OPP Six Questions

3.2 The Question of Methodology

From the commencement of OPP work in Orangi, planners and engineers questioned the rationality of OPP methodology for the Low Cost Sanitation Programme. Their doubts are briefly summed up below.

  1. Since the OPP was laying an underground drainage system, it was essential that a master plan for the whole of Orangi should be prepared. If this was not done then the system was bound to end in failure.1
  2. The lane as a unit of organization was incompatible with the sanitation technology being used. As an underground sewerage system was a complex affair, it could not be decentralized in this manner. For its efficient laying, operation and maintenance, the involvement of local bodies, contractors and councilors was essential.1
  3. Motivation should be carried out in specific target areas. These areas should be developed, complete with secondary drains, and with septic tanks at the junction with the creeks, before other areas are tackled. Accepting requests from individual lanes, which may be miles away from each other, was an invitation to disaster, for in the absence of a master plan, linking them effectively would be impossible.1
  4. The OPP was providing tools and giving advice to the people, but it was not controlling the development work. As such a lot of substandard work was being done, which was a waste of the peoples’ money. If this continued the OPP would lose all credibility.1

The OPP understood the questions raised by the planners and engineers, which reflected the conventional thinking and practice of these professions. However, the OPP stuck to its methodology for the following reasons:

  1. The OPP was not a planning organization. Nor did it possess resources to survey the 8,000 acres of Orangi and prepare a master plan. Nor did it have the authority to get that master plan implemented.
  2. The unit or organization, had to be small, otherwise it could not be cohesive. The people had been cheated so many times before that they would be unwilling to participate initially in any venture in which people they did not know, or could not pressurize socially, were involved. The lane in Orangi consists of 20 to 30 houses and everyone knows each other.
  3. All land in Orangi slopes towards the natural creeks. The OPP had full faith in the peoples’ common sense, and as such it knew that in the beginning only those lanes would opt for an underground sewerage system which were near the creeks, or could easily drain into them. Lanes further away would join up with the ones near the creeks once the demonstration effect caught on. The ones even further away would follow, linking themselves together through secondary drains. This is exactly what happened. Where secondary drains were too long for the residents to finance, they pressurized the KMC councilors to subsidize them with grants from the KMC.
  4. The OPP was not willing to associate the local government, councilors, or contractors with the programme at that early stage, for such an association would be on their terms and not the peoples or the OPP’s terms. In addition, the OPP wanted to evolve a system that replaced the existing one of contractors profiteering and state corruption. However, now that 43,000 houses have been organized, and have financed and built their own sewerage system, councilors and contractors are getting involved in the peoples effort, but on the terms dictated by the people.
  5. The OPP was not willing to control the execution of development work even if the people did substandard work. Wherever such substandard work was being done, the OPP organizers informed the people of it. Solutions to the defects were conveyed through meetings, posters and pamphlets. If the people still persisted in not following OPP advice, they were left alone. Controlling the execution of development was only possible if the OPP controlled the people’s finances as well. This, the OPP was not willing to do, as it would defeat the whole purpose of the OPP programme, which was to bring about a meaningful change in the relationship between the people and the KMC. In addition, Akhtar Hameed Khan knew from experience that using the peoples’ money always resulted in accusations of dishonesty, resulting in discord.
  6. With the passage of time the people came to understand the importance of OPP advice, and as work progressed its quality improved as wall (see paragraph 3 on maintenance).

3.3 The Question of Maintenance

When the sewerage lines were initially being laid, technical visitors to Orangi stressed the necessity of forming organizations in the lane to maintain the sewerage system. Various forms for such organizations were also suggested. Students and evaluators of the OPP effort, also remarked on the absence of such organizations in the lane.5

Akhtar Hameed Khan however did not see the need for developing such organizations. He was sure that people who had come together to finance and construct the system, would not allow it to fall into disuse. As problems would crop up he argued, the people would come together to tackle them. In addition, as work progressed the peoples’ confidence in OPP advice would also increase, resulting in better quality of workmanship, requiring less maintenance.

An evaluation of OPP supervised drains from 1981 to 1985, was carried out in July 1986 by Perween Rahman, Salim Aleemuddin and Anwar Rashid.6 It substantiated Akhtar Hameed Khan’s reasoning. Some of its results are given in the tables below.

Table – 1

Maintenance

For sewers constructed

in 1981-1983

For sewers constructed

in 1984-1985

Not required

In 20% cases

In 73% cases

Carried out

80%

37%

Not carried out

0%

0%

Maintenance means

  • entire or part cleaning of sewer
  • cleaning of individual manholes
  • replacement of manhole covers
  • repairs to manholes

Table – 2
Cost of Maintenance

Time period

For sewers constructed

in 1981-1983

For sewers constructed

in 1984-1985

Average/lane/line

Rs 266.00

Rs 26.00

Average/lane/month

Rs 7.40

Rs 1.08

The above mentioned study also established the manner in which maintenance is carried out, and the causes for the failure of the drains. These are listed below.

  1. The main reason for the blocking of the drains is the poor quality of manhole covers which get broken or cracked over a period of time. Thus the manhole gets turned into a garbage dump. People replace these covers collectively or individually. However, to make 2 or 3 covers at a time is uneconomical and difficult5 as it involves paying for the cartage of small quantities of materials for this purpose. For this reason delay in their replacement takes place. The OPP is now advising the building manufacturing yards in Orangi to keep a supply of OPP designed manhole covers so that people can buy them ready made.
  2. When cleaning of sewerage lines is required, money is collected immediately, about Rs.5 from each house. A scavenger is called in and he cleans out the line. Contributions are made to an active member of the lane, who is not always the lane manager, but has invariably been involved in laying the sewerage line.
  3. The problem of maintenance is not that it is not done, but that sometimes delay takes place before cleaning or the changing of manhole covers is carried out. This has led in a few lanes to making selected persons in-charge of looking after the maintenance. It is certain that this system will catch on, because after having spent so much money on their sewerage system, and having built it themselves, it is not possible that the people will allow it function unsatisfactorily.
  4. The type of maintenance required is closely linked with the quality of work at the initial stages. The efficiency of maintenance is linked with the extent of social cohesion and quality of leadership in the lane.
  5. In certain areas where OPP instructions were completely disregarded, the quality of work is so bad that it needs to be rectified. This rectification has been undertaken by the people (see para 4).

  1. Nicholas Haughton, in conversations with the author: 1982-83.Aftab Ahmed Khan, planner in private practice in Karachi, in a conversation with the author: July 1983. Ashraf Au, in conversation with the author: August 1984.
  2. Nicholas Haughton, in conversations with the author: 1982-83.Aftab Ahmed Khan, planner in private practice in Karachi, in a conversation with the author: July 1983. Ashraf Au, in conversation with the author: August 1984.
  3. Nicholas Haughton, in conversations with the author: 1982-83.Aftab Ahmed Khan, planner in private practice in Karachi, in a conversation with the author: July 1983. Ashraf Au, in conversation with the author: August 1984.
  4. Nicholas Haughton, in conversations with the author: 1982-83.Aftab Ahmed Khan, planner in private practice in Karachi, in a conversation with the author: July 1983. Ashraf Au, in conversation with the author: August 1984.
  5. Professor John Pickford of Laughborough University, in a conversation with the author during a visit to Orangi.
  6. John Abbott : “The Evaluation of Environmental Health Engineering Projects in Developing Countries” Department of Civil Engineering, Imperial College, London, September 1985

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