have on the project is not clear. However, they will not be of a positive nature.