How to Shelter Urban Poor

The process of acquiring a lease is also a complex one. The squatter has to visit various government agencies frequently to buy a form, fill and submit it; make payments more than once in the process; appear before a Registrar, maybe more than once; be subjected to hostility and be viewed with suspicion by the State functionaries and cater to corruption. In this process he may waste 10 to 14 days over a 3 to 4 month period. For a daily wage this is a very difficult exercise if not an impossible one.

Even if people did pay for regularisation, plots for housing the families displaced by the upgrading process are just not available. For instance, for the families to be displaced by the upgrading proposal, the number of plots required is equal to the total number of plots developed at Surjani Town, one of the major development schemes of the KDA!

Baldia Township in Karachi is an example of a squatter colony which the State has decided to upgrade. The decision to upgrade Baldia was taken in 1977 and actual work begun in 1981. Since then not even 10 per cent of the plots have been regularised. Negotiations with international agencies are taking place to finance development in regularised abadis. If Baldia’s response is an indicator this loan will be impossible to repay.

Given the failure of official policies, the people have had to find ways and means of overcoming their own housing problems, very often in defiance of government policies. The extent to which this informal sector has evolved over the years can be judged by making a comparison between the early and more recent katchi abadis.

The earlier katchi abadis were located in open areas in the city itself, or near its centre. The more recent abadis are located in the suburbs, often near areas through which service lines to the city pass, or a natural drainage basin exists.

The old abadis have no regular plan. The streets are narrow, and open spaces for schools, playgrounds and mosques are non-existent. The new abadis are planned on a grid iron.

Open Spaces:

The streets are wide and the sizes of the plots are identical. Open spaces for playgrounds, schools etc., are often set aside. Official planning regulations would have little quarrel with these town plans.

Houses in the early abadis were originally of mat and reed construction. They improved over a very long period of time. Houses in the more recent abadis have a uniform technology and the quality of construction is far superior.

Again, in the older abadis water supply through tankers and transport to the settlement was arranged as a result of a considerable amount of lobbying by the residents with the government. In recent abadis it takes place without any visible signs of lobbying. Early abadis were homogeneous both ethnically and class-wise. The new ones are heterogeneous in every way.

It is obvious from the comparison between the old and new abadis that there is some hand behind the organisation of the more recent settlements. This hand is that of the private entrepreneur or ‘dallal’.

This man (or group of men) has found weak points in the official ‘system’, and by co-opting it, or bypassing it, they have managed to give the people plots of land along with other facilities at a price which they can afford.

The early settlements were invasions into the city by groups of people who occupied whatever vacant land they could find. A decade or so of persecution, the bulldozing of settlements in the sixties, and the strengthening of the state apparatus, made the acquisition of land for housing almost impossible for lower income groups. It was at this stage that the ‘dallal’ – the broker – stepped in as a viable response to a genuine demand.

The ‘dallal’ occupies land illegally, with the patronage of state officials, who may acquire some financial stake in the operation. Police protection is sought for the new abadis, again at a price.

The planning is done as far as possible as per the government planning regulations, so that regularisation at some later stage may pose no problems to the future residents.

Prize plots for shops etc are held back for speculation. The price of the plots is made cheap enough for the poor to buy in one instalment. To make this possible the ‘dallal’ may even forego his profit and depend only on speculation of prize plots for making money.

The ‘dallal’ arranges for the initial supply of water to the abadis through tankers, and makes arrangements for its continuation, but at the expense of the user. He also manages to arrange the commencement of transport, either through political influence, or by using the government contacts who have been co-opted by him.

Cash Credit:

In addition, he arranges for the setting up of a building manufacturer’s yards, or a ‘thalla’ as it is called, in the new abadi. This manufacturer gives technical advice, makes artisanal skills available to house builders, gives materials of construction on credit, and sometimes also cash credit for house building.

This whole process gives considerable political power to the ‘dallal’ and he is wooed by political groups and parties, including the government.

Thus the ‘dallal’ illegally provides the people with immediate possession of land, with water, protection from eviction, transport facilities, and credit and technical assistance for house building, all at a price that the poor can afford. Government policies cannot do this legally, with all the power behind them.

The ‘dallal’s development strategy is successful because it is compatible with the sociology and economics of low income groups. The extent of its success can be judged from the fact that this kind of development is growing rapidly, in spite of increasing restrictions from officialdom.

All over the world, Pakistan included, there is talk of formalising the informal sector in housing. This means that the State would either integrate the ‘dallal’ into its development strategy or alternatively adopt the strategy followed by the ‘dallal’.

This, it is argued is the only solution to providing land to the poor at reasonable prices. In either case, the State would have to surrender a large measure of its power if this move is to be successful. This would also bring about a change in the unequal relationship between the government agencies and the katchi abadis, which would then need to be institutionalised.

Without these structural changes in the political and administrative structure of local bodies and development agencies, formalisation of the informal sector will only make it much more difficult for the poor to acquire land at a price that they can afford.

With the new Karachi Master Plan in the offing, it is hoped that in the absence of a definite political programme in favour of the urban poor, the policy of formalisation of the ‘dallal’ or his strategy, will not be attempted.