


THE WORK OF THE ANJUMAN SAMAJI BEHBOOD AND THE LARGER FAISALABAD CONTEXT

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(15 December 1999)



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PREFACE

In September 1988, Diana Mitlin of the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), UK, suggested that I carry out a study on the scaling up of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP). I informed her that I was already involved in such a study for the UNDP-World Bank Water & Sanitation Programme for South Asia, but I would be interested in looking at the growth patterns and service provisions in Faisalabad from the point of view of communities and other interest groups. Faisalabad is the third largest city in Pakistan and an important industrial centre. I further suggested that I could relate my findings to the work of the Anjuman Samaji Behbood (ASB), an NGO replicating the OPP model in the low income settlements of the city. IIED agreed to give financial support for this undertaking.

My colleagues, Architect Salim Alimuddin (joint director OPP-RTI), Akbar Zaidi (economist and researcher) and myself spent about a week in Faisalabad in March and April 1998, talking to government officials, community members, informal developers, contractors, shopkeepers and NGOs so as to sketch a picture of the city, its problems and future potential for development work. A list of people and organisations whom we met is given in Appendix – 1. Earlier, Architect Asiya Sadiq and myself spent four days as part of the UNDP-World Bank Orangi Replication study, the findings of which form part of section 5 of this report. These four days were spent with the ASB in their Project Area, talking to their staff, area activists and community members. Our research work has been aided by the fact that I and Salim Aleemuddin have carried out previous research on Faisalabad in 1989 and have worked closely with the ASB since 1994. The reason for involving a number of people in this research work was to acquaint them with conditions in Faisalabad so that they could take up further research independently of each other in the future, and also to create a group that shared a common knowledge base and work methodology.

IIED was interested in our assessing, in the light of our findings, the needs of agencies in the North and the direction that they should follow when dealing with development issues. I have not done that for I feel that the report is comprehensive enough for them to make their own analysis and reach their own conclusions. However, five points are clearly brought out in this study which may be of interest to them. i) Development does not take place with funds. It takes place through the development of skills, self-reliance and dignity. The three are closely inter-linked and follow each other in the order in which they are mentioned. They make relationships within community, and of community with government agencies more equitable. This change in relationships brings about changes in government planning procedures and ultimately in policies. ii) "Capacity and capability" building of government agencies can never be successful without pressure from organised and knowledgeable groups at the grass roots. Such groups can only be created by activists, who have to be identified, trained and supported financially. Formally trained professionals and technicians are not an alternative to such activists. The formation of such groups forces transparency in the functioning of government agencies. The most important aspect of transparency is the printing of accounts and their availability to community members. iii) One of the major reasons for disasters in government planning is that ideal plans are made and finances are then sought for them.

Often these finances do not materialise. Things would be very different if planning is done on the basis of a realistic assessment of funds that are available, and if an optimum relationship can be arrived at between resources (financial, technical and others), standards and demands, and if planning can recognise and accommodate the fact that all three are dynamic and can change over time. iv) poor communities do not own programmes developed by “others”, however participatory, in which they are asked to participate. It is government agencies that must learn to participate in people’s programmes and in their existing processes. And v) the role of NGOs and support agencies is primarily to educate but for this they must, before anything, have a knowledge and a sympathetic understanding of the context in which they are working.

This study is one of ten case studies being coordinated by the IIED for examining innovation in reducing poverty in urban areas. This effort is being funded by the UK governments’ Department for International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC). The authors would like to thank the IIED, DFID and the SDC for their support and also to thank S. Akbar Zaidi for contributing Section 8 of the study. In addition, the authors would also like to thank the ASB and the OPP for their assistance and for making their reports, documentation and records available to the research team.

ARIF HASAN

Karachi: 15 December 1999

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Abbreviations and Local Terms

Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADC	Additional Deputy Commissioner
ADP	Annual Development Programme
APD	Additional Project Director
ASB	Anjuman Samaji Behbood
BASWO	Boo Ali Seena Welfare Organisation
CDC	Community Development Concern
CDU	Community Development Unit
DG	Director General
ECNEC	Executive Committee for National Economic Cooperation
FAUP	Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project
FDA	Faisalabad Development Authority
FMC	Faisalabad Municipal Corporation
GOP	Government of Pakistan
KAIRP	Katchi Abadi Improvement and Regularisation Programme
KHASDA	Karachi Health and Social Development Association
MD	Managing Director
MNA	Member National Assembly
MPA	Member Provincial Assembly
MPCO	Multi-Purpose Community Organisation
NOC	No Objection Certificate
NTPW	National Trust for Population Welfare
OCT	Orangi Charitable Trust
ODA	Overseas Development Agency (UK)
ODP	Okara Development Programme
OPD	Organisation for Participatory Development
OPP	Orangi Pilot Project
PAC	Project Approval Committee
PMU	Project Management Unit
RTI	Research and Training Institute
SAP	South Asia Partnership
SKAA	Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WASA	Water and Sewerage Authority
WID	Women In Development
WSC	Water Supply Committee
YCHR	Youth Commission for Human Rights

Local Terms

Anjuman organisation

<i>baithak</i>	drawing room
<i>bradries</i>	clans
<i>chak</i>	village
<i>janazagah</i>	place where people hold funerals
<i>mandi</i>	market
<i>marla</i>	30.25 square yards
<i>mohallas</i>	neighbourhoods
<i>muraba</i>	squares of 25 acres
<i>nallas</i>	drainage channels
<i>kanal</i>	20 <i>marlas</i> or 605 square yards
<i>katcha</i>	temporary
<i>katchi abadis</i>	squatter settlements
<i>khal</i>	small water channel
<i>Rajbah</i>	small canal
<i>patwari</i>	lowest level revenue collector
<i>pucca</i>	permanent
<i>sikni</i>	transfer to urban
<i>tatima</i>	legal division of an <i>acre</i>

The map depicts the central urban area of Dhaka, Bangladesh, centered around the Dhaka Railway Station. Key features include:

- Major Roads:** Dhaka Motorway (top), Dhaka-Chittagong Highway (left), Dhaka-Lahore Highway (right), and various local roads like Tejgaon Road, Mirpur Road, and Old Dhaka Road.
- Landmarks and Buildings:** Dhaka Railway Station, Dhaka Central Jail, Dhaka Central Prison, Dhaka Central Market, and various government and commercial buildings.
- Geographical Features:** The map shows the layout of the city, including the Dhaka River and the surrounding urban area.
- Labels and Markers:** The map is labeled with letters A through K and numbers 1 through 10, indicating specific locations and areas of interest.

PLACES OF INTEREST

1. CLOCK TOWER
2. VICTORIA MEMORIAL GARDEN
3. JINNAH GARDEN
4. HABIB BANK
5. GOVERNMENT TRANSPORT SERVICE
6. KUTUB AL AIN
7. RAHWAY STATION
8. P.I.A. BOOKING OFFICE
9. AIRPORT
10. TRUCK STAND
11. ALLAMA IQBAL STADIUM
12. GENERAL POST OFFICE
13. TAXI OFFICE

EDUCATION

14. AGRICULTURE UNIVERSITY
15. GOVERNMENT DOCTOR COLLEGE
16. GOVERNMENT MEDICAL COLLEGE FOR WOMEN
17. ISLAMIA COLLEGE FOR WOMEN
18. GOVERNMENT SCIENCE COLLEGE
19. MUNICIPAL DEGREE COLLEGE
20. MUNICIPAL COLLEGE OF COMMERCE
21. ISLAMIA COLLEGE FOR BOYS

HOSPITALS

22. D.H.Q. HOSPITAL
23. AL-NOUR HOSPITAL
24. AZIZ PATRIOTRY HOSPITAL
25. SHERAT HOSPITAL
26. SAINT RABHEL HOSPITAL
27. ALITED HOSPITAL
28. SAHAL HOSPITAL
29C. NATIONAL HOSPITAL
30. NATIONAL HOSPITAL
31. BAY'S HOTEL
32. RIPPLE HOTEL
33. NAWAF RESTAURANT
34. KING OF RESTAURANT
35. DEEGO RESTAURANT
36. BERBER HOTEL
37. ELKIN
38. REY HOTEL

CLUBS

39. CURSIAN CLUB
40. MINTEVA CLUB

SHOPPING CENTRES

41. KATCHERY CLUB
42. CHRISTOPH BAZAR
43. AMINTUS BAZAR
44. BHAWANA BAZAR
45. BHANG BAZAR
46. MONTGOMERY BAZAR
47. KARHIANA BAZAR
48. ELLI BAZAR
49. UST. SUPER MARKET
50. FORT PARKER
51. ANSAARI BAZAR
52. NAGAR BAZAR
53. PEOPLE'S CO-OPED-GROUND
54. SATIANA ROAD
55. QUAID-E-AZAM MARKET
56. DODRA BAZAR MARKET
57. FAISAL MARKET
58. IRON MARKET
59. "MILK MARKET"
60. SHAHEED-MILLAT MARKET

RESEARCH INSTITUTES

61. AYUS RESEARCH INSTITUTE
62. NUCLEAR INSTITUTE FOR
RADIOLOGICAL PHYSICS (NIRP)
63. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY

MAJOR INDUSTRIES

64. TREESAT TEXTILE MILLS
65. CRESCENT TEXTILE MILLS
66. CHENAB FABRICS
67. NISHAT TEXTILE MILLS
68. KHAN INDOOR TEXTILE MILLS
69. KAPLAN MADE PRODUCTS
70. CRESCENT BICAR MILLS

MISCELLANEOUS

71. RADIO STATION
72. T.V. ROOSTER
73. COURT
74. POLICE SUB-STATION
75. PROPERLY POLICE STATION
76. CANAL TEST HOUSE
77. PET TEST HOUSE

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THE WORK OF THE ANJUMAN SAMAJI BEHBOOD AND THE LARGER FAISALABAD CONTEXT

1. FAISALABAD: ESTABLISHMENT AND GROWTH

1.1 Establishment and Growth of Faisalabad

Faisalabad was established between 1895 and 1905 as a *mandi* or market town. Before its establishment the area was the flood plains of the river Chenab, a tributary of the Indus, and was used as pastureland. In 1902 the lower Chenab canal was built by the British and it converted the flood plains of the Chenab into perennially irrigated areas. Peasants were imported from Eastern Punjab and settled on the newly irrigated lands. As a result, the local pastoral clans rebelled against the British. The rebellion was ruthlessly crushed and the local clans were declared as “criminal tribes” and were excluded from government service and educational institutions.

The function of the market towns in the newly established canal colonies in the Indus Valley was to serve as a centre for grain and cotton storage and its despatch by train to Karachi for export. Agricultural support services were also located in the *mandi* towns.

The old name of Faisalabad was Lyallpur. It was named after Sir James Lyall, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. Around the city the agricultural area was developed on a grid iron plan in squares of 25 acres, each square is known as a *muraba* and it was given a number. Certain *murabas* were set aside as villages known as *chaks*. Land was allocated again in *murabas*, around each *chak* for future expansion, amenities, housing, storage purposes and agricultural infrastructure. The revenue department was set up to manage and govern this development. The division of the agricultural areas into *murabas*, explains the manner in which the city has expanded both formally and informally over the years.

The town was laid out by Captain Pephram Young in the form of a square on an area of 45 hectares with room for extension on the north-west and south-west. The roads radiating from the centre, which had a Clock Tower, resembled the Union Jack. Even before the end of the first decade of its founding, the town was better equipped with amenities than other towns of British India. The water system comprised two large reservoirs with a capacity of 4.8 million gallons and was designed to supply 100,000 gallons of filtered water per day (the power for which was obtained from a water wheel in Tolbwala *Rajbaha* (canal) when the canal was open and from a steam pump during canal closure) and was distributed all over town through stand pipes which were also used to flush the drains. The drainage system comprised of outer and inner intercepting drains with subsidiary drains in the more inhabited portion of the town. Garbage and night-soil removal and disposal, street cleaning systems, public lavatories and large bathing tanks were established. Three slaughter houses (separately for Muslims and Sikhs) were set-up. The main roads were lighted. Grain stores and markets were established and separate facilities built for cow-keepers and tenants of the town farm. The civil station (i.e. area of the government officials) was in the north and south-west of the town with three main lines of buildings. The nearest to the 'native' town were offices and police lines, the second line being mainly occupied by the houses of the civil officers and the third line, separated from the second by municipal gardens, was occupied by the canal officers; the compounds were large, ranging from 6 to 8 acres each. The early public buildings were the Deputy Commissioner's House, the Qaisri Gate (1898), the Clock Tower (1905-13), and the District Board and Municipal Buildings. The main residential area, Douglasspura (1920), was followed by 40 other '*mohallas*', by which time the city had expanded to cover 7.8 square kilometres.

Industry came to the town during the 1930's with the Lyallpur Cotton Mills (completed in 1934) being the first major unit followed by three other units during the same decade.

After Independence in 1947 the town grew rapidly, initially due to the influx of Muslim refugees from India and later due to government policies that promoted industrialisation and green revolution technologies.

Today Faisalabad has become a sprawling, very rapidly expanding city characterised by large unserviced areas and *katchi abadis* where the vast majority of the population resides in poor living conditions. The planned and well-laid out low-density areas provide housing for the government officials and staff and the city entrepreneurs (many of whom have houses in other cities as well). (The above information is taken from a Profile of Faisalabad prepared for the Swiss Development Cooperation by Reza Ali, Salim Alimuddin and Ahmed Saeed in 1989.)

1.2 Population Increase

The increase in the population of Faisalabad from 1901 to the 1998 census is given in the table below.

Table – 1.2

Faisalabad: Population 1901-1991

Y e a r	Population	Increase Over Last Census Figure	Percentage Growth over Last Census Figure	Growth Rate Per cent Per Annum
1901	9,171	-	-	-
1911	19,008	9,337	101.8	-
1921	23,136	4,128	21.7	-
1931	42,922	19,786	85.52	-
1941	69,930	27,008	62.92	-
1951	179,000	109,070	155.7	9.86
1961	425,240	246,240	147.62	8.9
1972	823,344	398,104	93.61	6.2
1981	1,232,000	408,656	49.63	4.6
1998	1,977,246	745,246	60.49	3.5

Source: GOP Census Reports

* Estimated

1.3 Reasons for Growth

1.3.1 From 1901 to 1921

In these two decades the population of Faisalabad increased from 9,171 to 23,136. This increase was due to the establishment of the city and its administrative structure. In this period the flood plain was brought under cultivation and in 1910 the railway was established to link the town with Karachi port.

1.3.2 From 1921 to 1941

During 1921 - 1931 the increase in population was due to an increase of about 40 per cent in the production of wheat and almost 100 per cent in the production and export of cotton. Between 1931 and 1941 industries started to develop in Faisalabad and in this period three large cotton mills, including the Lyallpur Cotton Mills which was completed in 1934, were set up. Labour for these mills was also imported from eastern Punjab thus increasing the settler population.

1.3.3 Between 1941 to 1961

In the period between 1941 and 1951 the population of Faisalabad increased by 155.7 per cent. The reason for this was an influx of refugees from India into the city. The Sikh and Hindu population were forced to leave the city and their properties were occupied by Muslims coming from India. However, the influx of Muslims was much larger than the Sikh and Hindu population that left Faisalabad. Camps for the incoming refugees were set up near the city centre and these eventually became permanent settlements. Almost all these settlements were on agricultural land belonging to the Sikhs. A camp was also set up for the out-going Sikh and Hindu population. This camp was also on agricultural land around Khalsa College and it also developed into *katchi abadis* for the incoming refugees. In addition to the refugee influx, anarchic conditions in the countryside, as a result of the partition of British India, forced many people into the city.

In the period between 1951 to 1961 the population again increased by 147.62 per cent. This was because of two reasons: one, Faisalabad was declared an industrial zone with a tax holiday as an incentive for investors. Because of this a large number of textile mills came into being. Two, green revolution technologies were introduced in the agricultural hinterland of Faisalabad. This forced, and continuous to force, a large number of peasants off their land or requires that at least one member of the family of small landowners works in the urban areas so that the household can be sustained. Between 1947 and 1958 the number of industrial units increased from 20 to 690.

1.3.4 Between 1961 to 1981

During the 1961 - 1971 period Faisalabad increased at a rate of 6.2 per cent per year. Natural growth rate was about 3 per cent. Migration into the city was the result of a demand in the international market for cotton yarn. To meet this demand small looms were installed all over the city and labour from the rural areas moved in to operate them. In addition, there was a growth of industrial activity as well, mainly in the steel fabrication sector and in carpet weaving. Most of these units were small and a large number of these can be categorised as informal or cottage industries. Between 1958 and 1980 the number of industrial units increased from 328 to 8,380 and Faisalabad came to be known as the Manchester of Pakistan.

1.3.5 1981 onwards

Faisalabad has continued to grow at a rate of 3.5 per cent per year. This fall in the growth rate is due to the fall both in the natural growth rate and the migration rate. The rate of increase of industrial units has fallen considerably and the disruption caused in the countryside by the introduction of green revolution technologies in the 1960s, is stabilising. In addition, Pakistan has over-produced both in cotton textiles and in yarn and wheat is no longer an item of export.

2. URBAN PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES

2.1 The Agencies Involved

The nature and functions of government institutions involved in development in Faisalabad are similar to that of other large cities in Pakistan. These institutions are the Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA); the Faisalabad Municipal Corporation (FMC); the Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA); and the Cantonment Board.

2.2 The Faisalabad Development Authority (FDA)

2.2.1 Nature

The FDA is a statutory body and functions under the control of the Housing, Physical and Environmental Control Department of the provincial government. It is not an elected body but the mayor of the city is a member of its governing council.

2.2.2 Functions

The FDA is a policy making body for the development of the city and it is also in-charge of arranging for and supervising such development. In addition, it is responsible for the formulation and administration of building regulations, management of parks and gardens and subsoil water management. The FDA, through WASA, is also responsible for the provision of water supply, sewerage and drainage. It is also responsible for the upgrading of slums and *katchi abadis* and traffic engineering.

2.2.3 Finances

The FDA raises finances through land development and its sale; lease, regularisation and issue of building permits; federal and provincial loans and grants, which are sometimes a part of foreign assistance for urban development projects. The FDA, like all other development authorities in Pakistan, has an increasing financial deficit.

2.3 The Faisalabad Municipal Corporation (FMC)

2.3.1 Nature

The FMC consists of a “political” section and an “executive” section. On the political side is the elected municipal council with the mayor as its head. Each councillor represents his ward which, at an average, consists of a population of 50,000. On the executive side the FMC is a part of the provincial department of local government, which at the corporation level is headed by the municipal councillor who belongs to the provincial bureaucracy. The relationship between the executive and political wings is governed by the 1979 Punjab Local Body Ordinance. The Ordinance gives the executive the power not only to over-rule the decisions of the council, but to suspend or supersede the council for a period of six months if, in the opinion of the executive, the council has not managed its affairs satisfactorily.

2.3.2 Functions

The FMC is responsible for the maintenance and repair of roads; street paving in certain areas; removal of encroachments; fire fighting; provision and maintenance for street lighting and road signs; primary education; maintenance of tertiary open drains; health and sanitation; solid waste management; and recreation and social welfare. In addition, the FMC

also gives grant in aid to its councillors so that they may carry out small urgently needed developments in their areas. However, these works are limited to building open drains, street paving and street lighting. Each councillor receives an average of about Rs 600,000 per year as grant in aid.

2.3.3 Finances

The FMC raises revenues through Octroi; property tax; tax on transfer of property; rents and conservancy charges.

2.4 Water and Sewerage Authority (WASA)

2.4.1 Nature

WASA is a department of the FDA and the FDA Director General (DG) is its chairman.

2.4.2 Functions

WASA is in-charge of planning, developing, operating and maintaining water supply, sewerage and drainage and is empowered to collect charges for these services from the beneficiaries.

2.4.3 Finances

WASA's main source of revenue is from water and sewerage charges. However, power and operating costs of WASA are increasing while revenues do not show a corresponding increase. There are a large number of illegal and uncharged for connections that deny revenue to WASA.

2.5 Cantonment Board

The Cantonment Board looks after the cantonment area. It is in-charge of local development, operation of services and maintenance of the cantonment area. Its source of revenue is through conservancy charges, property tax, development charges, lease charges and various natures of fees, such as for building permits and regularisation of buildings and land use changes. The Cantonment Board has its own building bye laws and there is no coordination between its development programmes and that of the FDA.

2.6 MNA/MPA Funds for Development

Since 1985 Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and Members of the Provincial Assembly (MPAs) have received yearly funds of up to Rs 10 million and 5 million respectively for development works which they identify and have them implemented by the government agencies that they identify as well. In Faisalabad there are three MNAs and six MPAs and as such over the last 14 years they have received over Rs 630 million. The MNAs and MPAs identify schemes for their constituencies on an ad-hoc basis. These schemes are not part of a larger plan for the city and as such they often create more problems than they solve. Also, the contractors for the implementation of these schemes are chosen on a political basis. These two factors put together, adversely effect the functioning of government agencies without benefiting the constituencies of the MNAs and MPAs and often create conflicts within communities.

2.7 Some Conclusions Regarding the Nature of Local Government Institutions

2.7.1 Non-participation of Communities in Decision Making on Policy and Implementation

The FDA is the policy making body for the development of Faisalabad. It is not an elected body, and nor is it subservient to any representative institution at the local level. As such, the technocrats who man it, as a rule belong to the affluent classes, and do not interact with the representatives of the people at the micro level, nor do they feel obliged to take their point of view into consideration when dealing with policy matters. The only link of FDA with the people is through the mayor, who is a member of the governing board of the Authority. This governing board is dominated by the bureaucracy.

2.7.2 Ineffectiveness of the FMC

The FMC is an elected body. However, it has no relationship with the FDA, except for the fact that its mayor is a member of the FDA's governing body and as such no say in policy matters on development. Even in the functions it performs, it is subservient to the executive of the provincial government, whose political and economic interests (in certain political conditions) conflict with those of the city. Its survival depends entirely on the wishes of the provincial bureaucracy.

2.7.3 Revenue Collection

Revenue collection in all agencies shows a major default in recovery of taxes and an increasing number of unbilled for utility connections. In addition, the *katchi abadis*, for the most part have not been brought into the property tax net. Although there is a municipal councillor for every 50,000 population, the system of recovery stays in the hands of a highly centralised bureaucracy who are finding it increasingly hard to deal with Faisalabad's rapidly expanding population.

Revenue shortfalls mean that the ambitious development projects of the various agencies cannot be fully implemented and their partial implementation is in many ways more detrimental for the city than no implementation at all. In addition, this revenue shortfall makes the city increasingly dependent on provincial government funds which in the past two decades have proved to be extremely unreliable.

2.8 FAISALABAD AREA UPGRADING PROJECT

2.8.1 Background

In July 1989 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the governments of Pakistan (GOP) and Britain allocating PS 25 million as UK bilateral aid for social sector projects in Pakistan. In November 1989 it was agreed that the Overseas Development Agency (now Department for International Development)-GOP would develop a slum improvement / urban upgrading project in Faisalabad called the Faisalabad Area Upgrading Project (FAUP). Faisalabad was identified by ODA as the project site since it has a population of 2 million which was considered the correct size for a project of PS 10 – 15 million.

2.8.2 Objective of the Project

The objective of the Project is to promote economic and social welfare in slums and *katchi abadis* of Faisalabad. To achieve this, the Project aimed in 1989 to: i) provide income generation opportunities in the slums and *katchi abadis* through an investment of RS 6.8 million; and ii) develop physical and social infrastructure through an investment of RS 5.1 million. Project area communities are supposed to generate PS one million or one-twelfth of the total cost.

To achieve the above the participatory “process” approach to urban development has been adopted. Special emphasis is laid on tackling the problems of women in development by providing training in broad WID issues, gender analysis and planning. FAUP is not to implement a separate WID component but gives priority to women's needs as part of an integrated programme in which men will be involved.

2.8.3 Short History of the Project

Consultants started working on the Project in mid-1992 when a revised time-table was established for the programme. By December 1993, the PC-1 for the Project was approved by the government of Pakistan and letters were exchanged between the two governments. By January 1994, the process of team building and training of the staff begun and a core team for the Project Management Unit (PMU) was established. From January 1994, work began in the field and a process of building up a rapport with the community began. The Project Area was divided into four pilot areas and these were surveyed and mapped. Details of the pilot areas are given in the table below.

Table – 2.8.3

FAUP Pilot Areas

Abadi	Type	Population	Houses	Area (in acres)
Shadab Colony	Slum	18,000	2,100	100
Rasool Nagar	<i>Katchi abadi</i>	2,500	285	7
Khan Model Colony	Slum	1,600	232	25
Noor Pura	Slum	1,900	311	38
Chak 7/JB	<i>Katchi abadi</i>	15,000	1,800	75
Islam Nagar	<i>Katchi abadi</i>	21,000	2,361	49
Total		60,000	7,100	294

Source: FAUP Reports

A working relationship between FAUP, WASA, FMC and the social sector line departments has been attempted and work with some of them has been undertaken. Progress has not been as effective as the FAUP staff would have wanted it to be. They attribute this to a lack of interest on part of government agencies and the slow working of government departments.

Phase – 1 of the Project (now complete) was of 2 years and was to cover a population of 60,000 in 4 pilot areas. Phase – 2 (4 years) was to cover an additional 180,000 population.

2.8.4 Structure of FAUP

a) Project Management Unit (PMU):

The FAUP is managed by the PMU which is an autonomous body within FDA. It is responsible for contacting government line departments and agencies and coordinating FAUP's work with them. The DG of FDA is the FAUP director and chairman of the FAUP Steering Committee. The FAUP Additional Project Director (APD) is appointed by the FDA from its staff. The role of the PMU as envisaged by the PC-1, includes creating Multi-Purpose Community Organisations (MPCO), involving communities in the planning and implementation of infrastructure, health, education and enterprise projects. These projects are identified and selected by MPCOs and approved by a Project Approval Committee (PAC) headed by APD. This process is very different from normal practice of government.

b) Community Development Unit (CDU):

The CDU consists of a senior social organiser who works with a team of male and female social organisers. There is one male and one female social organiser for every pilot area. Their function is to develop awareness, help communities identify their needs and develop proposals for neighbourhood projects that can be supported by the FAUP.

c) PMU Specialists Unit:

This unit consists of specialists who work in close coordination with each other, and with the senior social organiser and his/her team. The specialists consist of a senior engineer, an economist/monitoring and evaluation specialist, education specialist, health specialist, and enterprise development specialist. The specialists in the unit are to develop an overall understanding of the conditions and issues in the Project Area and their larger linkages and develop the detailed designs, implementation and procedures for their work. In addition, they are to advise the CDU in their respective disciplines for projects that have been identified.

d) Foreign Consultants:

Foreign consultants work within the FAUP in advising and assisting the Project Manager and his special staff. Short term consultants have made regular visits as well. These consultants consist of urban health, education and enterprise development experts.

e) Steering Committee:

The Project Steering Committee consists of DG FDA (chairman); Project Manager FAUP (secretary); ODA Consultant Project Management Advisor; Managing Director WASA; mayor FMC; DG *Katchi Abadis*, Punjab; representatives from the Punjab Planning and Development Department; Finance Director PMU; NGO representative; a member of the public; and any other person co-opted by the Committee.

2.8.5 Operational Procedures and Achievements

The operational procedures of FAUP are given in **Box - 1: Operational Procedures and Role of Communities**. The achievements of FAUP are given in the table below. In addition to the achievements given below, a major achievement of the FAUP is that it has been able to set up a fully equipped office in an apathetic, if not openly hostile environment, and promote the concept of community participation in government planning.

Box - 1: FAUP: Operational Procedures and Role of Communities

Community Interaction Strategy:

This strategy consists of: i) familiarisation with area (reky survey); ii) individual contacts and project introduction; iii) community meetings and describing project details; iv) formation of multi-purpose community organisations (on basis of participatory approach rather than representation); v) identification of key persons (activists); vi) needs expressed and prioritised; vii) development of options; viii) project preparation; ix) project approval by community; x) implementation/execution; xi) impact monitoring/evaluation; and xii) amendments as a result of the learning process.

Role of Communities:

For tertiary level projects the role of communities in FAUP projects is: i) initial identification is done by the community and forwarding the resolution to FAUP; ii) community agrees to pay 50 per cent financial contribution in cash or kind; iii) possible options are developed with the community; iv) cost estimates are shared with the community; v) a joint bank account is operated with the community; vi) an implementation committee is formed to execute the project; vii) implementation committee purchases the material and hires the labour/workers; viii) community remains involved in the execution of the projects; ix) community signs to verify the purchase receipts; x) community maintains the account register; xi) community signs the completion certificates; and xii) community resolves the disputes, if any, during execution.

For secondary level projects line agencies are responsible for planning, designing and implementation and full financing of the Project. However, communities are involved as follows: i) initially the projects are identified by the community in consultation with the PMU; ii) community is taken into confidence with respect to design and implementation; iii) community is made responsible for the removal of encroachments (if any) and for the timely execution of the project; iv) community is involved in day to day monitoring of the project to maintain the quality of work; and v) community approaches the line agencies to resolve issues, if any arise.

In primary level projects, line departments are responsible for planning, designing, implementation and financing. The community is involved only in identifying the issue.

Source: FAUP reports

Table – 2.8.5

FAUP Achievements**Type and Number of Projects Up to June 30, 1997**

Activity	Type	No. of Projects	Total Cost (Rs)	Sharing (Rs)		
				FAUP	Community	Other Deptt.
Sewerage	Secondary	17	7,624,850	7,515,150		
	Tertiary	30	599,018	299,509	299,509	
Road/street paving	Secondary	2	5,753,000	5,753,000	-	
	Tertiary	22	545,470	272,735	272,735	
Water supply	Secondary	2	7,596,000	7,596,000	-	
	Tertiary	-	-	-	-	
Street illumination	Secondary	1	38,000	38,000	-	
	Tertiary	-	-	-	-	
Park development	Secondary	-	-	-	-	
	Tertiary	16	670,650	335,325	335,325	
School development		55	3,835,960	3,282,332	553,628	66,500
Percentage			100	85.58	14.41	1.72

Source: FAUP reports

2.8.6 FAUP Evaluation

It is difficult to evaluate the FAUP in terms of sustainability since its reports do not furnish us with any accounts. However, an Institutional Review of the project in March 1997 has raised concerns regarding sustainability once ODA funds are no longer available. Concerns regarding replication have also been raised and options for change have been suggested, which include taking the project out of government and implementing it through an NGO which will take the place of the PMU. Problems of working as a government institution with a non-government strategy have also been identified by the Institutional Review. In physical terms FAUP's impact has so far not been substantial and nor has it been able to bring about a major change in the functioning of government planning. However, it can be an important support organisation to NGOs and CBOs working in the development sector in Faisalabad if it agrees to support them rather than only the MPCOs that it helps create.

3. URBAN PLANNING AGENCIES: FUTURE AND PRESENT PLANS**3.1 The Faisalabad Master Plan**

In addition to the FDA, FMC, WASA and Cantonment Board, there are other agencies as well who are involved in the development of Faisalabad. These include the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA), a semi-autonomous body of the federal government; and the Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited, a public sector corporation under federal control, that provides natural gas for domestic and industrial purposes. Thus, the responsibility for planning, development, delivery and maintenance of services is shared by a large number of agencies sometimes operating under independent statutory regulations. Since the powers of FDA and FMC over these agencies are limited, the task becomes extremely complex. To overcome this problem, a master plan directorate was established in the FDA in 1976 to revise and update the 1968 Master Plan or if necessary to prepare a new plan.

After preliminary studies and surveys the work on the Master Plan (or structure plan as it was called) was suspended because the provincial Planning and Development Department insisted on engaging experts for the evaluation of the proposals while the FDA requested for permission to engage consultants to develop the plan. The controversy was finally resolved in January 1985 and the services of a professor from the University of Engineering and Technology, Lahore as consultant were acquired and the plan was finalised under his supervision in 1985.

The plan was not implemented due to absence of institutional coordination, political leadership and funds. Meanwhile, Faisalabad continued to grow. In November 1993, when the then Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, visited Faisalabad, the citizens demanded the preparation and implementation of a new do-able plan. As a result, she directed the Commissioner of Faisalabad Division to prepare a practical master plan and promised that resources would be diverted and utilised for its implementation.

Experts available in Faisalabad were constituted into a team for this exercise. They prepared the outlines of a plan on an “issue basis” which they felt would serve the needs of the city for the next 25 years. This plan consisted of four sectors; i) roads and transport; ii) environmental improvement; iii) social sector development; and iv) water and sanitation. The reasoning behind these four sectors is given below.

3.1.1 Roads and Transport

One of the major components of the Master Plan was the immediate improvement to the road infrastructure inside and around the city of Faisalabad. It was felt that the absence of good roads, pavements and rainwater drainage, was the major reason for congestion, environmental pollution, economic losses due to slow transportation of goods and material, and the yearly washing away of the road infrastructure due to the monsoons. The details of the proposals for this sector are given in Appendix – 2 Table – 1. It was estimated that its implementation would cost Rs 3,505.80 million. However, according to Faisalabad communities, not even 10 per cent of this work has so far been implemented. Apart from resource constraints, one of the major problems in building the roads was that road widening was an integral part of the schemes. In many cases, there are encroachments along the road and their removal is politically not feasible. Also, there are no funds or lands for rehabilitating the affectees.

3.1.2 Environmental Improvement

The Plan pointed out that the physical growth of Faisalabad has been disorderly and not subject to any regulation. People had converted their residences into industrial establishments and occupied amenity areas and infrastructure reservations. *Katchi abadis* were also growing and densifying and major wholesale markets, industrial estates and bus and cargo terminals were now within the city. These activities were causing environmental pollution, congestion and due to their expansion, inappropriate land use changes were taking place. The shifting of much of these activities was proposed along with a number of other measures. The details of the proposals for this sector are given in Appendix – 2 Table – 2. Its total cost was Rs 435.10 million of which Rs 258.60 million were to be raised through sale of constructed assets and from NGOs. Very little work has been done on these proposals.

3.1.3 Social Sector Development

The Plan felt that the enormous development that Faisalabad had made in industry and trade had no doubt improved its economic situation. However, Faisalabad had also grown without planning and as such the quality of life of its citizens had suffered considerably. Therefore, a number of social sector and institutional complexes were proposed for the city. The details are given in Appendix – 2 Table – 3. The cost of building these facilities was estimated at Rs 1,270.66 million of which Rs 533.17 million were to be raised by sale of constructed assets and from NGOs.

Attempts at implementing these proposals have been made. The fruit and vegetable market was shifted from within the city. It is now about 20 kilometres from the centre of Faisalabad. As a result, prices of vegetable have increased. The traders have now decided to build their own market on the Faisalabad bye-pass. Public latrines were also built, but somehow they have disappeared. According to residents, they have been converted into shops through an arrangement between FMC staff and entrepreneurs. Three incomplete sports complexes, on which no work is being done at present, were a part of this plan.

3.1.4 Water and Sanitation

The Plan considered water, sanitation and drainage to be the most important problems facing Faisalabad. It noted that these systems had not grown because of which the living conditions, health and mobility of the people were adversely affected. It is also noted that due to the topography of the region there are several sewage pumping stations which stop functioning during electricity load shedding or failures. As a result, large areas that the sewage system serves get inundated. Also, since there are no sewage treatment plants, raw sewage is discharged into water bodies, depressions and into the irrigation drainage systems. As great emphasis was given on this sector by the Plan, and since water, sanitation and drainage issues have been the expressed priorities of Faisalabad NGOs and CBOs, plans developed for this sector are given below in detail.

3.2 Water, Sanitation and Drainage Plans

3.2.1 The 1975-2000 Master Plan

A water, sanitation and drainage master plan was prepared with the financial assistance of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 1975-76. The Plan was for a 25 year period till 2000. Phase 1 of the Plan was approved by Executive Committee for National Economic Cooperation (ECNEC) in 1985 (after 10 years) for Rs 1,513.26 million, which was subsequently revised and approved for Rs 2,412.12 million in 1992. The salient features of Phase 1 of the project are given in Appendix – 3 Table 1.

If Phase 1 had been implemented, 80 per cent (or 1.12 million population), 63 per cent (or 0.88 million population), and 82 per cent (or 1.15 million population) of Faisalabad population would have been served with water, sewage and drainage facilities respectively. However, the project could not be completed due to shortage of funds. Water supply targets were achieved for the most part and commissioned in July 1992. The sewage component of Phase 1, which was only 18 per cent of the project cost, could not be completed. As a result, the additional water supply has added considerably to the sewage and drainage problems of Faisalabad. The details of the remaining Phase 1 water supply works costing Rs 56.13 million and or sewerage works costing Rs 283.44 million are given in Appendix – 3, Tables 2 and 3. At present, only 32 per cent of Faisalabad is served by a proper water borne sewage system.

The drainage channels, however, were completed, and in the absence of a sewage system, are being used for collecting and carrying of domestic as well as industrial affluent.

3.2.2 The Updated Water, Sanitation and Drainage Master Plan

Since the 1975-2000 Master Plan could not be implemented, it was updated in 1992-93 for the next 25 years or up to the year 2018. It is to be implemented in three phases (including Phase 1 described in section 3.2.1). Phase 2 deals with short-term needs up to the year 2000 and the remaining 2 phases are classified as long term needs up to 2018.

a) Water Supply:

A summary of short and long-term water supply development needs are given in Appendix – 3, Tables 4 and 5. Short term needs require an investment of Rs 463 million. Since these funds are not available the Plan has identified immediate needs. These are given in Appendix – 3, Tables 6 and 7 and their cost has been worked out at Rs 89 million. A major part of the work consists of laying a distribution system.

b) Sewage:

Sewage targets of Phase 1 were to be completed by 1988-89 but none of the items could be completed and due to an increase in population and water supply, conditions have deteriorated considerably. The 1992-93 updated Master Plan has identified both short and long term requirements for the city. These are given in Appendix – 3, Tables 8, 9 and 10 for short-term requirements and in Appendix –3 in a note “Long Term Requirements for Sewage”. Areas in Faisalabad that are without sewage are listed in Table 11. Rs 877.27 million are required to implement the short- term development works under Phase 2 of the Plan.

Due to financial constraints, it became obvious to the planners that the short-term needs could not be met. As a result, immediate sewage needs were identified in 1992-93 and a scheme called “Faisalabad Sewage and Drainage Project” was prepared. It had 2 parts which are described in Appendix – 3, Tables 12 and 13. The Project was approved by PDWP on 19 July 1993 for a cost of Rs 97.93 million. An allocation for Rs 20 million was made for it in ADP 1993-94. However, the scheme was deleted from the ADP later on due to a lack of funds. It is important to note that a major component for sewage development is the installation of tertiaries.

3.3 Financial Constraints of FDA, WASA and FMC

FDA's budget for the last 3 years is given in Appendix – 4 Table 1. It shows that in 1996-97 and 1997-98 the ratio of development to non-development budget is almost 1:1. However, in 1998-99 the development budget is far less than the non-development budget. If this trend continues Faisalabad will face very serious problems in dealing with the demand for infrastructure and amenities. Also, the budget shows a large gap between proposed and actual figures. This, points to a serious problem in relating planning to available resources.

WASA's budget for 3 years is given in Appendix – 4 Tables 2.1 and 2.2. The tables show that WASA operations have resulted in severe deficits and that expenditure has been increasing faster than revenues. Three years back (1996-97) WASA's position was much better as it showed an opening balance of Rs 71.42 million which has declined considerably in the next 2 years. The 1998-99 budget (to February 1999) shows a deficit of Rs 7.65 million. This means that WASA is in deep financial crisis and that it will have to either cut down its badly needed development works or borrow from external sources to meet its

expenditures for the current year as well as for the years to come. Then, it will have problems servicing its debts and will become a big burden on the provincial government.

FMC's budget is given in Appendix – 4 Table 3. The FMC budget shows that over the years the Corporation has managed to maintain a balance between expenditure and generation of revenue. However, it needs to increase its revenues so that larger sums can be spent on infrastructure development. Unfortunately, the FMC's administrative and overhead costs have been increasing far more in proportion to its development budget.

4. FAISALABAD: THE GROUND REALITIES

4.1 Economy and Employment

4.1.1 Industry

a) The Trend towards Smaller Units:

Faisalabad is the largest industrial city of Pakistan after Karachi. According to the Faisalabad Master Plan Survey, 1985, in 1947 it had 20 industrial units. By 1985, these had increased to 8,620 of which 4,695 were looms and an additional 23 were big textile units. In addition, there were 1,191 steel fabrication units and 682 carpet manufacturing units. Due to the large number of looms and textile units, Faisalabad has often been called the Manchester of Pakistan. However, it is no Manchester because by 1985 over 6,200 of its 8,620 industrial units were small units in the category of "cottage industries" whereas before 1962 almost all of its 690 units at that time, were large and medium size ones. This change from large and medium size units to small ones has continued since 1985 and has had a big impact on the physical and social environment in and around Faisalabad.

b) The Causes for Smaller Units:

In the 1960s the government declared all textile units of 4 looms and less as cottage industry and exempted them from tax. As a result, bigger units were broken down into smaller units and disbursed throughout Faisalabad low-income settlements. Also, this discouraged investments in larger units for the future. Again, in the 1980s the government declared all units of up to 40 looms as cottage industry and although they were not exempt from tax, they were given tax rebates. The result was that the larger factories that had survived, such as the Kohinoor Textile Mills, which had 5,000 looms, have also been wound up and their properties sold to real estate developers. At present, it is estimated that there are over 175,000 looms in the Faisalabad area.

c) Government Plans for Industrial Estate and Markets:

The FDA has not been able to provide space for industrial growth. As such, agricultural land around Faisalabad has been subdivided and turned into industrial areas. Conditions in these areas are described in **Box – 2: Faisalabad's Industrial and Commercial Areas**. Faisalabad is also a major business and commercial centre due to industrial activity which is closely linked to its cotton and wheat producing hinterland. It manufactures tractor spare parts, trolleys, harvesters, diesel engines, generators and other machinery and tools used in agriculture. It is also a major market for scrap metal which is recycled in many of the Punjab intermediate cities. For this enormous industrial and trading activity, FDA has provided only a few markets which are listed in Appendix – 5.

Box – 2: Faisalabad Industrial and Commercial Areas

Most of Faisalabad industrial and commercial areas have developed informally. Even those that have been developed by the government develop a lot of informal activities in them that occupy open spaces meant for activities such as vehicle parking and loading and unloading bays.

Maqbool Road is an important industrial area of Faisalabad. It is about 5 kilometres south-west of the Clock Tower. According to the factory owners of the area, it contains between 150 to 200 factories and foundries. These factories manufacture harvesters, threshers, trolleys and various components for agricultural machinery. These products are exported to all the major market towns of Pakistan. The area also includes textile units which undertake dyeing and washing. The water for these activities is acquired by tube wells within the factories. The area was developed after 1959 before which it was all agricultural land. It has been leased by the users from the original owner. There are about 20,000 workers working in these factories. About 30 per cent of them are from the city and the rest come from nearby villages. Environmental conditions at Maqbool Road are bad. There is no drainage system and therefore the large quantities of water used by the textile industry cannot be disposed off. In addition, there is no proper sewage system as a result of which the sewage gets mixed up with waste water, creating environmental problems and problems of movement for vehicles and pedestrians. The undrained waste water and sewage have completely destroyed the asphalt topping of the roads as a result of which the roads have large ruts in them. There are no proper facilities for loading and unloading or for parking of cargo carrying vehicles. They simply occupy the inundated roads. Maqbool Road itself is being widened and carpeted. In doing this, the needs of the foundries and the shops have not been taken into consideration. As a result, problems related to loading and unloading will increase considerably. The Maqbool Road factory area is under threat of shifting as the government wishes to relocate it outside Faisalabad municipal limits.

Adjacent to Maqbool Road is Faisalabad's scrap market. Ten to twelve years ago this market used to be on Summandri Road. It was shifted here by the FMC when Summandri Road was being widened. The land on which it is located was all agricultural. According to the scrap dealers, they purchased this land directly from the landlord and the FDA and FMC had nothing to do with it. There are more than 100 dealers in the market who buy scrap through tenders in newspapers. Very few mobile scrap dealers come here to sell. The market deals almost entirely in scrap steel. This is used in the foundries to make billet, rolled steel, tires, girders and in the light engineering industry. Almost all the labour in the market comes from nearby villages by bicycle. As the market is outside the municipal limits, the FMC does not provide it with water, sewage, road paving and electricity. There is a scrap dealers association but its role in the provision of services is negligible. As a result, the environmental conditions in the market are bad. There is congestion, absence of traffic and cargo handling management and the roads are without proper paving. The scrap market dealers complain that business is decreasing since there is very little money in the market and it is impossible to get a formal loan for purchasing of raw material. They claim that if loans were available they could improve not only their business but also the environmental conditions in the market. Many would like to shift to a better and more accessible location.

212 Market is the central iron market of Faisalabad. Manufactured steel products such as mild steel bars, girders, angle iron are sold over here. The land, on which the market is located, was agricultural and a market was planned on it by the FMC in 1980. The plots were auctioned by the Agricultural Department and uniform shops were constructed by FMC. The shops have covered *varandahs* in front of them which are now all encroached upon. There are no proper loading and unloading arrangements or space for the parking of cargo and other vehicles. According to the shop owners, there are 8 to 10 workers per shop, including drivers. Ninety per cent of the workers come from the nearby villages and only 10 per cent from the city. Business has reduced considerably in the last 2 years but the shop owners cannot identify the exact reasons for it. They feel that it is because housing construction has slowed down and because no new factories are being built.

Source: Observations and interviews

d) Location of Larger Industrial Units:

In the absence of space within the city the larger industrial units have located themselves outside the metropolitan area on the roads linking Faisalabad to other cities of the Punjab. These units get electricity from the grid system on these roads and locate themselves near drainage channels to the irrigation system so that their affluent can be taken away to the natural water bodies. Informal settlements then develop around these industries. These industries do not require any building permits or other permissions from the FDA or FMC since they are outside Faisalabad metropolitan limits.

4.1.2 Employment

The figures of the 1998 census have yet to be compiled. However, according to the 1985 Master Plan surveys, 52.68 per cent of Faisalabad population was self-employed. Much of this employment was related to micro enterprises servicing the industrial sector. These enterprises consisted of making cardboard boxes for packaging of industrial goods; piece work for the garment industry; rope making; piece work for the shoe making industry; manufacturing components for the light engineering industry; retail outlets; and vendors and hawkers serving transit populations at various transport and cargo terminals in the city. In most manufacturing enterprises, men, women and children of the family work together as most of these activities were carried out in the home. In addition, 23.48 per cent and 11.05 per cent of the work force worked as unskilled and skilled day-wage earners respectively. Only 9.88 per cent of Faisalabad population was employed in regular jobs in formal sector enterprises and 2.89 per cent were in government service.

Estimates vary, but there is a consensus that between 100,000 to 150,000 persons comes into Faisalabad to work from villages up to 25 kilometres away. These villages have really become dormitories and cash earnings are more from employment in Faisalabad than from agriculture. In addition, many Faisalabad entrepreneurs have put up looms in these villages, thus bringing about major social and economic changes.

4.1.3 Repercussions of Industrialisation and Employment Trends

The decision in the 1960s to give a tax holiday to units of 4 looms or less resulted in a proliferation of looms in all the low income settlements and *katchi abadis* of Faisalabad. This meant the generation of noise and air pollution and the emergence of a transport, packaging and services sector to the loom industry causing congestion in the settlements. This has created major problems, not only for the settlements but for Faisalabad as a whole since its infrastructure was not geared to cater to these activities.

The decision to declare units of 40 looms or less has also led to the break-up of large textile industries into smaller ones. This has meant the end of large formal sector trade unions and the emergence of contract labour due to which minimum wage and labour laws can be by-passed. It has also resulted in the old industrial establishments being sold and their land being converted into markets and housing developments, further congesting the city.

The development of industries along the roads linking Faisalabad to other Punjab cities has meant "corridor development" and the use of irrigation and natural drainage channels for the disposal of effluent. This is causing considerable visual pollution and pollution of water bodies. Again, the daily migration of labour into Faisalabad from the neighbouring villages creates problems for the city. This is because the city at a formal level has not organised itself to receive this daily influx. Resting, eating, transport and related activities, toilet facilities, for this influx are all arranged for informally or not arranged for at all. This causes congestion, unhygienic conditions and conflict between providers of these facilities and the establishments whose lands and zones of influence they occupy.



SHOPS IN 212 IRON MARKET



ENCROACHMENTS ALONG THE
RAILWAY LINE



KING WHEAT THRESHER: MAQBOOL ROAD COMMERCIAL AREA



THE FAISALABAD SCRAP MARKET

4.1.4 Present Economic Conditions

In conversations with various communities, real estate developers and traders, one point came across very strongly. Unemployment and a decline in business is taking place. Various reasons have been given by community members and entrepreneurs for this. There is a consensus that the dissolution of the finance companies (examples, Punjab Cooperative and Taj Company) is the main reason. Landlords, common people, traders had invested in these companies who were giving big interest rates. These companies ran away with their money which amounted to Rs 4 billion. This created a sudden money gap. The other reason is the non-functioning of the textile industry. Looms are not working because of the sales tax that has been imposed and the very large increase in electricity charges. Also, since the army moved in to recover WAPDA charges, it has become difficult to have an illegal connection or not pay for electricity. It is generally agreed that if the textile industry functions well, all businesses function well too since money is generated. With no jobs being created, the cost of agricultural subdivisions for housing has also decreased substantially since labour increasingly prefers to cycle, walk or take a bus to Faisalabad from their villages, for work purposes, rather than acquire land for a house. Another reason that businessmen have given for the economic crisis in Faisalabad is the lottery schemes that the banks have initiated. They claim that people are investing their money in these schemes in a big way.

4.2 Housing

4.2.1 The Demand-Supply Gap

Between 1947 and 1998, Faisalabad's population has increased by about 1.9 million. A minimum of 200,000 housing units would be required for this population increase. However, between 1947 and 1998 the government has been able to provide only 38,785 plots and houses. This includes nuclear houses and 22 flats developed for bulldozed *katchi abadi* residents. Details of the housing schemes developed by the government are given in Appendix – 6.

4.2.2 *Katchi Abadis*

As a result of the demand-supply gap, *katchi abadis* have developed all over Faisalabad. These *katchi abadis* are in proximity of the city centre and for the main part, house migrants from India and their descendants. The majority of them are on state land but a sizeable number have also developed on agricultural land vacated by the departing Sikhs and Hindus at the time of partition.

The Katchi Abadi Improvement and Regularisation Programme (KAIRP) was established in 1978. The programme is run by the FDA Katchi Abadi Directorate. Initially, only those *abadis* were to be regularised which had more than 100 units. However, in 1985, the number was reduced to 40 due to which many more *abadis* became eligible for regularisation. A list of *katchi abadis* according to the 1978 and 1985 criteria are given in Appendix – 7. The programme consists of providing a 99-year lease to individual house owners and providing development to the *katchi abadis*. Development consists of providing water, sewerage, gas, electricity, road paving and social sector facilities.

In these *katchi abadis* development works have been partially carried out by different line departments. Lease charges for 5 *marla* (125 square yards) plots is Rs 172 and the cost of more than 5 *marla* plots is recovered on market rates. The lease charge does not include the development cost, which is different for each settlement. In addition to the partial work done by FDA in these *abadis*, area councillors have also invested in their development. However,

the work in these *abadis* has been extremely slow and uncoordinated. The scale can be judged from the table given below.

Table – 4.2.2

Lease Position Regarding *Katchi Abadis*

	Total Settlements	Transferred	Housing Units	Sale deeds issued	Before
Old	13	12	11,885	868	1.1.1978
New	72	36	15,000	600	23.3.1985
Total	85	48	26,885	1,468	

Source: FDA reports

4.2.3 Low Income Un serviced Areas on Private Land

In addition to *katchi abadis*, which can be regularised as they are on government land, there are similar un serviced areas on private land as well. Many of these are so large that it is inconceivable that they can be bulldozed. In most cases, they have acquired legal or illegal water and electricity connections and their councillors and MNAs and MPAs have invested money in their development. A list of these un serviced areas is given in Appendix – 8.


4.2.4 Densification

In the *katchi abadis* and also in the middle income areas of Faisalabad, densities are rapidly increasing because new families are being created. In the middle income areas there is still space to expand both horizontally and vertically. However, in the *katchi abadis* and lower income settlements, plot sizes vary from 2 to 7 *marlas* (50 to 175 square yards). In some of these settlements, there are 10 to 15 people living in one house on 3 to 5 *marla* plots. Vertical expansion of these houses is not possible due to their poor quality of construction. In many cases, these houses are not only used for residential purposes but are also used as business enterprises and workshops. As a result of congestion, houses in many settlements keep changing hands and whoever has the means, moves out to the informal settlements being created through the subdivision of agricultural land on the city fringe. For example in Allama Iqbal Colony, which was developed as 2 –1/2 *marla* plots in 1976, only 15 to 20 per cent of the 5,900 original allottees are left simply because the plots are too small to accommodate an extended family or even a large one.

4.2.5 Informal Subdivisions of Agricultural Land

a) The Housing Demand-Supply Gap:

The large demand-supply gap in housing is met by the development of settlements through the informal subdivisions of agricultural land on the fringes of the present city. The estimates of the scale of such subdivisions vary. According to the FDA, 2 to 3 thousand such plots are put up for sale every year. However, the informal developers claim that the figure is between 6 to 8 thousand. Most of the schemes are small in scale. Usually they have between 50 to 200 plots in each. The plot sizes are of 5, 7 and 10 *marlas*, with the 5 *marla* plots being in the majority.



PLAN OF FAROOQ TOWN, ONE OF THE SCHEMES BEING
DEVELOPED BY GHULAM RASOOL



DEVELOPMENT IN PROCESS: RAISED ROADS AND
STREETS BEING BUILT



ON SITE ADVERTISEMENT OF GULSHAN-I-RAHEEM, AN INFORMAL SCHEME



Office of Khaksar Developers who develop schemes through informal subdivision of agricultural land

Almost all the schemes are within the metropolitan limits of Faisalabad and are located on the roads connecting Faisalabad to the other cities of the Punjab. The price of a plot in these schemes depends on which road it is located off; how far it is from the road; and how far it is from the city. Schemes that are more than 2 to 2-1/2 kilometres from the inter-city roads, do not sell easily. This is because the inter-city roads have transport on them and it is not easy to walk more than 2 to 2-1/2 kilometres. As a result, ribbon development is taking place along the inter-city roads. (For an understanding of the price of these plots and its increase over a period of time see **Box – 3: Informal Subdivisions of Agricultural Land: Description of Settlements**).

Box – 3: A Description of the Informal Settlements Created by Subdivision of Agricultural Land

Faisal Town was developed in 1981-82. It has 180 plots. These plots are of 5, 7 and 10 *marlas*. In 1981, they were sold at Rs 500 per *marla*. Today their cost is over Rs 5,000 per *marla*. The scheme is located on Jaranwala Road. All the plots have been sold but still about 30 per cent remain unoccupied. Most of the people living in the scheme work on looms in Faisalabad. Transport is available as the scheme is near to road.

Mehran Colony is also on Jaranwala Road. The scheme was developed in 1986 and in 1987 the cost of a *marla* was Rs 4,000. At present its cost is Rs 24,000 to 28,000 per *marla*. Most of the people living here came to know about the scheme from the agents of the property dealer. Once all the plots were sold out, the developer had nothing more to do with the scheme. The scheme is totally sold out yet about 20 per cent of the plots are lying vacant. These belong to speculators or to those who have another place to live and do not wish to move here because electricity and sewage facilities are not available. However, a few houses have taken electric connections from an adjacent settlement and the WAPDA bills are shared by all the beneficiaries. Water is not a problem as hand pumps can be installed since the ground water is good. The developer has raised the level of the roads by about 2 feet but not that of the plots. For earth filling of the plots, individual owners employ Afghanis who have the necessary equipment to carry out this work. Most of the people living here are house owners and the settlement residents feel that only 5 to 10 per cent of the residents are renters. The difference in cost of a plot which is filled up to road level and one which is not, is Rs 20,000. The difference between the cost of a corner plot and a non-corner one is Rs 30,000. The developer has laid a sewage system which functions badly and disposes of into a canal which ultimately serves the agricultural fields. Children go to school as there are about 15 private schools in the vicinity which charge between Rs 50 to Rs 100 per child per month.

Ilyas Town is another settlement, also off Jaranwala Road. The scheme has 123 plots which sold at Rs 15,000 per *marla*. All the plots have been sold but only a few have been occupied. The scheme has been developed by the land owner's uncle who is developing another scheme next to Ilyas Town. The scheme was developed in 1992. In all the settlements the residents say that environmental conditions here are much better than in the inner city of Faisalabad and the ground water too is of better quality than that supplied by WASA.

Source: Observations and interviews

c) The Developer and His Mode of Operation:

The most important player in the development of these settlements is the middleman or developer (**see Box – 4: The Informal Developers of Faisalabad**). He purchases land from a farmer, subdivides it into plots and sells it to prospective house builders. Alternatively, he enters into an agreement with the farmer whereby he plans the scheme, develops a bit of infrastructure, finds the buyers, who then make direct payment to the farmer and the middleman gets a commission. However, the most successful schemes are those where the

farmer and the middleman enter into a “joint venture”. These schemes are more successful because payment from the buyers can be recovered in monthly instalments over a 2 to 4 year period. Because of this arrangement, the price of the plots can be increased and at the same time they sell easily since they suit the paying capacity of the buyers. The plots are transferred to the names of the buyers in the records of the revenue department since there is no law preventing this transaction. The strategy of recovering the cost of land in instalments was adopted by the developers only six to seven years ago as a consequence of the declining capacity of buyers to pay for the land in one go or to pay a large sum of money as down payment.

Box – 4: The Informal Developers of Faisalabad

Rana Bashir Ahmed is really an industrial plot developer. For the moment he has no work as no new industries are being set up. However, he has also developed 3 housing schemes. He planned these schemes himself without the involvement of any government agency. No one ever stopped him from carrying out this activity. The schemes that he has developed were never registered anywhere except in the documents of the *patwari*. *Sikni* is not required either if *tatima* is done. Rana Bashir Ahmed says that at present where he is working, land is purchased from the owner at Rs 1.5 million per *kill*a (8 acres) and sold at Rs 25,000 per *marla* (or Rs 5 million per *kill*a). Rana claims that 5,000 to 7,000 plots are being developed in Faisalabad every year on the inter-city roads. He says that people have no other housing option available.

Chaudhary Ghulam Rasool Cheema is another Faisalabad informal developer. His family came from Gurdaspur in India and lived near a village on Jaranwala Road. His first job was as a WAPDA storekeeper. He began this business because his salary was not enough to support his big family. He has been a member of the Pakistan Peoples Party and later of the Pakistan Muslim League. To begin his business he sold a piece of land that he had in his village which is about 20 kilometres distance from Faisalabad. He chose to work along the Jaranwala Road because the people of the area knew him because of his political activities. He planned his first housing scheme in 1990 but work on it started in 1994. Up till now he has completed five small schemes each having 70 to 150 plots. The size of the plots is usually 5 *marla* and the measurements are 30 feet front into 45 feet depth. The streets are 20 to 28 feet wide. He raises the streets 2 feet above the road level. If the streets are not raised then people do not buy the plots because they are afraid that the settlement will get flooded. The earth-work for the streets is done by the Afghanis who have trolleys and jack machines for this job. Local people do not do this work since they have no experience in it and no machinery. For setting up his business he employs two persons as office staff. However, he hires a number of “field workers”. These field workers contact prospective clients, prepare layout on site and supervise earth filling. When a project begins he usually has about 20 field workers who provide forms to the clients at Rs 10. If they sell ten forms in a day they earn Rs 100. For the advertisement of a scheme a pamphlet is prepared and is given in newspapers inviting young middle or metric educated boys to come and work as field staff. These boys go to the areas which are congested or where people do not have their own houses. They brief them about the scheme and try to convince them that they should buy a plot. Most of the boys, who respond to Mr. Cheema’s ad, already have experience in this field. They are given a further incentive of a commission for each plot that they sell. The planning of the scheme is done by Mr. Cheema himself after which the sketches are provided to a draftsman for further development. The draftsmen who work for him are FDA employees and are hired by him on a per job basis. The most important criteria for the purchase of land for the scheme is availability of transport, which means access to the main inter-city road, and electricity. If the land is more than 2 kilometres from the inter-city road, the scheme does not sell. There is no attempt to develop corner plots or commercial plots. It is simply a 5 *marla* subdivision. In the smaller schemes Mr. Cheema provides no services such as water, sewage or electricity. People acquire water by hand pumps, which they later convert to piston pumps, sewage through self-help (it invariably disposes into a canal) and electricity through lobbying with WAPDA. The developer does not keep any plot for speculation but 30 per cent of the plots normally remain unsold for a period of 3 to 4 years. There is a written agreement with the person who purchases the plot and proper records of receipts of instalments paid are maintained. People invariably pay regularly by coming themselves to Mr. Cheema’s office. For the transfer of land from the land owner to Mr. Cheema, both the parties visit the divisional headquarters where land records are kept. Here they pay the legal as well as “the other” charges. In the revenue department

ledger, land remains as agricultural and streets and roads are recorded as amenities. The cost of transfer of land to the developer is borne by the purchaser.

Mr. Cheema is in the process of developing a large housing scheme on 25 acres. He has purchased this land from a brigadier at a cost of Rs 23 million. He and his partner have paid Rs 2 million as an advance for this land. They raised this money by selling their agricultural land. This advance payment has given them the right to plan and advertise the scheme. With the advance instalments they hope to pay the brigadier the full amount in 20 months. In the scheme they have planned parks, schools, and a market. They will also provide water, electricity and sewage. They have plans of getting this scheme approved by the FDA. However, to do this, they will have to pay about Rs 700,000 to the FDA in addition to legal charges. With two-thirds of the money that the brigadier has made by the sale of his land, he intends to educate his children and arrange for their marriages. The remaining third he wishes to give away as charity to the poor in the name of God.

Besides this grand scheme, Mr. Cheema is also developing a small scheme on 2.75 acres. The name of the scheme is Al-Farooq. It has 70 plots of 5 *marlas* each and all of them have been sold but no house has been constructed so far. He purchased this land at Rs 400,000 per acre and is selling it in instalments at Rs 48,000 per plot. He is providing no services.

When Mr. Cheema started his business in 1990, he had to look out for people who wanted to sell their agricultural land. Now that people know that he is in business and has an office where plans are displayed, land owners come to him themselves. Also, wherever he develops a scheme, he puts up a board on which the name, plan and details of the scheme are given. Mr. Cheema says that the success of these schemes lies in the fact that the developers have understood what a poor man can afford to pay and they act accordingly. He also says that if the government could support this activity and provide the developers some loan, then in two to three years time there would be no one left in Faisalabad who was homeless.

Source: Observations and interviews.

The developer has the plan of the settlement drawn up by a draftsman. He is usually an FDA employee. He is paid a lump sum for this work. Once the plan has been prepared, the marketing of the plots begins. The developer gives an ad in the newspapers asking educated young men of middle, matriculate or intermediate education, to apply to him for employment. Their work consists of identifying settlements where people may be in need of new homes due to the expansion of their families. In these settlements they talk to people, often go house to house, and introduce the scheme. They sell application forms to people who are interested and arrange a contact between them and the developer. For every form sold they are paid Rs 10. In some cases they are also paid a commission if they arrange for the sale of plots. Thus, the developer has no regular overheads for marketing his scheme and no regular employees either. According to the developers, the vast majority (70 to 80 per cent) of plot purchasers are from Faisalabad city who want space for their young married children or wish to escape from paying high rents. Many of them move to the new schemes because environmental conditions here are better than in the Faisalabad inner city low-income settlements. However, in spite of the pull factor of the settlements, it takes 10 to 15 years before they are fully occupied. This is because people also buy property for their children and for speculation.

The planning of the scheme is on a grid iron and is determined by the parameters of the *muraba* or square of 25 acres whose dimensions are 1,100 feet by 1,100 feet. The size of a 5 *marla* plot is usually 30 feet front and 45 feet depth. The width of the street is kept between 20 and 25 feet. To promote their work, the developers also print and distribute sensational leaflets. An example of such a leaflet and its English translation is given in Appendix – 9.

d) Facilities Provided by the Developer:

The developers do not provide open spaces or plots for amenities. However, they do raise the level of the roads to 2 feet to 2 feet 6 inches above the level of the land so that flooding does not take place. This work of earth filling for the roads is let out on contract to the Afghans who have the necessary machinery and expertise for it (**see Box – 5: Afghans and Earth Works**). The Afghans acquire this earth from the fields of those farmers whose land is higher than the irrigation channels and who wish to lower the level of their land so as to avoid pumping water for their fields. In some cases, developers do provide a sewage system, complete with underground pipes and manholes. However, a disposal is seldom provided and the sewage either flows into a cesspool, a natural drainage channel or into an irrigation canal. Electricity and water are not provided. Residents collectively struggle to acquire electricity after they have started living in the scheme. They tap the subsoil aquifer for water, and if it is saline, they make a bore adjacent to the nearest canal. Near the canal, the subsoil aquifer is usually potable.

Box – 5: Afghans and Earth Works

Before the Afghan War, the *Pawandas* of Afghanistan used to migrate to the Punjab plains in autumn and stayed put till spring so as to escape the harsh Afghan winter. They used to bring their donkeys and camels with them. During their stay in the plains, they built and repaired mud walls around orchards, carried out earth works related to agricultural infrastructure, and levelled agricultural lands. With the Afghan War many of the *Pawandas* did not go back but settled in the Punjab to become earthwork contractors. They have purchased machinery and live in camps from where they operate.

Ghulam Yasin is one such contractor. He owns one trolley and has been working in the Faisalabad area for the last 10 years. Muhammad Toor Khan is another contractor. He has a jack machine and 10 trolleys. The drivers belong to their clan and they do not get a salary but are paid a “commission” for each item of work that they do. The labour is hired on contract. The Afghan contractors get work orders from landlords and also from contractors working in the urban areas. They purchase earth from agricultural landowners who wish to lower their land so that water can get to it. They pay the landowners Rs 1,500 to Rs 2,000 per *kanal* (about 600 square yards) for a depth of 2 feet. For filling up to 5 feet they charge Rs 50 per *kanal*. For filling a 5 *marla* plot of 5 feet depth they require 4 to 6 days with 2 to 3 labourers working on site. The capacity of one trolley is 350 cubic feet and its cost is Rs 300 on the outskirts of the city and Rs 400 in the city itself. The Afghans are also working in the districts of Sahiwal, Okara, Bahawalnagar and Sheikhpura.

Source: Observations and interviews

e) Reasons for Non-involvement with FDA or FMC:

The schemes developed through the subdivision of agricultural land have no relationship at all with the FDA or the FMC. The legal position is defined in Box – 3. The reason why the developers do not approach the FDA for approval is obvious. The FDA fee for granting approval is Rs 1,000 per acre and 20 per cent of all plots have to be pledged to the FDA. In addition, FDA has elaborate planning standards for roads, amenities and other services. These standards would increase the cost of the scheme by 30 to 50 per cent more than what it now costs the informal developers and the purchasers.

4.2.6 Other Processes of Acquiring Land for Housing

a) ***Katchi Abadis* on Board of Revenue Lands:**

Katchi abadis were developed between 1947 and the late 70s on government land. The refugees came and occupied state land or land vacated by Hindus and Sikhs. Later on these settlements densified because of migration from the rural areas and new settlements were also created on Board of Revenue lands. The process of the creation of these new settlements was simple. A person or a group moved in and occupied a part of the land. After this he negotiated with the lower staff of the revenue office to “buy” this land at a nominal price. After this, he or they, subdivided the land and sold it to incoming migrants. Once the settlements became large enough, they sought the support of their political representatives for survival and ultimate regularisation. Very few such settlements are now being created in Faisalabad because very little Board of Revenue lands are left within the city limits.

b) ***Katchi Abadis* on Railways Lands:**

Katchi abadis on Railways land are still being developed as there is considerable land with the Railways. The Railway Land Department permits a middleman to build a house on Railway land. The house is originally a tent and subsequently becomes a proper house. The boundary of the house slowly expands, enclosing more space and a number of families move into this space. These families pay the middleman who shares this payment with the Railway staff. The middleman then moves on to another piece of Railway land while the settlement he created keeps expanding. Often during the tent phase and the expansion phase, the railway magistrate’s staff initiates processes for the removal of these illegal structures. However, the middleman, who is really the commission agent of the railway staff, negotiates an end to these processes by arranging payment from his clients to the magistrate’s staff and the squatters stay put.

The railway has also started giving a 38-year lease to its employees for constructing houses on its lands. Most of these plots have now been sold informally on the open market and non-railway related families are now living in these settlements along the railway tracks. When the lease expires, it will not be possible to remove these settlements for by then they will have built permanent houses.

c) **Lobbying by People Ejected from Agricultural Lands:**

The area around Faisalabad is agricultural. The process of informal subdivisions and urbanisation also means the ejection of tenant farmers from their lands. It also often means the sale of land on which villages have been built as sometimes this land is owned by landlords. These ejected communities collectively lobby with government agencies, bureaucrats and politicians to acquire land for living on. For an example of such lobbying see **Box – 6: Shaikhanwala**.

Box – 6: Sheikhanwala – Peasants Evicted From Agricultural Land

Sheikhanwala is a settlement adjacent to the lands of an influential landowner. The families who had worked on his land for generations have been evicted by him and have now created this settlement. The settlement is on government land and they have been allowed to live here on a temporary basis. These families were share-croppers and had houses on the landlord’s property. However, this property has now come within the urban sprawl of Faisalabad and the landlord wishes to sell it to developers. The landlord no longer requires the services of these people. They pleaded with him to let them have a small and most inexpensive part of the land so that they could continue to have homes.

They reminded him of the association that their families and him had had for generations. But all the same, he evicted them and they could not seek any legal redress.

These people belong to the Christian community. The church has helped them with advice and put them in contact with concerned officials, but that is all. The people approached their MPAs and MNAs and the record of their meeting was forwarded to the Additional Deputy Commissioner (ADC). The elders of the community met the ADC and requested him to provide them with land at a low cost. The ADC sent them to the *patwari*. The *patwari* came to their settlement for a site survey, after which he asked them to pay Rs 300,000 which works out to Rs 10,000 per family. Against this payment, they will be provided a 3 *marla* plot but they will not be the owners of this land. They will simply be allowed to build their houses and live on it. They are willing to accept this, hoping that this de-facto arrangements will be regularised during some election process. They have already collected Rs 80,000 and given it to the *patwari*. They do not know, or do not wish to say, how much of this money is being paid informally and how much of it is legal. The people living in this settlement now work as day-wage labour in the city or in the agricultural sector. There are 3 to 4 children in each family but they do not go to school, which they used to before.

Other communities evicted from agricultural land have been more lucky than the Sheikhanwala community. One community that was evicted moved onto the railway line when the Faisalabad-Jaranwala line was abandoned. It was a small community. However, once the settlement began, other communities and families (not necessarily evicted ones) came and settled here. They took away the railway tracks and used them as girders for roofing their homes. Nobody stopped them from occupying the land and nobody gave them permission for building their homes. Ground water is available and electricity is supplied by WAPDA and was acquired as a result of negotiations for votes with the prospective MNA and MPA candidates before the elections. The settlement is called Islampura.

Source: Interviews

4.2.7 FDA's Constraints in Providing Support for Housing

According to FDA estimates, developers are subdividing agricultural land for housing on a large scale (2,000 to 2,500 plots per year) to meet the housing demand which is estimated at 7,000 for the low income groups. There is no housing scheme in the public sector at present and nor is there any plan for one in the future. One of the reasons for this is that the FDA does not own any more land. In addition, there is no plan to integrate the informal housing projects into a larger city plan. Out of the total schemes that the informal sector develops, not even 10 per cent are approved by the FDA and in most cases the FDA has no knowledge of them.

The FDA has many problems. It has no source of income. There is no monitoring of developments in the city or of the housing situation. The town planning directorate does not have a proper city map and it cannot prepare one because it has no transport facilities for surveying purposes.

FDA's planning and building permit regulations are complex and expensive for developers to follow. In addition, it has elaborate planning standards for roads, amenities and other services. Therefore, the cost of a plot developed in accordance with its procedures will be unaffordable to low-income groups unless loan facilities are available to them.

Transfer of agricultural land is controlled by the Revenue Department and that too by its *patwaris*. As such, the FDA gets to know of the informal schemes only after construction work has begun on them. By then it is too late to take action and even if it is not too late, the FDA does not have a demolition squad.

Politicians are also a hindrance to the working of the FDA. They have agricultural land and they want to develop it by bye-passing the FDA and in the process saving costs and increasing their profits. The FDA does not have the legal or bureaucratic support it requires to fight these strong vested interests. In addition, the FDA has no land acquisition act and without land it cannot have any housing schemes and without housing schemes and building permits for them, it cannot generate revenues.

Under the conditions mentioned above, The FDA is unable to deal with the housing issues in Faisalabad although it has been given this responsibility in its charter.

4.2.8 The House Building Process

The majority of families, who move onto plots in informal subdivisions, first construct a hut and a boundary wall. Very often the boundary wall is made of sun dried brick or is of in-situ earth. For water supply they install a hand pump or if their neighbour has one they arrange to get water from him. If a few plots are inhabited at the same time, then they get together to install a community pump. Usually, ground water in Faisalabad is brackish except near the irrigation channels. If the water is brackish, they install a pump near the canal if it is not more than one kilometre from their settlement. Women and children fetch water from this pump. The pump is invariably put up on land belonging to the Irrigation Department. Over time the hut, with its thatched roof, is replaced by 9 inch burnt brick walls set in mud mortar. The roof is invariably of steel girders, spanned by T-iron channels which carry brick tiles. Polythene sheets are spread over it for water proofing and earth mixed with straw, about 9 to 12 inches thick, is placed on it for insulation purposes.

Residents often get together to lobby their MNAs and MPAs for an electric connection for the settlement. They usually succeed during an election campaign. Alternatively, if electric lines are not too far from the settlement, an enterprising individual manages to get a connection and then sells electricity to his neighbours. The extension of the distribution system is carried out by an electrician of the settlement, or if one is not available, a WAPDA line man is informally hired for the purpose. Often this sale of electricity does not involve any profits for the individual who has got a connection, and by virtue of providing electricity at cost, he becomes a leader and in the long run may become an important member of a political party.

Initially, waste water and sewage is disposed off in cesspools. As the settlement grows, unpaved open drains carry the waste water to the plots which are empty and which have not been earth-filled to the level of the road. Once these plots get occupied, the residents collectively search for an irrigation channel to which the unpaved drains can connect. The fact that the roads and plots in the settlement are 2 to 2-1/2 feet above the level of the ground, makes this connection possible. Before elections the communities try and get their roads paved and their unpaved open drains lined with brick. This is done through meetings with their current and prospective MNAs, MPAs and councillors.

Many homes have businesses in them. The business part of the house opens onto the road and the residential area is at the back. Bricks for house building are either ordered directly from kilns or are purchased from dealers. There are stores in most settlements that sell roofing elements as well. All dealings for the purchase of construction material are in cash, unlike Karachi where a credit system also operates. Unskilled labour is provided by family members and a mason is hired for putting up the walls and laying the roof. There is no shortage of skilled labour in Faisalabad and the house owners are also aware of building practices and materials, which are similar to those in their villages. As such, they know how to relate to the various actors in the building process (**see Box – 7: The House Builders**).

Box – 7: The House Builders

Subedar Abdul Majeed lives in the informal subdivision settlement of Tariqpur. He purchased this plot in 1985 at Rs 3,000 per *marla*. The size of the plot is 8 *marlas*. He made payment in one go with dues he recovered on retirement from the army. He started construction in 1989 when he built one room and a boundary wall. In 1996, he constructed two more rooms. Bricks were purchased directly from a kiln, because it is cheaper than purchasing them from a dealer. The roof is of wooden beams and planks covered with earth. He says that this is the cheapest form of roofing. He disposes his waste water and sewage into a *khal* and has a hand pump whose water he uses both for drinking and other purposes although it is slightly brackish. There is no electricity in the settlement but he has acquired an individual connection for which he has paid Rs 4,000 to WAPDA.

Kabir Hussain purchased a 2 – 2-1/2 *marla* plot in 1990 at Rs 6,000 per *marla* in the informal subdivision scheme of Kot Umar. There are 400 houses in the scheme consisting of 2 – 2-1/2 and 5 *marla* plots. He made payment at one go and constructed a hut made of thatch. Four years later, he built a proper room with brick walls and a wooden roof. Open paved drains were made by the councillor for the settlement, but they are not functioning since they have got silted up and there is no proper disposal point for them. They dispose into fields and the agriculturists object to it. This is a cause of tension. For drinking purposes they get water from a hand pump near the canal which the community have installed, about half a kilometre away. The family also has a hand pump in the house. Its water is used for other purposes than drinking. There is no school or clinic near the settlement and to reach the main road one has to walk the unpaved road along the canal bank.

Niamat Ali purchased a 7 *marla* plot at Rs 7,000 per *marla* in Nafees Town in 1993. He paid for the plot in 2 instalments of Rs 10,000 each with a gap of six months in between. Funds for the purchase of the plot were raised by selling his buffaloes that he owned in his village. He had enough money to construct a proper brick room with a wooden roof. After six months, he constructed another room and after another four months he constructed a *baithak*. Just six months ago, he constructed a bathroom. The roofs of the rooms, apart from the first one, are of T-iron and brick tiles. He was able to purchase brick on credit because a kiln owner was his relative. If credit had not been available, he would not have been able to have a T-iron-brick tile roof. Like Kabir Hussain, he gets water for drinking purposes from a bore near the canal and has another bore in his house for water for other purposes. The bore in the house cost him Rs 1,900. Sewage is disposed off in unoccupied plots which have not been earth-filled.

Muhammad Rafiq purchased a plot of 2 – 2-1/2 *marla* in 1997 at a cost of Rs 14,000 per *marla* in Nafees Town. He made payment in one go although the possibility of making payment in instalments was there. However, if he had paid in instalments, he would have had to pay about 15 per cent more. He raised finances by selling his agricultural land, his wife's jewellery and a buffalo. He constructed one room and after one year added a shop. A kitchen has just been completed. The floor of the shop is paved but the floors of the rooms are of compacted earth. When he has money he will pave them. He purchased bricks on credit because the kiln owner was known to him. He has repaid this credit in instalments. Without this credit facility he would not have been able to build a permanent room. The credit facility was for Rs 3,800.

Muhammad Arshad has a brick store in Bilal Colony on Jaranwala Road. He purchases bricks from a kiln 4 kilometres away. He has been in business for the last six years. He purchases first quality brick at Rs 980 per thousand and second quality brick at Rs 750 per thousand. This includes Rs 120 for transport per thousand bricks. He sells first quality bricks at Rs 1,200 per thousand and second quality bricks at Rs 850 per thousand. The sale price does not include the cost of transportation. He has no particular kiln from which he purchases bricks. All his dealings are in cash and if he could have a credit line of Rs 10,000 he could triple his business.

On the same road, Muhammad Yaseen owns the Noorani Iron Store. He purchases girders and T-irons for roofing from Lahore and sells them to house builders and contractors. This material comes from Lahore on trailers. Each trailer carries a load of 35 to 40 tons. He can purchase material on credit from the manufacturers or their middlemen- purchasing on credit means paying 20 per cent more. If a bank loan at 18 per cent interest per year was available, it would help him but credit at 20 per cent for purchase is economically not feasible. However, he does not sell material on credit except

to friends and relatives. Two qualities of products are available with him. Number one quality weighs 2-1/2 kg per running foot and number two quality weighs 2 kg per running foot for the girder.

Source: Interviews

4.3 Infrastructure

4.3.1 Existing Conditions

a) Government Planned Housing and Resettlement Schemes:

In the government schemes, sewage, road paving, drainage and water supply are available. The sewage and drainage systems are linked to trunks and pumping stations which dispose into irrigation drains and canals. However, due to poor construction quality and poorer maintenance, the sewage systems do not function well and choking and overflowing of sewage is common. The rain water drainage channels have also been filled in with solid waste and during the rainy season the sewage system carries the rain water. As a result, many settlements are flooded in the monsoons with a mix of sewage and rain water. Due to this there is large scale disease in the post-monsoon period and the roads are badly damaged. They are repaired after a few months in an ad-hoc manner or not at all. Residents consider sewage and drainage related problems to be the most serious ones in their settlements (see **Box – 8: Conditions in the Resettlement Schemes**).

Box – 8: Conditions in the Resettlement Schemes

Mubarikpura was Faisalabad's largest *katchi abadi* and had a population of 10,000 people. Its name was changed to Sir Syed Town after its redevelopment in 1985. The settlement was formed in 1947 when refugees from India came and settled on government land in the factory area near Lyallpur Cotton Mills. It was redeveloped because the level of the streets was much higher than that of the houses. People were literally living in ponds. In the resettlement scheme, space was allocated for a park, school and proper roads. Therefore, all the people could not be accommodated in the redevelopment scheme. These were settled in Ahmedpur, Allama Iqbal Colony and Madina Town. People are happy. They have water, the sewage system works, they have electricity and garbage is lifted almost daily by the FMC staff. The only problem people complain of is that the roads are low lying and in the rainy season water accumulates on them. Most of the population consists of labourers working in loom factories on contract. These loom factories are within the settlements and it is estimated by the residents that they would number about 100. Besides these factories, there are small hosiery, stitching and knitting units.

Allama Iqbal Colony was planned in 1976 to resettle the families dislocated from the factory area *katchi abadis*. In this scheme built quarters on 2-1/2 *marla* plots were provided. Their cost had to be paid by the allottees in easy instalments. This cost is still outstanding and the interest on it has increased many-fold. The land was provided free of cost. The scheme has developed wide roads, water supply, park, school, post office and other amenities, spread over an area of 190 acres. 5,900 quarters and 750 shops were built. Most of the original allottees, about 75 per cent, have left. The reasons given for this is that the quarters are too small to accommodate a large family. They also fetch a reasonable price of Rs 150,000 to Rs 200,000. With this sum one can buy a big plot in the subdivision schemes on the city fringe where environmental conditions are better. Water is not enough in the colony, the sewage only works in the dry season and the roads are in a bad state of repair. People claim that the FMC staff, carries out maintenance and lifts solid waste only when they are paid informally by the residents.

Source: Observations, interviews and FDA reports

b) Conditions in the Inner City *Katchi Abadis* and Semi-serviced Areas:

In the inner city *katchi abadis* and semi-serviced areas, most development works have been done through councillor's schemes. The councillors are only permitted to build open brick paved drains, brick paved streets and provide street lighting. These have been provided in an unplanned manner to most of the inner city settlements. The open drains are supposed to carry waste water and it has been assumed that people will build soak pits for excreta disposal. However, this has not happened and most of the open drains also are directly connected to latrines and therefore, carry excreta as well. Solid waste is often thrown in these drains which results in clogging and flooding. In addition, many of these drains have no disposal points. They simply go and join a larger unpaved drain or directly dispose into a depression. Increasingly, these depressions are being reclaimed, making the functioning of the open drains difficult. Sometimes people pay the owners of these depressions so that they may be permitted to discharge their sewage into them. In many cases, the drains are connected to WASA's sewage trunks. Since they are the disposal for solid waste as well, they clog the WASA system. For these reasons, in the rainy season, the settlements are flooded. However, the streets here are narrow and brick paved. Through traffic and heavy vehicles cannot use them. Therefore, they have the potential of being developed as environmentally friendly areas. In many of these settlements, communities hire sweepers at Rs 15 to 20 per household per month for keeping the streets clean and lifting solid waste. In most cases, this solid waste cannot be disposed off since the FMC manages to lift only 30 per cent of Faisalabad's garbage. Therefore, the solid waste piles up in one location and often results in conflict between the neighbourhood where it is piling up and the neighbourhoods which are the source of the solid waste. Finally, through pressures on the councillors, the waste is lifted and the process begins again. For details regarding conditions in the settlements, see **Box – 9: The Inner City Informal Settlements**.



RAILWAY COLONY KATCHI ABADI



SIR SYED TOWN:
AN FDA RESETTLEMENT SCHEME

Box – 9: Conditions in the Inner City Informal Settlements

Railway Colony No. 1 is near the Railway Station and along the railway track. There are quarters for the Railway employees in this colony. Between these Railway quarters and along side them, refugees from India came and occupied all vacant land at the time of partition. Since then this land has changed many hands. Whenever new construction is built or additions to the old are made, the Railway staff issues a memo and on that basis a report with the police is lodged. People involved in this activity are arrested. They give a bribe to the police, get bail and come out. This activity continued. There is no land left for new houses so houses are built as encroachments on the streets. The sewage system built for the Railway staff is used by the squatters. It is old and does not function properly. Gutters overflow all the time. Possession of the homes is sold. Its price depends on the nature and extent of construction as land has no value. Most of the people are day-wage earners on building sites and in the markets. A few work in the mills and a few have donkey carts. One part of the settlement was bulldozed 5 years ago to construct a road. As a result, 615 houses were evicted. The road has been constructed but people point out that there is still enough place to house 615 homes along the road. The evictees filed a case in the High Court against their eviction. The Court directed the government to provide alternative plots to the affectees not more than 5 kilometres from Railway Colony No. 1 plus Rs 50,000. The government, however, provided only land to the evictees and that to 20 kilometres away at Go Khowal Workshop. Very few people took the plots and those that did, sold them and came back as the plots were too far away from the city and there were no jobs in the vicinity. The people are still waiting for the implementation of the High Court decision. They are willing to purchase land on easy instalments and build their own homes, provided the land is within the city or on the main transport corridors. Meanwhile, they fear eviction. "When we go to sleep at night, we are not sure whether our houses will remain till the next morning".

Mohalla Farid Gunj is on the site of the Camp. People came from India and occupied it. First they erected tents, then, made mud structures and more recently they have built permanent homes. Government has announced a regularisation scheme for this settlement but so far no action has been taken. Services have been acquired as a bargain with political candidates during the last three to four elections. There are no problems in the rains because the settlements unlike others in Faisalabad, is at an elevation. Solid waste is the major problem. People have hired sweepers who collect garbage from the houses and the streets but there is no disposal point and the FMC does not pick up garbage regularly. People are vendors, donkey-cart owners and drivers. About 10 per cent of the people are educated and work in offices. There are no looms in the settlement but some people work in looms situated outside. The community feels that about 20 per cent of the adult population is unemployed. The better houses in the locality are of those people who have gone to the Middle East and sent remittances. A few homes have shifted to Karachi where they are doing much better than they were in Faisalabad. The majority of children do not go to school because schools are expensive and their fees and the cost of books is beyond the reach of 80 per cent of the residents.

Bahadur Singhwala is also on the Camp site. The refugees who settled here are from the Indian cities of Amritsar or Jalandhar. There are over 200 houses in the settlement. The land originally belonged to the Sikhs. The plot sizes vary between 1-1/4 *marla* and 4 *marlas*. Most of the original inhabitants have left to other new settlements where they have acquired larger plots and have houses. Piped water is available through WASA main line and electricity is legally supplied. Sewage has been laid on a self-help basis and requires constant maintenance. It disposes into the WASA trunks and is often clogged which results in flooding of the settlement.

Sources: Observations and interviews

c) Informal Subdivisions of Agricultural Land:

Infrastructure conditions in these settlements have been explained in section 4.2.5. The major problem that these settlements are facing is related to the disposal of waste water and sewage. Since the settlements are higher than the agricultural fields, they have no difficulty in disposing onto agricultural land but often farmers object. However, as urbanisation

expands, settlements have to come together to find a disposal point. This is usually a small irrigation channel. As new schemes are built in the neighbourhood of the old ones, the small channels are also absorbed by the urban expansion and the disposal point has to become an irrigation canal. Disposing into an irrigation canal means pumping since the canals are usually much higher than the agricultural land. Many of the agricultural land subdivision schemes are the expansion of villages. People here own cattle. The disposal of its dung becomes a major problem and clogs up both the drains and the disposal points.

4.3.2 Problems with Councillor, MNA and MPA Schemes

a) Councillor Programme:

The FMC councillors are permitted only to develop open paved drains, brick paved streets and street lighting. Most of the work that is carried out through their programmes is in the *katchi abadis* and low income under-serviced settlements. This work is funded by the grant-in-aid that the councillor receives from the FMC or from funds allocated for the schemes approved in the ADP. Most of this development is haphazard, non-coordinated and substandard in quality. This is because it is done piecemeal over the years since the funds allocated to the councillors are too small to develop the area at one go. As a result, drains built under this programme normally do not function, water does not reach the extremities of the distribution system and often road paving is substandard. Thus, large sums which could be better utilised are wasted.

The problems with the work of the councillor are that they are not according to a master plan for the settlement, as it is unavailable. Consequently, the work that is carried out is done on an ad-hoc basis with no relationship to larger planning considerations. Thus, paved streets are often torn up for laying gas, water and sewage lines and drains empty their effluent onto neighbouring unpaved lanes. Then, in many settlements there is more than one councillor, and a lack of coordination between them makes it impossible to tackle issues that are of a common nature such as an access road or a secondary drain.

The councillor's decision to develop a certain street in a neighbourhood is politically motivated rather than need or planning related. This development is carried out for those who have helped him in the elections, his friends and relatives, or those who can be of assistance to him in the future, that this development may be detrimental to a few other lanes (especially if people who belong to the "rival" group live there), is of no concern to him. In addition, no detail design or supervision for the works is carried out. Often the contractors employed do not even have simple survey instruments and use unskilled labour for skilled jobs. Communities complain that the contractors' profit margins are exceptionally high and that the contract is given not on merit but on the relationship that the councillor has with the contractor. Where the community is organised and has building skills, it manages to get the councillor and the contractor to do a better job and gets lanes re-paved after gas or sewage laying has damaged them. The FMC and its executive are not concerned about the nature and manner of work carried out in the poorer areas, because these areas are not politically powerful.

b) MNA / MPA Funded Development:

MNA/MPA funded development has all the problems that the councillor funded development have. However, there are differences. The MNA/MPA projects are large in scale and can consist of almost any item of development. Their constituencies are also large and as such they often undertake not only on-site or neighbourhood development, but also development that has a direct bearing on city level infrastructure and its planning. However, as this development is also decided upon in an ad-hoc manner, it does not relate to larger city level

plans or to the neighbourhood development that is being carried out through the councillor's programmes or through community efforts. Also, there is no coordination among the projects of different MNAs and MPAs. There is a general consensus, both among neighbourhoods that have been the beneficiaries of these programmes, and the government agencies that have implemented them, that these programmes have benefited only contractors and the MNAs and MPAs. There is a further consensus that they have made a mockery of the master and sector plans developed by the FDA and FMC. Apart from the inappropriateness of the MNA/MPA projects, the work done under them has been substandard and of a much poorer quality than work done under normal programmes.

4.3.3 Problems with WASA Planning

WASA has a master plan for water supply and sewerage. However, due to financial constraints and political pressures, work is not carried out according to the plan but on an emergency and ad-hoc basis. For example, if under the master plan a 10 inch diameter water line is to be laid, but at the time of implementation there are financial constraints, then a 6 inch water line will be laid. Later, when funds for a 10 inch line are available, it is re-laid in addition to the 6 inch line. The same holds good for sewage projects as well. A major problem with WASA master planning is that it is not related to funds that are available, or are likely to be available. Often funds are promised by the provincial government but they are seldom provided. Also, there is no coordination between MNA, MPA and councillor projects, the gas company and WAPDA on the one hand and WASA on the other.

Almost all the inner city *katchi abadis* and under-serviced areas have WASA trunk sewers adjacent to them or laid along side them. However, secondary sewers connecting these settlements to the WASA trunks do not exist and most of the laterals are open paved and unpaved drains. There are also numerous neighbourhoods that have laid an underground sewage system and or water supply distribution lines on a self-help basis or through MNA/MPA programmes. To complete the system, laterals and secondary drains are a priority since garbage from the open drains clogs the trunk sewers, flooding the settlements and also seizing the pumps. In addition, the existing infrastructure has to be integrated into the WASA master plan. However, this infrastructure, including the open drains, has not been documented and as such realistic planning of secondary and primary infrastructure that can integrate it, cannot take place.

WASA's major expenditure is on electricity. There are heavy duty pumping stations both for water supply and sewage disposal. They operate 24 hours a day. When electricity fails, water supply is affected and sewage floods the settlements. Due to solid waste which enters the system, pumps need constant repairs and this also is a major expense. In addition, WASA has problems generating revenue since it bills only "legal" connections. Communities point out that most of the connections are illegal and they will remain illegal because the WASA staff charges for them informally. Recently, there has been a move to bill all those houses for water and conservation charges, which have an electricity connection and are in the municipal limits. The logic being, that they all benefit from the WASA pumping stations. Anjuman Samaji Behbood (ASB), a Faisalabad NGO estimates that this will increase WASA clients from about 50,000 to about 250,000. In ASB's opinion, all the housing and commercial units who discharge their sewage into the WASA system, even if through open drains, should be charged. But for that to happen, plans of the settlements are required and these do not exist.

4.4 Repercussions of Ground Realities

Due to what has been described above, Faisalabad has some of urban Pakistan's worst living conditions with two-thirds of the population living in largely unserviced areas. Over half

of the population have no piped water and less than one-third have sewerage. In 1985, when the last comprehensive survey was carried out, 186,000 people lived in 27,200 houses in squatter settlements on 596 acres of public land, officially classified as *katchi abadis* according to the 1985 criteria. This has grown as discussed in section 4.2.2. This substantial shortage of housing and infrastructure services, particularly for the low income groups is rapidly growing.

Estimates of backlog in 1990 are over 150,000 units including replacement need of 13,000 units for dilapidated stock. Annual requirement to meet population growth are 12,000 new units not accounting for backlog and replacement need. Although there is a dearth of data and information on housing, the following statistics from the 1985 FDA survey provide an overview: i) There were 268,181 households living in 195,452 dwelling units i.e. 1.37 household per unit. ii) There were 432,818 rooms for the estimated 1985 population of 1.4 million i.e. 3.25 persons per room; the 1980 housing census figure was 3.4 persons per room (and 2.1 rooms per unit). iii) Of the 195,452 dwelling units, 48.6 per cent were classified as being in "good" condition, 44.17 in "fair" condition, and 13,043 or 7.3 per cent as dilapidated and/or dangerous; 70 per cent were "*pucca*", 22 per cent were "*semi-pucca*" and nearly 8 per cent were "*katcha*". iv) 78 per cent of households lived in accommodation they owned and 19 per cent in rented premises; this compares to the 1980 figures in the housing census of 74.7 per cent and 16.4 per cent respectively. v) 95.7 per cent of the dwelling units were on plots of less than 10 *marlas* (76.7 per cent were less than 5 *marlas*); 2.8 per cent were between 11 *marlas* and 1 *kanal* and only 1.5 per cent above 1 *kanal*. In terms of availability of infrastructure services, the 1985 FDA survey results are summarised in the following table:

Table – 4.4
Infrastructure Services - 1985

	Households	
	Numbers	Percentage
Water:		
- Piped	85,071	42.0
- Community Taps	7,431	3.7
- Hand Pump	109,710	54.0
- Wells	243	0.3
Sanitation:		
- Sewerage	64,724	32.0
- Septic Tank		3.2
- Night-Soil	97,361	48.1
- Others	33,871	16.7
Energy:		
- Gas	64,016	31.6
- Electricity	167,071	82.5

Source: Greater Faisalabad Master Plan (1986)

The conditions described by the 1985 statistics could not possibly have improved since then because there is an increasing gap between Faisalabad's expansion and densification and

what the government agencies have been able to provide. The situation is similar in other intermediate cities of Pakistan but in the Faisalabad case it is more serious since Faisalabad is an industrial city and as such its economic activity generates serious environmental pollution which damages not only the city, but the natural environment around it.

5. THE WORK OF THE ANJUMAN SAMAJI BEHBOOD, DHUDDIWALA

5.1 Dhuddiwala, Hasanpura and Rasool Nagar

Faisalabad city consists of *chak* numbers, or numbered villages, which have become urbanised over time. The layout of these *chaks* was planned in 1885. The original city is *Chak* number 212 and the area consisting of Peoples Colony, Madina Town and Kohinoor Textile Mill, area is *Chak* number 213. *Chak* number 214 consists of 94 *murabas*. Of these, one is Dhuddiwala East and the other is Dhuddiwala West. The rest of the *murabas* were agricultural land. Land in Dhuddiwala and the *chak* itself was owned by three *bradries* or clans. These were the Wattoos, the Kamonkas and the Balas. With the two *murabas* that constitute Dhuddiwala, the government had reserved land for expansion. On some of this land refugees settled at the time of partition along with a few families coming from the rural areas. These settlers were permitted to settle free of cost by the *Chaudhries*, or leaders of the clan, for humanitarian reasons. Due to this, and later developments, the population of Dhuddiwala has increased from 500 in 1947 to 8,080 in 1999.

According to the senior citizens of Dhuddiwala, after 1955, rural urban migration into Faisalabad increased because of the setting up of industries. The two large industrial units, National Silk Mill and Kohinoor Mill were put up adjacent to Dhuddiwala. As a result, mill workers and their families started acquiring land from the *Chaudhries*, initially on lease and rent and later on purchase. On purchase too, the land was paid for in instalments. Ground water in Dhuddiwala was brackish but the *Chaudhries* bored a deep well and they were lucky to find potable water. A tap was fitted on the bore and water was made free for all. As a result, more migrants started to settle in and around Dhuddiwala so as to have easy access to potable water. The *Chaudhries* simply sold the land and laid out the main streets. Lanes, plots, open spaces, were all arranged by the people themselves. Most of the plots were between 2 and 4 *marlas*. There were no middlemen involved in this development as there are today. Hasanpura and Rasool Nagar are two settlements that developed on the Dhuddiwala agricultural lands.

Till the early 1960s, Dhuddiwala and its adjoining settlements used the open fields as latrines and water either came from the deep bore or from irrigation channels. However, when the settlements densified, using the fields was no longer convenient, especially for women, and the irrigation channels also started to get polluted. As a result, by the late 60s, over 50 per cent of the households had built soak pits and installed hand pumps in their homes. But the water table in Dhuddiwala kept rising as a result of water-logging and soon the soak pits started overflowing into the streets and diseases and environmental degradation increased. The government's anti water-logging programme consisted of installing deep tube wells along the main irrigation channels and pumping water back into the canals. As a result, water levels fell drastically in the late 60s and most of the hand pumps became inoperative. These were the beginnings of the water and sewage problems of Dhuddiwala and its adjacent settlements of Hasanpura and Rasool Nagar.

There were also problems of a social nature in the new settlements. There were related to health, education and funerals. In 1968, an organisation or *anjuman* was formed by Dr. Naseer, a medical practitioner, and his friends. The *anjuman* identified 10 persons who were of secondary and intermediate education and were comparatively well-off, and requested

them to spare one hour in the evenings to teach 35 students who had completed their primary education. The programme started from 3 *baithaks*, or drawing rooms, which people used to spare for this purpose. The *anjuman* also helped the successful students in getting admission to the high school in Faisalabad. In 1970, the *anjuman* took the responsibility to upgrade the school in Hasanpura. In the late 70s, Chaudhry Abdul Ghafoor, member of the district council from Dhuddiwala, informed the *anjuman* that he had got a budget approved for a road linking up the area with Faisalabad. The *anjuman* felt that the road would cause conflict as it could not equally benefit all the settlements. They asked their council member to divert the funds for the road to the upgrading of the school. As a result, the primary school was upgraded to a middle school and to a high school in 1986. The *anjuman* also purchased land in Hasanpura from the Aqaf Department in an auction, and established a *janazagah*, a space for holding funerals. People contributed Rs 150,000 for the construction of its boundary wall.

The population of Dhuddiwala, Hasanpura and Rasool Nagar consists today of 1010, 1000 and 200 households respectively. According to the residents, about 60 per cent of the working population is employed in the formal industrial sector or on looms. Residents also claim that more than 50 per cent of the population below 20 years of age can read and write.

In addition to the *anjuman*, there was another welfare organisation that was formed in 1964. Its name is Anjuman Samaji Behbood (ASB) and it is carrying out the replication of the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Dhuddiwala, Hasanpura and Rasool Nagar.

5.2 The Formation and Evolution of ASB

The formation and evolution of the ASB is very closely linked to the career of its coordinator, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo. He was born in 1944 in Dhuddiwala where his family have been farmers since 1882. However, he has not followed his family profession. He got a diploma in electrical works from the local polytechnic, and then worked as an electrician for 12 years. He supplemented this income at different times by working as a stationery supplier, general contractor and an editor of a magazine. At present, apart from being the coordinator of the ASB, he has shares in an automobile workshop.

As the problems of Dhuddiwala increased due to urbanisation, Nazir Wattoo motivated a few like-minded and educated young people to form a welfare organisation. The team consisted of four primary school-mates of Nazir Ahmed Wattoo, a high school graduate and a tailoring shop owner. The organisation was registered under the name of Anjuman Samaji Behbood (ASB) and the tailoring shop was used as its office. The expenses for stationery, postage and registration were collected as donations from the team members. Soon the fund proved to be inadequate and the team started depending on donations and charity given by the notables of the area. These funds were used for arranging receptions for political representatives, influential bureaucrats, and technocrats of line agencies. In these receptions speeches were made in their honour; they were garlanded; beverage and food was arranged for them; and they were presented with requests for water supply, sewage, drainage, electricity and social sector facilities for the area and its inhabitants. In response, these dignitaries promised these facilities and more, but nothing concrete and sustainable, came of it. This practice became a habit and encouraged them to rely on funds from area politicians for running their organisation, in return for which they supported one or another political candidate or party. Thousands of *anjumans* operate in this manner in Pakistan.

Since the lobbying process was not successful in bringing development to Dhuddiwala, the ASB also undertook development work with community funds. This work included solid waste management, cleaning of streets and the construction of open drains. It was from these experiences that the ASB identified sewage disposal and water supply as the most

urgent problems facing Dhuddiwala and its neighbouring settlements. However, ASB's development work was never successful because it was expensive and technically faulty and did not function properly. This created distrust between ASB and the communities who felt that the ASB had robbed them. Soon, development work had to be abandoned.

A time came, when most of the time of the ASB began to be spent in organising political rallies, campaigning for elections and spreading propaganda against their actual or perceived political opponents. These activities resulted in bad relations between the ASB and other NGOs and civic agencies working within Dhuddiwala. To overcome these conflicts, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo decided to contest the elections to the FMC council, first in 1979 and then again in 1984. He lost both times.

The work of the ASB was a failure and so was the political career of Nazir Ahmed Wattoo. However, this experience had brought Nazir Ahmed Wattoo into contact with CBOs and with national level NGOs. It also led to his participation in workshops and seminars and in becoming a partner in the programmes of various agencies such as the National Trust for Population Welfare (NTPW), PVNAH and the Social Action Programme. This widened his vision and convinced him that meaningful change was not possible. But then, in 1987, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo met the Principal Consultant to the OPP in a seminar at the Rural Development Foundation in Islamabad. The OPP consultant was impressed by Mr. Wattoo's clarity and outspokenness and invited him to visit the OPP in Karachi and to replicate its work in Dhuddiwala. As a result, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo visited the OPP for the first time in December 1987.

5.3 The Orangi Pilot Project

5.3.1 Orangi Township

Orangi is Karachi's largest *katchi abadi* and has a population of 1.2 million. The Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) was established here in 1980 by Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, the renowned Pakistani social scientist. In 1988 the project was upgraded into four autonomous institutions: The OPP Research and Training Institute (RTI); The Orangi Charitable Trust (OCT); Karachi Health and Social Development Association (KHASDA); and The OPP Society which channelises funds in these institutions.

The OPP considers itself a research institution whose objective is to analyse outstanding problems of Orangi, and then through action research and extension education, discover viable solutions. These solutions can then be applied, with modifications, where necessary to other settlements and become part of state policies. The OPP does not fund development but by providing social and technical guidance it encourages the mobilisation of local resources and the practice of co-operative action. Based on these principles, the OPP has evolved a number of programmes, some of which are described below.

5.3.2 The Low Cost Sanitation Programme

This programme is managed by the OPP-RTI. It enables low income families to construct and maintain an underground sewage system with their own funds and under their own management. For this programme, the OPP provides social and technical guidance (based on action research), tools and supervision of implementation. The OPP's work has shown that people can finance and build underground sanitation in their homes, their lanes and neighbourhoods. This development is called "internal" development by the OPP. However, people cannot build "external" development consisting of trunk sewers, treatment plants and long secondary sewers. This only the state can provide. In Orangi, people have invested Rs 78.79 million on internal development (including 405 secondary sewers) in 5,987 lanes

consisting of 90,596 houses (there are 104,917 houses in Orangi). The state would have spent over six times to do this work. The programme is being replicated in seven cities of Pakistan by NGOs and CBOs and in 49 settlements in Karachi by the Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority (SKAA). The OPP concept has been accepted by the Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) and SKAA and is being applied to their development plans.

5.3.3 The Family Enterprise Economic Programme

This programme is run by the OCT which was formed in 1987. The OCT borrows from commercial banks and then on lends to small family businesses but without red-tape and collateral. These loans vary between Rs 1,000 and Rs 75,000. The aim of these loans is to increase production and generate jobs, which they have done. Loans are usually given to people who have expertise in what they plan to do or are already operating businesses. Interest is charged on the loans at the current bank rate of 18 per cent. Presently, there are 6,555 units being supported by OCT loans of Rs 123,738,610. Out of these Rs 97,327,482 have been paid back with a mark up of Rs 22,999,610. The recovery rate is 97 per cent. The World Bank has also given a grant as a revolving fund for the programme.

5.3.4 The OPP's Low Cost Housing Programme

This programme is operated by the OPP-RTI and provides loans and technical assistance (based on research) to building component manufacturing yards, or *thallas* as they are called, in Orangi so that they can mechanise their production, improve their products, train their staff and increase their production. In addition, the programme also trains masons in using the new technologies and components that are being developed at the manufacturing yards. Also, house builders are given advice on how to relate to the manufacturing yards and masons and also advice on design, light, ventilation and other hygiene related design aspects. To provide such advice, the OPP is in the process of training para-professionals who are mostly young unemployed youth from the Orangi communities who are paid by house builders or those who want improvement to their homes. The OPP housing programme thus tries to create a more equitable relationship between the actors in housing drama, as a result of which housing has improved in Orangi.

So far, 57 *thallas* have been mechanised due to which employment has been generated and machine made blocks and roofing elements are being fabricated, not only for Orangi, but for the rest of Karachi as well. In addition, 33 masons have been trained and 2 para-architects, after a training of 2 years at the OPP-RTI, have started working independently designing homes and community building and being paid for it.

5.3.5 Health Programme

The OPP's Health Programme is operated by KHASDA and originally consisted of developing women's organisations at the lane level where the sanitation system has been built. A mobile team of experts gave advice to such organisations, through discussions and meetings, on common diseases in Orangi, their causes and ways of preventing them. It also gave advice on hygiene, immunisation and family planning. As a result, 90 per cent of households that were part of this programme, immunised their children and over 45 per cent families adopted birth control. However, the OPP could not reach more than 3,000 families through this method and the project was revised.

In the revised model the health programme is imparted through training to local lady teachers, managers of family enterprise units and doctors in private clinics, thus anchoring the programme institutionally in schools, private clinics and family enterprise units. A health centre is operated at OPP office, which provides vaccines and family planning supplies to

the activists in these centres. Due to the sanitation and health programmes, infant mortality in those parts of Orangi, that built their sanitation system in 1982, has fallen from 130 to 37 in 1991.

5.3.6 OPP's Education Programme

OPP's Education Programme is run by the OPP-RTI and through social and technical guidance it improves and upgrades the physical conditions and academic standards of private schools in Orangi. These private schools cater to the needs of the vast majority of Orangi's school going children. Physical improvements are made with loans from OCT and advice from OPP-RTI. Academic improvements are made by arranging teacher's training through existing relevant organisations; provisions and use of libraries and audio-visual aids; and publication of manuals and guide books.

Financial support is extended during three stages of establishment of these schools. One, a small start up grant of Rs 3,000 to Rs 6,000 for setting up the schools. Two, within a year the school is institutionalised and then arises the need for physical expansion. This amounts to Rs 20,000 to Rs 30,000. This support is very important for the survival of the school. And three, loan for upgrading is needed as the school is by now a formal education institution and can take loans which can be repaid through its income.

OPP has provided 364 loans to such schools. Teacher's training through Allama Iqbal Open University is also being coordinated. The education entrepreneurs also hold their monthly meetings at OPP office, where they share information on registration and teaching methods.

5.3.7 Significance of OPP Programmes and Their New Directions

The OPP research programmes and their documentation have provided NGOs, CBOs and government agencies with successful models for overcoming the physical, social and economic problems faced by low income settlements and communities. These have been successfully tested through government-OPP-community participation projects but have still to become official policy. The infrastructure development models in particular, reduce capital costs; ensure good quality work since communities acquire skills for building internal infrastructure, maintaining it and supervising government work for external infrastructure; and create a more equitable relationship between government agencies and poor communities.

Increasingly, the OPP is getting involved in policy issues and promoting macro-level solutions, based on its models, to sanitation, health, housing and economic issues. This has led the OPP to document 189 *katchi abadis* in Karachi along with physical and economic proposals for upgrading the *nallas* of Karachi through which most of city's sewage flows. For this work, the OPP trains young people from low income settlements who after their training become, not only an asset to the community to which they belong, but also a part of a larger movement to create self-reliance, freedom from foreign loans and grandiose projects, and a more equitable relationship between low income communities and government agencies and their plans. At present there are 20 young people under-going a 90-day training for survey, documentation, designing and estimation of existing and or proposed infrastructure in low income settlements. In addition, there are seven young people under-going a two-year course in becoming para-architects. Two previously trained para-architects are now practising in their settlements.

Based on its documentation of Karachi's *katchi abadis* and its work, the OPP has developed proposals for a sewerage system for Karachi. These proposals cost only a fraction of the

government proposals that were to be funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). In principle these proposals have been accepted and the ADB loan has been cancelled.

5.3.8 The Four Barriers to the Acceptance of the OPP Concept

The OPP has identified four barriers that communities face in taking on the responsibility for internal infrastructure and other social sector initiatives. These barriers are: i) the **Psychological Barrier**: communities feel that the building of a house is their responsibility but the development of infrastructure and the lane is the responsibility of the government. ii) the **Social Barrier**: people have to come together to form some sort of an organisation to build infrastructure and take over the lane and open spaces. The organisation should be large enough to be effective and small enough to be cohesive. In Orangi the organisation has been lane based and consists of 20 to 40 households. iii) the **Economic Barrier**: the cost of development of infrastructure should be low enough for people to afford. This requires technical research and the development of cost effective community based procedures of building; and iv) the **Technical Barrier**: people do not have the technical expertise or tools to design, build and supervise underground sewage and water supply systems. To do this they need tools, technical advice and managerial guidance.

5.3.9 Replication of OPP Programmes

Many NGOs and CBOs from all over Pakistan have asked the OPP for support in replicating its programmes in their localities. For the replication process, the NGO/CBO leadership and area activists are invited to the OPP-RTI for orientation. If they are interested in the programme after orientation, they are provided training at the RTI and the OPP staff visits their area and provides advice. The important aspects of the training consists of how to motivate communities; surveying, mapping and estimating; supervising work; and documenting the development process.

WaterAid, a UK NGO has provided funds to the OPP for the replication process. With these funds the OPP trains students, young professionals and community activists and documents *katchi abadis* in Karachi. Outside Karachi, NGOs and CBOs are provided small start-up grants for replication. If after a year, the replication has the possibility of success, it is arranged that the concerned NGO/CBO receives direct WaterAid funding for its non-development expenses. Many of the NGOs and CBOs that have received OPP and WaterAid support outside Karachi; have been identified by the South Asia Partnership and by the UNDP LIFE Programme.

5.4 The ASB Psychological Barrier

When Nazir Ahmed Wattoo visited the OPP in 1988, he expected that the OPP would fund the ASB for building infrastructure in Dhuddiwala and its neighbouring settlements. In many conversations, he has stated that he was disappointed when he was presented with the OPP programme and that he was not able to relate to its transparent manner of working since it was so different from the way the ASB had worked since 1964. However, the concept intrigued him and he came back many times to the OPP to learn more about its working. But he was not convinced and so he met and had long meetings with the people of Orangi who had built their sanitation systems and had received micro-credit. According to him, it was these meetings that made him feel that the programme could be replicated in Faisalabad. But again, he was hesitant because he felt that people would not be willing to make investment in development on his advice because of his past associations and failures. He even doubted that communities, given their psychology of dependence on politicians and

civic agencies, would accept the model. These were issues he debated at great length with the OPP team for a period of six years.

In February 1993, a WaterAid team consisting of Ray Heslop (Technical Advisor to WaterAid) and the OPP Consultant visited Dhuddiwala. They surveyed the situation and discussed the possibility of initiating a water and sanitation pilot project in the area with ASB involvement. Mr. Wattoo was tempted and as a result, he visited the OPP again in April 1994 for formal training. He was also accompanied by social activists from Dhuddiwala.

5.5 Arrangements for the Commencement of Work

In September 1994, Hafeez Arian a social organiser from OPP visited Dhuddiwala. He met the community and introduced OPP as a loan giving agency, which promoted “self help” development. It was decided between the ASB and OPP that, a small credit program amounting to Rs 100,000 would be initiated in the area to help establish a relationship of trust between the ASB and the community. The credit programme was designed so that the loans for micro-credit were identified by Nazir Ahmed Wattoo but they were directly returned to the OPP. The money transactions were kept under the OPP’s control to avoid any misunderstanding between the ASB and the community, since Nazir Ahmed Wattoo felt that people would not trust him. Soon after Hafeez Arian’s visit a six-month agreement was signed between ASB and WaterAid. According to the agreement, ASB was responsible for surveying, documentation and mapping of the existing water and sewage facilities in the areas in and around Dhuddiwala and identifying a suitable pilot project for the replication of the OPP infrastructure model. For making this possible, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo was given training and orientation by the OPP at the OPP-RTI and on-site at Dhuddiwala.

5.6 The Beginnings: ASB-OPP Micro-Credit Programme

5.6.1 Identification of the Credit Units

The OPP started the credit programme on a small scale. An amount of Rs 100,000 was approved and was to be invested in five credit units of Rs 20,000 each (for details of credit units see **Box –10: OPP-ASB Micro-Credit Programme Details as on 31 March 1999**). The programme started with three units identified by Nazir Ahmed Wattoo. These included two TV repair shops and a small scale entrepreneur, all old and trusted residents of Dhuddiwala. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo had earlier helped the two TV shop owner’s set-up their businesses and knew that they needed more money to expand their work.

Box - 10: OPP-ASB Micro-Credit Programme Details as on 31 March 1999

Position of Units:

Male units	:	232	:	83.75 per cent
Female units	:	45	:	16.24 per cent
Total	:	277	:	100.00 per cent
Closed units	:	166	:	59.92 per cent
On-going	:	111	:	40.07 per cent

Financial Position:

Total amount loaned	:	Rs	4,351,500
Repaid by borrowers	:	Rs	3,376,495
Balance to be recovered	:	Rs	587,353
Total mark-up paid	:	Rs	668,635
Mark up paid to ASB	:	Rs	115,314

Overheads till March 99	:	Rs	110,000		
Defaulter	:		Nil		
Recovery	:		88.48 per cent		
Death case	:		4		
Closed units	:		199		
Ongoing units	:		78		
Note: Credit is obtained from OCT Karachi at paisas 50 per Rs 1,000/day and given to clients at paisas 60 per Rs 1,000/day.					
Types of Units:					
Bakery	01	Consumer Stores	62	Cloth Shop	10
Crockery	03	Cosmetics	02	Carpets	01
Dairy Cattle	17	Elec. Store	13	Embroidery	11
Hotels	04	Hard ware	02	Junk Dealer	05
Medical Store	04	Moulding	01	Printing Press	01
Stationery	07	Spare Parts	05	Small Business	42
Supplier	05	Shoe Maker	02	Steel Works	02
Thela	13	Typing Institute	01	Water Land	
Home School	01	Hair Dresser	01	Development	04
				Clinic	07
				Decorators	01
				Garment Factory	08
				Leather Works	03
				Repair Shop	01
				Stitching	10
				Taxi Motor	04
				Workshop	17
				Video Shop	04

Source: ASB Progress Report, April 1999

Nazir Ahmed Wattoo was very clear that if the OPP replication was to succeed, he should re-establish the trust the community once had in him and so he made his choices very carefully. He waited till these three units were successfully underway before identifying the remaining two. This measure strengthened his reputation and restored the community's confidence in the ASB. Soon Nazir Ahmed Wattoo started to be approached by people who wanted credit, and to cater to this demand, he made a formal proposal to the OPP for extending the credit programme.

5.6.2 The Credit Programme and Two Way Trust Building

The ASB carefully monitored the five loans and gave a regular report on their progress to the OPP. As a result, the OPP developed trust in the ASB and at the same time, the ASB became creditable in the eyes of the community. A large number of businesses started to approach him for loans, promising to follow the procedures that the OPP had laid down. This two-way trust building was clearly identified by OPP social organiser Hafeez Arain and on that basis it was decided to expand the credit programme. Since then, the number of credit units has reason from 5 to 277, with a 88.48 per cent recovery rate. The details of the credit programme on 31 March 1999 are given in Box - 10: OPP-ASB Micro-Credit Programme Details as on 31 March 1999.

5.7 The Water Project

5.7.1 The Beginning of the Project

The ASB analysed the success of the credit programme and their previous failures. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo became very critical of the work that he had done previously since it had produced no lasting physical or social improvement in the area; and at the same time it had produced a large number of dependants within the community who benefited financially from this work but remained suspicious of the motives of ASB and of each other. On the other hand, the success of the credit programme made them confident of the OPP approach and

of the ASB's capability and capacity in promoting it. As a result of this analysis, the ASB decided to initiate a pilot water supply project financed and managed by the community.

5.7.2 Identification of the Project Area

Hasanpura was identified as the project area for the water supply project. Hasanpura was chosen because it had severe water problems. Most of the households had installed hand pumps. However, due to water-logging, houses in the area were threatened by rising damp and the water quality suffered due to a rise in the water table. As mentioned earlier, to solve this problem the FDA installed eight deep tube wells on the major irrigation canals in the neighbourhood of these settlements and pumped the ground water into the canals. This lowered the water table and the hand pumps became inoperative.

5.7.3 Contacts with WASA

After Hasanpura had been chosen as the pilot area, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo with the help of the OPP team identified a WASA water main at a distance of 1,100 feet from Hasanpura, which could be tapped for getting water to the settlement. However, since WASA permission is required to tap any line, the ASB made a formal application to WASA for this purpose. WASA responded that it was not possible to treat Hasanpura as an individual case as it formed a part of a larger WASA water supply plan. WASA further stated that its plan would be implemented in 2008 and that too depended on the availability of funds. Another problem was that the pipe line would have to pass under a major road for 110 feet and for that special FMC permission would be required.

The ASB discussed this reply with the OPP and it was decided to calculate the total expenditure that Hasanpura residents had to incur due to the non-availability of potable water. According to the ASB analysis, Hasanpura residents acquired drinking water from outside their settlement through donkey-cart vendors. Underground water from shallow bores was used for washing clothes and other purposes. The water was extracted from these bores by a large number of electricity operated pumps. According to ASB calculations, every house was purchasing 35 litres of water every day for Rs 5. Thus, the total expense for 1,000 houses was around Rs 5,000 per day, Rs 150,000 per month and Rs 1,800,000 per year. Since almost every house had an electric pump for extracting ground water, around 730,000 units of electricity were consumed annually. This amounted to Rs 1,460,000 per year. Additional community expenses incurred on washing of clothes, using saline water were also assessed. It was estimated that additional laundry soap consumed by 1,000 houses was 48,000 kg per year. The cost of this additional soap works out to Rs 960,000. The consumption of additional bath soap was around 96,000 pieces. Its cost was estimated at Rs 672,000. Use of saline water, dearth of clean water and bad sanitation conditions, were responsible for various diseases. It was estimated that residents spent about Rs 2,400,000 annually on medicines and doctors. Open drains were also causing water logging and damaging the housing stock due to rising damp. It was estimated that each house spent about Rs 2,000 per year dealing with this problem, and 1,000 houses spend Rs 2,000,000. Thus, owing to the above factors, the community was spending Rs 9,292,000 annually. If water came in 2008 to the ASB areas, then the community at this rate would spend Rs 100 million between now and 2008. A water and sanitation system could save them this expense. It was therefore decided to inform the community of these figures and present them with the OPP alternative. However, before this could be done, it was necessary to identify community activists.

5.7.4 Identification of Community Activists and Strategy for Work

In September 1995, a team of activists was formed in Hasanpura. For identifying the members of this team Nazir Ahmed Wattoo contacted Najabat Hussain Sial, an ex-political activist and homeopathic doctor living in Hasanpura. Najabat Sial identified Muhammad Siddique and Haji Muhammad Yousuf as the two most respected and active persons in Hasanpura. Muhammad Siddique is an old shop keeper of Hasanpura and Haji Muhammad Yousuf is the caretaker of the local mosque and an *ex-patwari* who has served in the irrigation department for 35 years. As such, he knew Hasanpura and the adjoining areas well. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo approached these two persons and after detailed discussions they decided to support the concept and its implementation.

Wattoo, Yousuf and Sial decided not to approach the community immediately but to keep talking to individuals concerning the programme to gauge their reaction and at the same time maintain a low profile so as not to build false hopes. This methodology was practised for over three months and a consensus on the laying of a water line was developed. Once it was felt that the idea would be supported by the community, the first community meeting was organised in November 1995 in a local mosque which was identified by the people. The meeting was attended by 48 residents. At the meeting, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo presented the OPP concept and emphasised the fact that this was a “non-political” project. He proposed that a people’s committee should be formed to organise and undertake the development work and that the ASB would only be a teacher, an advisor and a liaison between the OPP and the people. The community accepted the idea and a ten-member Water Supply Committee (WSC) was chosen.

5.7.5 Financing the Project

Once the decision for commencing the project was made, the issue of funds required for this undertaking was raised by the WSC. The committee felt that it required funds for laying the main pipe line. Individual lanes could then lay their own distribution lines and households would connect to them and when they did so, they would pay their share of its cost and the project cost would be recovered. The ASB proposed that the WSC should ask the OPP for a loan which would be returned after individual water connections had been paid for. The community accepted the proposal but the OPP suggested that WaterAid should be asked for a revolving fund for the Water Project. A loan application for Rs 200,000 for laying 1,100 running feet for the main line was made to WaterAid by the ASB. The application was approved and an agreement between the Hasanpura Water Supply Committee and the ASB was framed under which the WSC was made responsible for collecting money from water connections, keeping accounts, purchasing materials of construction, and supervising the construction of the main line and the distribution lines in the lanes.

5.7.6 NOC for Connection to WASA Main Line

On ASB’s advice, the WSC, before starting mobilisation and organisation of the community, made an application in November 1995 to the Managing Director (MD) of WASA for a no objection certificate (NOC) for making a connection to a government water source. The MD WASA passed on the application to the Deputy MD who then passed it on to the Engineer in-charge of the area, who after giving his approval sent it to the Deputy Director of the Planning and Development Department. The whole process took over three months and at every stage the ASB had to apply pressure on the WASA staff, from various sources, and informally give money to the lower staff of the department so that the file could be kept moving. Finally, in January 1996 the NOC was given with the proviso that the 4 inch main pipe line that had been proposed by the ASB, should be increased to 6 inch. The WSC had decided in November 1995 not to wait for the NOC but begin work.

5.7.7 Organising the Work

After the formation of WSC, an OPP team consisting of an engineer and a social organiser visited Dhuddiwala and trained the ASB team in mapping, surveying, estimating and planning of the water supply line. The training was provided by involving the ASB team and the water supply committee in preparing the plans and estimates for the line.

WaterAid funds were received in November 1995 after which a Purchase Committee was formed which included Nazir Ahmed Wattoo, a WASA fitter (not in his official capacity), and three members of the water supply committee. The WASA fitter was included since he was a Hasanpura resident and had technical expertise. The Committee was made responsible for buying and storing materials till the work could be started.

A major dispute took place in the Committee. Some members, supported by a part of the community felt that the 4 inch dia pipe line proposed by the OPP engineers was insufficient for 1,000 households. They insisted that the line should be of at least 6 inch dia. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo tried to convince them that a 6 inch line was not necessary. However, the dispute intensified and was resolved by Haji Muhammad Yousuf who proposed that a 6 inch dia pipe line should be laid under the metalled municipality road in Hasanpura and the rest of the line should be 4 inch. The community accepted the compromise. The NOC for connection with the WASA main line, which was granted later, also directed that a 6 inch dia line should be laid, but this was not followed by the community.

5.7.8 Crossing the Metalled Road

The WSC decided to begin work by laying the water line under the metalled road. For road cutting, permission from the FMC was required. The Committee contacted the lower staff of the FMC who told the committee that getting permission would take a long time and would also involve illegal gratification to FMC staff. They suggested that the Committee should go ahead and lay the line across the road and after that pay the necessary fine. This process was simpler and cheaper and the ASB decided to follow this advice. However, the road crossing had to be done clandestinely so that it was not noticed and stopped by the FMC. This could only be done after dark. In addition, the Committee discussed the matter with the area councillor and he also backed this advice.

On November 24, 1995, the laying of the pipe line was inaugurated by Haji Master Ghulam Nabi, the oldest member of the Hasanpura community. He was chosen by consensus of the active members of the settlement. The excavation began at 9 p.m. and the 110 running feet was laid across the road in one night. The excavation was refilled and the road was repaired. WASA would have require three days to carry out this work. Throughout the night the Committee members and the municipal councillor remained on site to deal with a possible stoppage of work. However, work continued and it was only in the morning that an opponent group of the area reported the cutting of the road without permission and the laying of the pipe line, to the area magistrate. The case fizzled out because of support from the councillor and FMC executives. WASA also had no objection as only a pipe line had been laid and no water connection was involved.

5.7.9 Connection with WASA Main Line

Connection of the 1,100 running feet of ASB line with the WASA main line could only be made if the existing WASA line could be de-watered. For this a pump was required. The WSC requested the WASA officials for a pump but it was refused. This problem was overcome by acquiring the pump informally from the WASA pump operators against a payment of Rs 2,000. Two WASA fitters were informally hired to work on the connection. This entire work was also done clandestinely and was executed in six hours in freezing cold.

After the connection was made, the line was extended by 400 running feet into the project area within a few days and the first tap was installed at the office of the ASB. The community was ecstatic when they saw clean water coming out of the tap.

5.7.10 Procedures and Costs

The procedures and costs for acquiring a water connection are: i) After a lane is organised, it approaches the ASB and requests it for a water connection. The lane households who want a connection are asked to pay Rs 20 each. These charges are to cover the cost of stationery and printing of forms that are used in registering the request; ii) After this ASB contact WASA and each applicant household has to pay WASA connection charges of Rs 1,175. Originally, this was Rs 1,363 but was reduced by WASA in July 1997. iii) A design for laying the water line is made by the ASB, executed by the lane community, and supervised by the ASB team. The average estimate per house for connections works out to Rs 600 depending on the length of the pipe and excavation needed to be done to make the connection. This payment is made to the WSC. iv) An additional Rs 1,300 per household have to be made, also to the WSC, for the cost of the lane line and the water main already laid by funds from WaterAid. And v) a sum of Rs 100 has to be paid to the WSC as service charges. Thus, the total cost of acquiring a water connection works to Rs 3,195 per household.

The estimate and design for the water main line were made as follows: i) System designed for 1,000 houses in 84 streets. Their actual number is 829. The extra 171 households were included in the estimate as it was expected that they would join in from the neighbouring settlements. ii) Realistic beneficiaries were calculated at 700 households or 70 per cent of 1,000. iii) The total project was calculated at Rs 910,000 or at Rs 1,300 per household, minus connection expenses.

5.7.11 Problems and Conflict

Soon after the main line had been connected to the WASA water line, differences arose in the WSC. The reasons for the differences are unclear, and seem to be related to ego problems of two members, who left the Committee. These two members started maligning the work of the ASB and approached the area MPA. They informed him that the ASB and the WSC were using the water project to build a constituency for themselves and were his political opponents. They also informed him that they were giving water connections to the community in violation of WASA rules. The MPA reacted and called the WASA MD for an explanation. The WASA MD informed the MPA that the WSC was not making illegal connections since they had acquired a WASA NOC. In addition, they were paying WASA connection charges.

The MPA then started laying his own water line in Hasanpura and promising free connections to the community. Once the MPA began this process, progress on the water project slowed down. The ASB decided to counter this situation by informing the community of the substandard nature of the work being done by the MPA's contractors. This was there for all to see. In addition, it was also pointed out that WASA could not provide any more water to the area as per its plan. This generated considerable debate in the community. Meanwhile, the MPA's project fizzled out in a couple of months and the people realised that it was a hoax.

In these circumstances, it was necessary to build the community's spirit. Choudhary Muhammad Akram, a member of the WSC, decided to organise his lane as a demonstration model. The community was organised and a design was made according to the procedures laid down by the ASB. Charges for connections at Rs 3,195 per household were requested. People objected that this sum was too high and so the ASB requested WASA for an

exemption from WASA connection charges. The request was considered by WASA and three months later it was refused. After this, the community decided not to waste any more time and collected Rs 22,000 from six houses. With this money Chaudhry Muhammad Akram undertook the laying of the first lane.

5.7.12 Unauthorised Connections and Further Conflict

The opponents of the ASB struck back in August 1996 when Nazir Ahmed Wattoo was visiting the OPP-RTI for a training session. With support from the political party in power, they managed to take 65 unauthorised connections from the water lines laid by the WSC. They paid no charges to the WSC or to WASA. WSC contacted Nazir Ahmed Wattoo in Karachi and told him that the community was furious and wanted to take revenge on the opponents of the Water Project. However, on OPP advice, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo asked the community to keep calm and to prepare for taking legal action against the illegal connections that had been taken. An application requesting their disconnection was made to WASA, but it took three months before WASA approved the request. Meanwhile, work again slowed down due to this new conflict.

WASA issued disconnection orders in November 1996. People who had taken illegal connections were fined Rs 500 each and the connections were made legal after the WASA connection charge of Rs 1,175 was paid by them. However, they refused to pay an additional Rs 600 to the WSC. As a result, the ASB filed a petition with the Senior Civil Judge Faisalabad requesting him to order that no water connections could be acquired without ASB's approval and a payment to the WSC. The petition was accepted and households who had taken connections without paying were forced to pay. In September 1997, thirteen members of the Hasanpura community approached the MNA and MPA of the area and informed them that ASB's activities in Hasanpura were a threat to their political standing. They further said that ASB's activities were of a commercial nature and that ASB was extorting money from the poor. The MNA and MPA agreed to look into this matter.

When the WSC got to know of these happenings, it decided to meet the political representatives and explain the nature of ASB's water and sanitation work. In October 1997, it made a presentation before the MNA and MPA and misunderstandings were removed. As a result of the meeting, the MPA decided to give support to the ASB programme and issued a directive to MD WASA that no new connections should be issued to anyone unless they were willing to make the required payments to the WSC.

In spite of the Civil Judge's order and the MPA's directive, the MD WASA continued to issue connection notices to people who have not paid the ASB/WSC charges. As a result, the ASB filed a writ petition against MD WASA in the Punjab High Court and also complained to the WASA board regarding the MD. This led to a meeting at WASA in December 1997 in which the Vice Chairman of the WASA Governing Board, directed the MD that in future no new connection would be provided from the community's line without consulting ASB. It was also stated by the Vice Chairman that if these orders were not followed, strict action would be taken against the MD.

After the December 1997 meeting, WASA officials became very cooperative and work progressed smoothly in the ASB project area. In January 1998, the writ petition was withdrawn by the ASB.

5.7.13 Details of Work Done and Loan Recovery

The work done and expenses incurred on water supply till June 30, 1999 is given in the table below.

Table – 5.7.13

ASB Low Cost Water Supply Project, Hasanpura Cumulative Works from 01 September 1995 to 30 June 1999

Total number of streets in Hasanpura	84
Total houses in these streets	1,000
Total area	25 acres
Total length of these streets	13,500 running feet
The streets where water pipe has been laid	36 No.
Length of main lines 3" to 6" dia laid in 36 streets	6,339 running feet
Legal connections provided	253 houses
Applications for connections in process	15

Expenses Incurred Description	Expenses (in Rs)
Main lines 1,925 running feet 6" and 4" dia	194,901
Lane lines 4,414 running feet 3" dia	284,395
Misc. (BRIV.)	56,000
Payment to WASA as connection fee @ Rs 1,363 and Rs 1,175 (two rates prevailed during this period)	333,371
253 houses connection charges @ Rs 600 per house	151,800
ASB service charges	7,900
Total cost up till 30 June 1999	1,028,367

WASA estimates for this project	Rs 3,200,000
ASB estimates for this project	Rs 1,300,000
Difference of cost effective programme being run by ASB	Rs 1,900,000

Source: ASB Progress Report, June 1999

According to the table, the community had invested Rs 1,028,367 in this work. Rs 73,500 have been recovered from the Rs 200,000 WaterAid loan. The recovery is at Rs 300 per household. The recovery has been slow as slightly more than 30 per cent households have connected to the system.

The reason for the slow pace of connections is: i) people who take a connection share it with their neighbours and thus their neighbours do not feel the need for taking a connection; ii) uncertainty regarding the programme due to opposition from within the community and from the politicians, prevented people from taking connections; iii) water lines were laid in the lanes once enough money had been collected to lay them, irrespective of how many households were willing to connect. This procedure is now being revised by the ASB and in the future only lanes where over 70 per cent of the households agree to participate, will be supported and given permission to connect to the main line.

5.8 ASB's Sanitation Project

5.8.1 The Beginnings

While the water supply project was being planned, investigations on sanitation and drainage issues in Dhuddiwala and its adjacent settlements were undertaken by the ASB with OPP assistance. It was observed that the majority of households in the project area disposed their sewage into paved or unpaved open drains in the streets. Due to this, the foundations and walls of the houses had been affected by damp and erosion. Also, many of the drains were choked and were only cleaned when there was a major crisis. It was therefore decided to adopt the OPP model for sewage as well.

Because of the credit programme and the initiation of the water project, both the OPP and the ASB had established their credibility in the community. Visits to the OPP-RTI by activists and community members had further strengthened this credibility. As such, when meetings were held to explain the programme, there was enthusiastic response. A team comprising of Nazir Ahmed Wattoo as coordinator/social organiser; Aziz Ahmed, his brother as technician; and Haji Muhammad Yousuf as assistant to both, was formed.

After initiating the project, the OPP team visited Dhuddiwala regularly and helped the ASB in identifying sewage disposal points. Visits were also arranged for the project team to the OPP-RTI in Karachi. Details of the OPP team visits and ASB team visits to Faisalabad and Karachi respectively, are given in the tables below.

Table – 5.8.1 a

**Visits From ASB Staff, Community Members, Activists to OPP
for Orientation and Training**

(From December 1987 to February 1999)

Month/Year	Number of Persons	Training Provided	No. of Days
December 1987	1	Orientation	1
March 1988	1	Orientation	1
December 1988	3	Orientation	2
June 1989	1	Orientation	2
December 1989	1	Orientation	1
September 1990	6	Orientation	7
February 1991	1	Orientation	2
June 1992	1	Orientation	1
November 1992	1	Orientation	1
May 1993	1	Orientation	2
October 1993	1	Orientation	2
April 1994	1	OPP programmes	1
July 1995	1	Organisational set up/Finance	3
September 1995	1	Sanitation/Micro Credit (MC)	3
January 1996	7	Sanitation/MC/Health	7
February 1996	8	Sanitation/MC/Health	4
July 1996	1	Sanitation/MC/Health	2
October 1996	1	Sanitation	2
January 1997	1	Sanitation	2
April 1997	1	Sanitation/MC	2
May 1997	1	Sanitation/MC	3
June 1997	5	Sanitation/MC/Health	3
July 1997	1	Sanitation	2
October 1997	1	Sanitation	2
February 1998	1	Sanitation/MC	6
March 1998	1	General workshop	6
May 1998	1	Sanitation/MC	3
June 1998	2	Sanitation	5
July 1998	1	Sanitation	11
August 1998	1	Sanitation/MC	3
November 1998	1	Sanitation	14
March 1999	1	Sanitation/MC	2
May 1999	1	Sanitation/MC	3
June 1999	1	Sanitation/MC	2
December 1999	1	Sanitation/MC	2
Total	60		Days: 115

Source: ASB/OPP records

Table – 5.8.1 b

Visits of OPP-RTI Staff to ASB for Providing Training

Month/Year	Name of Person	Reason of Visit	No. of Days
January 1991	Anwar Rashid, Joint Director	Micro Credit (MC)	2
May 1994	Rasheed Khatri, Engineer Hafeez Arain, Social Organiser	Joint survey of Project Area	3
May 1994	Salem Aleemuddin, Joint Director	Survey of Project Area	3
February 1994	Ray Heslop and Arif Hasan, WaterAid Team		2
September 1995	Rashid Khattri Noor Muhammad Saifi, Technician	Sanitation	3
October 1995	Rashid Khattri Noor Muhammad Saifi	Sanitation	5
January 1996	Noor Muhammad Saifi	Sanitation	14
April 1996	Noor Muhammad Saifi	Sanitation	9
January 1997	Anwar Rashid, Perween Rahman	Sanitation/MC/ Organisational set up	3
April 1997	Rashid Khatri	Sanitation	1
April 1997	Salim Alimuddin	Sanitation	1
May 1997	Salim Alimuddin	Sanitation	3
October 1997	Salim Alimuddin	Sanitation	1
November 1997	Salim Alimuddin	Sanitation	3
December 1997	Noor Muhammad Saifi	Sanitation	5
January 1998	Noor Muhammad Saifi	Sanitation	14
January 1998	Anwar Rashid, Perween Rahman	Sanitation/MC/ Organisational set up	3
October 1998	Salim Aleemuddin	Sanitation	3
November 1998	Rashid Khatri	Sanitation	6
January 1999	Anwar Rashid, Perween Rahman	Sanitation/MC/ Organisational set up	2
Total			Days: 86

Source: ASB records.

Social organisation and mobilisation of the community was easy as contacts had already been established for the water project and activists identified. A number of people volunteered their help and Dr. Naseer, a member of the WSC offered to organise his lane as a demonstration model.

5.8.2 Procedure and Costs for the Sanitation Model

In the OPP's work in Karachi, the disposal points for sewage were the natural drains. In the case of Faisalabad, these were not available. In addition, the topography of Faisalabad is flat and there are almost no slopes. Therefore, the sewage system could only be built if it could be connected to WASA trunk sewers, some of which were at considerable distance from the Project Area. Consequently, the ASB decided that the laying of a collector sewer that could connect with the WASA trunk was the first priority as this would motivate the lanes to connect to it. It was also assessed that households would not contribute to the construction of this collector sewer but would pay its cost when their lanes connected to it. Since there was no money at that stage to lay a collector sewer, it was decided to develop a lane that could be connected to an existing WASA trunk.

The procedure that emerged was: i) Building of a collector sewer to connect to a WASA trunk. This cost was to be borne by a revolving fund and was to be recovered from households when a lane connected to the collector sewer. So far, the average cost per household for the collector sewer has been about Rs 600; ii) construction of the lane sewer by the community at their own cost and under their own supervision and management. The cost per household of this has worked out between Rs 700 to Rs 900; and iii) installing a latrine pot and P-trap in the house. This works out to Rs 750. Thus, the average cost per household for the entire system is between Rs 2,050 to Rs 2,250.

Another decision that was taken was that while the connector sewer was being laid, work would be stopped when it reached a lane intersection. At that stage, the lane would be asked to lay the lane sewer and connect to the collector sewer. The lane would be informed that a connection would not be allowed after the collector sewer had been built beyond the intersection. It was further decided that every household would have a small one chamber septic tank, whose purpose was less to treat water and more to prevent solids from entering the sewage system and choking it.

5.8.3 Laying of the First Lanes

In Hasanpura, the open drains of 35 lanes discharged their sewage into a canal which was originally used for irrigation purposes. This canal was choked due to garbage being dumped in it. In 1989, the FMC built an open drain parallel to this canal and connected it to a WASA trunk in the neighbourhood. This drain too was often choked and as a result, lanes were inundated. Whenever there was a crisis, households collected money and hired scavengers to make the drain functional again. Dr. Naseer's lane was one of the 35 lanes that connected to the FMC open drain.

Once the organisation and mobilisation of Dr. Naseer's lane had begun, the ASB requested OPP for technical help. As a result, Noor Muhammad Saifi, OPP technician and social advisor, was sent to Hasanapura for ten days where he provided on the job training to the ASB team in documentation, estimating, levelling, use of shuttering for manholes and the laying of pipes. Construction work on the lane began in January 1996.

Dr. Naseer could not continue his work due to a difference between him and some members of the lane. Therefore, a new social organiser was chosen through a consensus of sorts and the community started to lose interest in the project. The ASB panicked and in order to motivate the community, gave a loan of Rs 5,500 to them to finish the work. This loan was given from the water supply fund provided by WaterAid. Noor Muhammad Saifi was not informed of this as the ASB knew that giving a loan for work at lane level was against the OPP's philosophy.

The work gained pace after receiving the loan and 534 running feet of underground sewage line serving 32 houses was completed. However, people hesitated in taking individual connections as they were unsure that the system would work. Eventually, a young man took the risk and bye-passed the old open drain to connect to the new system and built a one chamber septic tank. People saw that the system worked and the other houses also started to make their connections. At the same time, other lanes started approaching the ASB for technical assistance for laying their sewage system.

Five lanes were completed in the following five months. They all disposed into the FMC open drain and due to the condition of the open drain, they did not function well. It was therefore decided by the ASB that if the system was to function, then the FMC drain should be cleaned and be replaced by a collector sewer. This sewer would connect to the WASA trunk.

In addition to the 35 lanes, the FMC open drain was also the disposal for the shops of Jalvi Market and it was decided to involve the shopkeepers of the market in this project as well.

5.8.4 Laying of the Jalvi Market Collector Sewer

Jalvi Market is a commercial area in Dhuddiwala developed by an informal developer. It consists of about 700 shops and these disposed their sewage into the FMC open drain, also known as the Jalvi Market Drain. Since the drain constantly overflowed, it effected environmental conditions in the market adversely. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo went and spoke to the developer and informed him of their plans for replacing the open drain by an underground collector sewer. He asked the developer to participate in this work. The developer refused as he was afraid that his money would be misused. However, when he saw the work being undertaken in the lanes and the building of the water supply system, he approached Nazir Ahmed Wattoo and offered to participate. What motivated him was the fact that with improved environmental conditions, the property value of the shops would go up. He offered to pay the ASB Rs 150,000 as 50 per cent of the estimated cost of the underground collector sewer. On OPP's advice, the ASB declined this offer and instead asked him to purchase the material for the sewer line. The reason for refusing a cash donation, was that he would probably have claimed later on that his funds had been misused.

ASB requested the OPP for help in designing and laying the Jalvi Market collector drain. The OPP sent Noor Muhammad Saifi back to Dhuddiwala for two weeks where he trained the ASB team and supervised the commencement of work. Work began on November 04, 1996 and was completed in four months and 1,700 running feet of trunk sewer was laid.

The laying of the Jalvi Market sewer was not an easy task. Cleaning it, diverting the water in it, laying the sewer, was all intensive and dirty work. Four teams of labourers quit the work, refusing to complete it. A fifth team completed it at higher rates. The pace of development was very slow, at two pipes being laid per day. The community was impressed by the work of the fifth team and decided to pay them a reward of Rs 5,000. The completion of the collector sewer was a major boost for the ASB and it motivated the communities to mobilise and request ASB support for their lane sewers. The ASB too, identified connections to existing WASA trunks as disposal points and the programme expanded.

To finance the collector sewers, the ASB used the Jalvi Market developer's materials, and funds recovered from the WaterAid loan for the water project. In addition, individuals from the community also made contributions as loans.

5.8.5 Detail of Work Done

Details of work done by the community with ASB support is given in the table below.

Table – 5.8.5

ASB's Low Cost Sanitation Project

Location	Number of Lanes	Length (Running Feet)	Number of Houses	Cost of Tertiary Lines (Rs)	Cost of Internal Fittings (Rs)*	Total Cost (Rs)
National Colony	3	582	38	28,480	53,200	81,680
Dhuddiwala	27	3,573	161	190,381	225,400	415,781
Hasanpura	51	7,664	540	455,580	756,000	1,211,580
Niamat Colony	6	1,600	64	83,526	89,600	173,126
Rajada Town	4	635	37	31,435	51,800	83,235
Al-Najaf Colony	1	160	16	10,320	22,400	32,720
Jalvi Market	14	2,591	97	130,684	135,800	266,484
Jalvi TR line	2	1,820	41	277,305	57,400	334,705
Factory Area	1	310	10	26,587	16,083	42,670
Abdullah Town	3	1,668	48	123,542	67,200	190,742
Daruslam Colony	2	300	12	13,800	16,800	30,600
Iqbal Nagar	2	418	22	17,974	30,800	48,774
Mujahid Town	5	680	30	35,330	42,000	77,330
Bilal Colony	18	3,232	178	270,800	249,200	520,000
K.T.M. Chowk	2	210	6	12,600	8,400	21,000
Total	141	25,443	1,300	1,708,344	1,822,083	3,530,427

*. It includes house connection and latrine cost.

Source: ASB Progress Report, June 1999

In addition to the lane sewers listed above, 1,820 running feet of collector sewers have also been laid at a cost of Rs 277,305. Therefore, the total cost of the work done so far works out to Rs 3,807,732. The proportion of investment in the collector sewers to the lane sewers works out to 1:13.73.

5.9 Repercussions of the ASB Water and Sanitation Programmes

5.9.1 Requests from Other Communities and Future Plans

After the completion of the Jalvi Market collector sewer, numerous communities have applied to the ASB for technical assistance for laying their sewage lines. ASB has considered requests from those settlements which are in the neighbourhood. These are Hasanpura No. 2, Bilal Colony and Kehkeshan Colony No. 2. These have now been included in the ASB Project Area phase 2.

By the first quarter of 1998 the ASB completed the surveying, mapping and planning of these settlements and identified the location for a 3,300 running feet collector sewer that would need to be laid and connected to a WASA trunk. This collector sewer would serve 1,000 houses in 52 lanes who would build 12,000 running feet of underground lane sewers. According to the plan, each lane would have its lane organisation and there would be three committees building the different lengths of the collector sewer. It was estimated that the work on the collector sewer would be completed in four months and the lanes would require two years to be completed. For the trunk sewer the ASB applied to WaterAid for a revolving fund of Rs 500,000 which would be recovered from the lanes as and when they connected to the collector drain. The fund was made available in the 1998-99 financial year.

However, work has not yet begun on the collector drain. This is because plans were often changed due to insufficient and often inaccurate information regarding WASA disposal points and future plans. Also, OPP was reluctant to begin work since it felt that the ASB did not have the technical expertise to survey and implement such a large project. Therefore, extensive training was provided to Aziz Ahmed Wattoo first at the OPP and then on-site in Faisalabad. It was tested out by OPP's engineer, Rashid Khatri, through onsite survey work and estimating done by Aziz Ahmed. As a result of this training, Aziz Ahmed can now work independently, but will require assistance for complex situations and for developing master plan concepts, integrating different neighbourhoods. Work on the new collector drain is now about to begin.

Communities from eight new settlements which have been created through the informal subdivision of agricultural land, have also applied to ASB for assistance. The developers of these schemes have not provided any infrastructure. The ASB has visited three of these settlements and presented its programmes and prepared documentation, designs and estimates. Reaction from the communities is awaited.

5.9.2 Offers for Collaboration and Funding

A number of national and international NGOs and agencies have offered support and collaboration to ASB. CIDA (Canada), Asia Foundation, Trust for Voluntary Organisations, have all offered ASB financial support. They have, along with the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme and UNDP-LIFE, invited the ASB to their workshops and seminars. ASB has not accepted their financial help. This is because the ASB feels that the people of Pakistan may be poor individually but, as the OPP and ASB have demonstrated, are quite capable of financing infrastructure collectively. Also, the ASB feels, like the OPP, that development has to take place at the pace of the people and cannot be pressurised through large funds. However, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo has accepted the invitations to workshops and seminars where he has presented his work and delivered the message of self-reliance. Like the OPP, he feels that the ASB is not a consultant or contractor, but a teacher who guides people to make them self-sufficient.

Action Aid has sent a group of 26 people belonging to two union councils from the Faisalabad region for orientation to ASB. Six of these people have applied to ASB for work in their villages. Action Aid has also sent a group of activists, councillors and staff from District Haripur in the NWFP for orientation and people from a neighbouring village. Caritas Faisalabad sent a group from Chak number 232. Method of laying sewers was explained to them. They borrowed three sets of manhole shuttering from ASB, sought ASB advice and went back to their *chak* and laid their sewer lines at their own expense. In addition, Nazir Ahmed Wattoo has been invited to visit various communities in the Punjab and also to Swat in the NWFP by Environmental Protection Society, a local Swat NGO. Anjuman Falah Behbood (AFB) from Rawalpindi, which is also replicating the OPP model with WaterAid funding, has also visited Dhuddiwala with its staff, area councillors and activists for orientation and training and so have groups from Multan that are in contact with the OPP. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo is also being consulted by the Conservation and Rehabilitation Centre (CRC), which is working on the conservation for the ancient city of Uch in the Punjab. The OPP is providing technical support to the CRC and the ASB Project Area is seen as a training ground for Uch activists and CRC staff. For details of various visits of CBOs, NGOs and international agencies to ASB and of ASB to other CBOs and organisations, see table below.

Table – 5.9.1**Important Workshops, Presentations and Visitors**

Dates	Event	By	Sponsoring Organisation
13.02.96	Visit to ASB	Executives of Social Action Programme (SAP)	SAP
20.03.97	Visit to ASB	Executive of Trust for Voluntary Organisations (TVO)	TVO
04.04.97	Visit to ASB	CBOs and activists of Action Aid Programmes	Action Aid
23.04.97	Visit to ASB	TVO executive	TVO
05.11.97	Visit to ASB	Fr. Jorge Anzorena (SELAVIP representative)	SELAVIP
13.04.98	Visit to ASB	UNDP group	UNDP
24-25.08.98	Presentation at Islamabad workshop	ASB	Action Aid
26-27.08.98	Presentation at Lahore workshop	ASB	UNDP/GEF
03.09.98	Presentation at Islamabad workshop	ASB	National Rural Support Programme
27.09.98	Meeting with Faisalabad councillors	ASB	ASB
08.10.98	Visit to ASB	Fr. Jorge Anzorena	SELAVIP
14-15.11.98	Presentation at workshop in Faisalabad	ASB	UNDP-World Bank RWSS
12.12.98	Visit to ASB	M.M. Qureshi, Federal Secretary Women's Development	Ministry of Women's Development
23.01.99 13.02.99 23.02.99	Visit to ASB	Community groups and Action Aid staff	Action Aid
18-19.03.99	Presentation at workshop in Faisalabad	ASB	UNDP-World Bank RWSS

Source: ASB records (for details see Appendix – 10).

5.9.3 Changed Attitude of Government Agencies and Politicians

Social Action Programme (SAP) of the government of Pakistan has offered the ASB a grant to expand its development work. The ASB has attended SAP's workshops but refused to accept the grant. Instead they asked SAP for a loan but that was refused. In September 1998, the Punjab Social Welfare Department invited ASB to Lahore to present its work to 25 social welfare officers of the district. In addition, under-graduate and post-graduate students from the Social Welfare Department, University of the Punjab, have visited the ASB in groups. Muzzaffar Mehmood Qureshi, Federal Secretary of the Ministry of Women Development spent a day at ASB and directed the commissioners of a number of divisions to visit the ASB. The UNDP-LIFE and GEF programmes have also directed a number of their partners to visit the ASB. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo also made a presentation of ASB's work to senior civic servants at the National Institute of Public Administration in Karachi in May 1999.

Three councillors of Faisalabad visited the ASB in September 1998 for orientation. The ASB has convinced them not to invest in water supply or sewage at the lane level but to spend

their funds on building collector sewers and paving the lanes where water supply and sewage lines have been completed. The councillor of the ASB Project Area has already started following this advice and has paved six lanes in which water and sewage lines have been laid by the community.

In September 1999, ASB was invited to present its work in a NGO workshop organised by the FAUP in Faisalabad. After the workshop, a discussion was held between the FAUP consultant and staff and the ASB. The possibility of FAUP working with ASB was explored and it was suggested that the FAUP should fund and build collector and trunk sewers and the ASB should motivate communities and support them to fund and build lane sewers. It is hoped by the ASB that this will be possible.

WASA's relationship with the ASB has also undergone a change. At the neighbourhood level there is considerable interaction between WASA area staff and the activists and staff of the ASB. The ASB monitors their work, and since it now has an understanding of water and sewage related issues, there is growing acceptance of ASB's role. At the WASA head office too ASB contacts have developed into mutual understanding and respect. Since WASA does not have area plans, it has on more than one occasion used the plans prepared by the ASB for helping it design area sewage and water supply proposals.

5.9.4 Improved Physical and Social Conditions in the Project Areas

Observation of the lanes in the project area shows that an unbelievable physical change has taken place. Waste water and sewage have disappeared from the lanes. The lanes that have been paved are now clean and full of people. Children play in them, women gather in them, and residents have started planting trees in them. Before trees were only planted in the homes. Residents have also come together to arrange for the collection and disposal of solid waste and the sweeping of lanes. There is collective pressure on the councillors to install street lights, and this pressure is working. Dr. Naseer reports that water and sanitation related diseases have fallen by over 60 per cent. He says in good humour, "Doctors are losing money. They will have to shift to settlements where water and sanitation do not exist, or they will become broke and homeless." In the many meetings that were held between the residents and the authors of this report, community members said that water and sanitation related quarrels that were common between neighbours have now disappeared and the value of their properties has gone up. They also said that they were making considerable savings in medicines and doctors which they could now use to improve their homes.

5.9.5 ASB: Emergence of New Needs

With the development of sewage and water supply systems in the ASB project area, request from communities, and changed attitudes of government and donor agencies, the ASB had to re-assess its future needs and directions. First, it was assuming the role of a trainer. For that it required better trained staff and training material. Second, the infrastructure, that it had helped develop needed maintenance and for that equipment, funds and manpower was required. And three, an expansion in its work meant covering a larger area and to do that effectively, transport was necessary. To take care of these demands, the ASB took the following actions:



THE KIA VAN



AZIZ AHMED WATTOO, ASB TECHNICAL PERSON AND HAJI MUHAMMAD YOUSUF, ASB SOCIAL ORGANISER IN A LANE IN ASB PROJECT AREA



THE SLUDGE PUMP



THE DRIVER'S KIT AND MASK

a) Video Documentation:

After the completion of about 50 lanes for water and sanitation, the ASB started the video recording of its programme. For this a commercial video maker was hired. The purpose of making these videos was to develop training and orientation material for other CBOs and NGOs. However, hiring of equipment for this purpose was very expensive. As such, the ASB applied to WaterAid for funds for purchasing video equipment. It was agreed that this video equipment would remain with the ASB, who would be responsible for maintaining it as well, but it could also be used by other CBOs and NGOs in the Punjab for recording their work and for training purposes. WaterAid gave a grant for this purpose and the equipment was purchased for Rs 320,280 in the 1998-99 financial year. ASB hired a Karachi film company "Imagine Films", to make a video of its work. The film was completed in May 1999 and is being used for motivation and orientation. In addition, interested communities and organisations can purchase it for Rs 650. The ASB intends to make four training films related to i) motivation techniques; ii) surveying and mapping techniques; iii) material purchasing and account keeping; and iv) on-site work.

b) Staff Requirements:

For the expansion of work, more and better trained staff will be required. So far, the only technical staff with the ASB is Aziz Ahmed Wattoo. He has been trained by the OPP-RTI, both in Karachi and on-site in Faisalabad. The ASB hired Imdad Hussain and Bhatti, at different times, as technical persons before they decided to train Nazir Ahmed. Both Hussain and Bhatti were formally qualified, especially Bhatti who had a diploma in Civil Technology. However, they were not willing to work with communities and wanted a conventional technician's job and working environment. For this reason, they could not last. Other attempts to recruit formally qualified technicians have been unsuccessful. For this reason, Aziz Ahmed will have to improve his skills through further training at the OPP-RTI and become a trainer of local educated community members. It seems that this is the only way that the non-availability of technical staff can be overcome.

c) Maintenance Unit:

Due to the lack of maintenance capacity in WASA, continuous problems were faced by the ASB regarding the maintenance of sewage lines built by the people. The more serious problem however, is the continuous choking of WASA trunks that adversely effect the functioning of the community built sewers. Whenever a crisis takes place, communities get together, collect money, hire sweepers and have the WASA line cleaned. Sometimes, WASA provides a pump for doing this and the approximate cost to the community for de-sludging a line works out to Rs 800 to Rs 1,200. To overcome this problem, the ASB requested WaterAid for funding a maintenance unit. The request was approved and a maintenance unit was set in August 1997. The unit consists of a de-sludging pump; a safety kit consisting of a diver's suit and mask so that a person can enter the trunk sewer safely; and two sweepers who have been hired for manual labour. WASA was informed of the setting up of this unit. The kit is available to any community that has a sewage committee. WASA sewers serving the community built sewage systems have been desilted at three locations so far. The ASB has not charged the community for this as it considers this work to be in the experimental stages. However, in the future the ASB intends to charge Rs 200 per hour for their services. This will take care of fuel, transport, operation and labour costs and is less than one-third of what communities spend at present. The ASB has also received requests for the de-watering of open plots which are being used as sewage disposal for a number of houses. ASB has provided this service and recovered costs. The ASB feels that the unit will help overcome sanitation related maintenance issues and will be self-financing.

d) Transportation:

Due to the increase in the size of the Project Area, ASB felt the need for a transport vehicle. Consequently, WaterAid accepted ASB's request for a vehicle which was purchased in February 1999 for Rs 400,000. The vehicle is a KIA pick up and as such can be used for the transportation of materials. Before the vehicle was purchased, manhole shuttering and construction material were transported by donkey carts which charged the community anything between Rs 20 to Rs 40 for a one way trip. ASB intends to charge the same price and the profits will be utilised for the repair and maintenance of shuttering. A removable sewage collecting tank and a jetting pump has been purchased and arrangements for mounting it on the pick up when required, have been made. This will be used for cleaning the one chamber septic tanks and carrying away sewage when WASA trunks have to be de-sludged. At present, WASA sewer men charge Rs 300 for cleaning the one chamber septic tank. They also do not do it properly and dispose the silt they remove from the tank in the lane. The vehicle has made it possible for ASB to visit neighbouring rural areas to present their work, before they had to hire a van for carrying their staff, activists and equipment.

6. RESULTS OF OPP REPLICATION PROJECTS OUTSIDE KARACHI

6.1 The Status of the Projects

The ASB is so far the most successful of the OPP replication projects outside Karachi. The replication projects fall into three broad categories. These categories are discussed below.

a) Projects That Never Developed:

Two projects that were supported by WaterAid funding and OPP training never materialised. These are Okara Development Programme (ODP), Okara and the Community Development Concern (CDC), Sialkot. The ODP was introduced to the OPP by the Youth Commission for Human Rights (YCHR), Lahore, in 1994. The YCHR was supposed to supervise the Project and help it evolve. However, this did not happen as the YCHR itself had certain operational and staffing problems. The OPP tried to keep in touch with the ODP but there was no response from them. Subsequently, the OPP requested WaterAid to discontinue funding the Project.

The case of the CDC, Sialkot was similar. CDC was introduced to the OPP by the South Asia Partnership, Lahore, in 1994. CDC however, is an old NGO operating in Sialkot since 1985. YCHR was also supposed to train and support CDC technically and OPP engineers also visited the CDC Project Area in 1995 and provided ten days of technical training in surveying and mapping to CDC surveyors. However, the CDC did not send any reports regarding its work to the OPP and nor did any construction work on sanitation take place. As a result, the OPP requested WaterAid to discontinue funding CDC. The reasons why CDC could not replicate OPP's work are that CDC has a history of lobbying for development and in this it has been fairly successful. It was difficult for it to shift from lobbying to development. Also, its leadership was very busy in human rights issues, attending seminars and expressing concerns regarding the social and political conditions in Pakistan in general and its own project area in particular.

ODP and CDC have received Rs 162,842 each from WaterAid.

b) Sanitation Projects That Fizzled Out:

YCHR, a Lahore based NGO, established in 1989 by a group of university graduates, was introduced to the OPP by South Asia Partnership in 1991. The OPP supported the YCHR with training and guidance both in Lahore and at the OPP-RTI in Karachi. YCHR was also supported from February 1993 to January 1996 by the Swiss NGO Programme. In addition to sanitation, the YCHR adopted the OPP's micro credit programme in September 1992 and took on the role of trainer for other NGOs. However, YCHR's emphasis shifted from sanitation to education and health. The reason for this shift was YCHR's involvement with the Social Action Programme of the government of Pakistan through which YCHR received a grant of Rs 6.4 million and the sanitation and credit programme became secondary matters. Also, a clear division between the finances of the credit programme and other programmes was not maintained creating some financial and administrative confusion. A large number of staff were employed by the Project and staff turn-over was considerable. As a result, consolidation of work became problematic. Currently, the YCHR's main work is in education, health and support to government plans in solid waste management.

Boo Ali Seena Welfare Organisation (BASWO), Muzzaffargarh, was introduced to the OPP in 1996 and WaterAid support was given to them subsequently. Physical training on sanitation was also undertaken for a main line with community funds in the same year. In 1997, the organisation went through a lot of internal problems. The coordinator of the

organisation was accused by the project staff and communities of misappropriating money meant for the purchase of survey instruments. This divided the organisation and many attempts to bring it together since then have failed in spite of the fact that various development proposals for community organisation and fund raising have been made, many of them with OPP support. Meanwhile, the coordinator accused by the organisation of corruption has got himself a job with the foreign funded NGO in Islamabad and left the town.

Organisation for Participatory Development (OPD), Gujranwala was introduced to the OPP in 1993 by YCHR. The organisation successfully adopted the OPP micro enterprise credit model. It also adopted the OPP sanitation model for which the OPP gave technical training and guidance both in Karachi and on-site in Gujranwala. The project was initially successful but the work started to decline after mid-1997. The OPD carried out an internal evaluation in mid-1997 and decided to close down its sanitation programme. The OPD felt that sanitation was not a neighbourhood affair but had to be looked at a larger level. The OPD felt that it could do this by motivating the local authorities and collaborating with them. The OPD also felt that almost 50 per cent of the households in its Project Area could not afford the cost of the OPP model. As a result of the evaluation, OPD priorities are now education, credit and health for which it is operating successful programmes and it keeps in touch with the OPP. Meanwhile, the OPD coordinator, Bahar Ali is now a senior executive in Save the Children's Fund (UK) office in Islamabad. Funds provided by WaterAid to OPD for the sanitation from 1994 to 1997 are Rs 821,217.

c) Projects Which Have Consolidated:

ASB Faisalabad and AFB Rawalpindi are two projects that have consolidated their sanitation and water supply projects. In both cases, the success is because they have been able to adapt the OPP model to local conditions, rather than adopt it. In addition, in both cases, constant contact with the OPP has been maintained and there has been no internal conflict in the organisation. Also, they have shown no impatience for quick results or for acquiring large funds. Another organisation that has similar qualities is the Environmental Protection Society in Swat whose work is still in the initial stages.

6.2 Changes in OPP's Policies

As a result of its experience with replication projects, the OPP has decided to choose its partners carefully. In the beginning, only a small start up grant is provided to NGOs and CBOs for the sanitation programme. If they show signs of promise, only then is an agreement between them and WaterAid finalised. It has been observed that CBOs relate to the OPP model better than NGOs whose staff and leadership belong outside in the project area. This is now an important aspect that the OPP looks into when deciding with whom to collaborate. The OPP has also learnt that the CBO or NGO with whom the OPP works must have a team of social and technical people with whom it can relate. Such a team is not always available and needs to be built up. The methodology for building up such a team from within the community has now been evolved. As has been demonstrated by many OPP replication projects, social organiser and technical person from outside the community is not a viable alternative.

7. REASONS FOR ASB'S COMPARATIVE SUCCESS

7.1 Adapting but Not Adopting the OPP Model

The ASB has adapted the OPP model to its context. Changes have been made in methodology of motivation, financing of external development, and by taking on service provision for maintenance of infrastructure.

The ASB, unlike the OPP, did not begin by holding meetings for motivating communities. It identified "respectable" community elders with whom it held a dialogue individually and they in turn spoke to people who were under their influence. It was only when this process had been completed that a meeting was called. Even then, the elders decided on where and when to hold the meeting. Each development work was converted into an event. The inauguration of the water line by an elder, complete with banners and a gathering is one example. Muhammad Naseem, a famous populist artist of Faisalabad was invited to inaugurate a sewage line in the settlement although he lives in a formally planned middle income settlement. Through him the ASB has been able to lobby for support in government agencies and also to get him to design their literatures and posters. Since a number of people visit him, he is able to spread the message of ASB. These innovations in motivation reflect the reality of Faisalabad as opposed to Karachi. In Faisalabad the ASB is dealing with a homogenous and cohesive society with its roots in the soil. In Karachi one is dealing with a migrant population where traditional values and organisations no longer exist. These reasons are also responsible for the ASB's effective interaction with area councillors.

The ASB's decision to build the external infrastructure with a loan and then recover it from the beneficiaries is also a departure from the OPP model. Again, this decision was made after a careful examination of local conditions and a firm belief that social pressure could be exerted to recover the loan. However, the decision to lay the external infrastructure first has been proposed by the OPP and followed by Karachi, Sukkur and Hyderabad communities as well, where a disposal point was not available.

The decision of ASB to organise the maintenance of the sewer system and to provide a service for it is again a major departure from OPP work. OPP has always asserted that it is not a service provider and this work should be organised, undertaken and financed by the communities themselves or by entrepreneurs. It will be interesting to see how the maintenance model of the ASB works out and what administrative and financial pressures it puts on the organisation.

7.2 The Role of Nazir Ahmed Wattoo

Nazir Ahmed Wattoo's personality and experience has been pivotal in whatever success has been achieved by the ASB. Nazir Ahmed Wattoo had an advantage that he had spent about 25 years of his life in interacting with politicians, government agencies and communities before he became involved with the OPP. As such, he knows the nature of the government institutions, their procedures, the manner in which one had to deal with them, and the relationship between them and the politicians on the one hand, and communities on the other. He is at home with legal processes and has access to courts and lawyers. Since he has interacted with various elements of society, he knows how to motivate them and to use them for his cause. Because of his failures in lobbying for development and in politics, he was willing to try a new approach. That is why he accepted the OPP philosophy and methodology and realised that there was no short cut to improvement in the conditions of low income settlements.

Nazir Ahmed Wattoo took his time in getting to know the OPP. He displayed no impatience. In the same way in the course of his work on ASB programmes he has shown no impatience either. The most important thing that Wattoo has learnt is that development does not come through money but through teaching people how to look after themselves and developing skills in them for this purpose. Because of this he has rejected various offers of grants which would have forced him to expand his work and staff, thus increasing his dependence on unreliable funds and persons. The most important element in ASB's work is that all decisions are taken collectively and with the involvement of community members. In addition, unlike many NGOs and CBOs, the ASB's accounts are transparent and available for community members to examine and this builds trust and confidence.

7.3 Low Cost, Culturally Compatible

ASB's major achievement is its low overheads and small staff. This makes management easy and also creates a greater understanding between it and the communities it works with. The three member staff is also drawn from the community, thus strengthening the entire process. The health and credit programme of the ASB are completely separate, both financially and organisationally from the water and sanitation programme. In addition, there is no conflict between the organisational culture of ASB and the communities it works with. The points mentioned above are reflected in the two tables below.

Table – 7.3 a

**Approved Water and Sanitation Budget of ASB for
Financial Year April 1999 – March 2000**

Items	Approved Budget (Rs.)
Staff Salary:	
- Coordinator	96,000
- Assistant social organiser	66,000
- Surveyor/supervisor	72,000
Operational Cost:	
- Postage & stationery	12,000
- Printing of maps	5,000
- Office maintenance	16,000
- Maintenance of shuttering	6,000
Equipments:	
- Tools and shuttering	6,000
- Audio visual	15,000
- Training	25,000
- Technical back-up support	60,000
Total	379,000

Source: ASB Progress Report, June 1999

Table – 7.3 b

Total Funds Received by ASB from WaterAid for Water and Sanitation Projects

Financial Year	Description	Amount Received (Rs)	Actual Expenses (Rs)	Balance (Rs)
1995-96	Amount received for Annual Budget plus Rs 200,000 as revolving fund for water project	405,160	458,622	- 53,462
1996-97	Amount received for Annual budget	301,251	291,928	+ 9,323
1997-98	Amount received for Annual Budget	251,470	155,708	+ 95,762
1998-99	Amount received for Annual Budget	434,327		
1999-2000	Amount received for Annual Budget	379,000		
	Total received for budget and revolving fund	1,771,208		
	Deduct Rs 200,000 for revolving fund	- 200,000		
	Sub total 'A'	1,571,208		
1997-98	Amount received for equipment for video and sewer maintenance unit	305,002	305,002	Nil
Nov. '98	- Video making - Trunk sewer revolving fund - Transportation (truck and equipment) - For Project No. 5814 (Video Making)	320,280 500,000 705,000 116,710		
	Total for equipment, video and revolving fund	1,943,992		
	Deduct Rs 500,000 for sewer revolving fund	- 500,000		
	Sub Total 'B'	1,443,992		
	Total A plus B	3,015,200		

Source: ASB reports

Against a total investment of Rs 1,571,208 for staff salary, operational costs, office equipment and training, the community has been able to invest Rs 4,558,794. In addition, capital expenses for equipment of sewer maintenance unit, truck and related equipment, video camera and the making of a video film have been Rs 1,443,992. As the work expands, the ratio of ASB expenditure to community investment is bound to fall.

8. PERCEPTIONS OF FAISALABAD CITY LEVEL GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS REGARDING ASB AND OPP

8.1 Preamble

This section consists of a note by Akbar Zaidi and is based on field work and meetings, with a number of senior employees of three of Faisalabad's key infrastructure delivery institutions. Officials from the FAUP, WASA and the FDA were interviewed between February 12 – 15, 1999 and were asked for their opinions and analysis of the work undertaken by the ASB in the area of Hasanpura in Faisalabad. Since the ASB has been

working closely with the OPP, questions were also asked about how these government officials view the work of the OPP.

8.2 Questions Put to Officials

The nature of the questions put to the officials included the following: i) How is the work of the ASB perceived by government officials in Faisalabad? ii) Are they familiar with the type of work that the ASB has undertaken? iii) Do they feel that this type of work can/ought to be undertaken by NGOs in Faisalabad? iv) Can the work of ASB in Hasanpura be replicated in other poor income settlements in the city? v) Can this sort of work be co-opted by government institutions at the city level? vi) Is there any relationship between the work of ASB and government? Is it possible to build a working relationship between ASB and government in the future? vii) Are government employees familiar with the work of OPP? Have they learnt anything from this work? Is it of any relevance to government in Faisalabad?

8.3 Discussions with FAUP

Officials met and interviewed at FAUP included: Ataullah Khan, Additional Project Director, FAUP; Wajid Hasan, Senior Social Organiser, FAUP; Khatib Alam, Consultant; and Ejaz Ahmed, Social Development Consultant.

Although there was no intention to compare the nature and type of work undertaken by ASB and FAUP, this seemed to be the underlying theme in discussions with FAUP staff. They emphasised the fact that it is not possible and incorrect to compare the nature and scale of work undertaken by the two institutions. FAUP staff argued that ASB was very small in scale and restricted to only one locality, while their own work in Phase 1 of the Project, covered four localities and four times as many households. They argued that theirs was a government project and they wanted communities to work with government, rather than without it, as has been the case with ASB. Moreover, they emphasised the fact that their work was multi-dimensional and included water supply, sanitation, but also health and education, areas which ASB did not address. Moreover, they felt that FAUP was empowering communities because they used to set up MPCOs, unlike the ASB, which they felt was only a service provider providing water and sanitation, and not an NGO involved in community welfare and empowerment as defined by FAUP. A fundamental difference they identified between the two organisations was that ASB asked the community to provide full funding for the cost of infrastructure and labour, while FAUP asked for a contribution of only 50 per cent from the community, with government (FDA in this case) providing the other half. It was acknowledged that since FAUP 'is government', things are slow to materialise, unlike initiatives in ASB which do not have this constraint; ASB was seen to have the advantage of being 'flexible'. However, FAUP staff felt that their procedures while slow, allowed easier auditing and more accountability than most NGOs.

No difference in the quality of the nature of work between the two organisations was found regarding sanitation infrastructure. Both bought the same types of raw material, usually from the same source. Since there are differences in the costs of the two sanitation projects, with FAUP's being somewhat higher, FAUP felt that this was on account of some differences in design. (FAUP designs are also based on OPP designs, as are those of ASB). An important difference expressed by FAUP was that ASB's sanitation programme was restricted to household and lane level (tertiary), while FAUP undertook tertiary and secondary infrastructure as well, and in the case of the later, community contributions were not sought, with FAUP providing full funding for trunk sewers. Since the FAUP was critically dependent on funding from the UK government's Department for International Development, some of

the FAUP staff felt that the project would not be able to continue if funding came to a halt and most MPCOs would fold.

It was felt that ASB will not be able 'scale-up' its work and will not be able to install a secondary sewer system as it costs too much and the community would not be able to afford these costs. When informed that ASB was already in the process of setting up such a system, they felt that ASB would not be able to maintain it. Besides, they felt that at a tertiary level ASB has worked only with communities and since a secondary system requires interaction with government, the NGO will have to change its outlook and style of work. It was felt that FAUP's approach was better than ASB's as the internal sanitation and sewerage was done by the community with FAUP taking care of the secondary level.

It was conceded by all FAUP staff that ASB's work had been a success and that it had achieved its targets. One explanation for the success of the ASB was the perception that Hasanpura was a far more prosperous area than three of FAUP's areas, and hence it became easier for households to contribute the full cost of sanitation services. Another important factor for the success was seen to be the personality, initiative and drive in Mr. Wattoo and his team. Although some FAUP staff felt that ASB had done well for itself, they also felt that it was a 'one man show' and felt that without Mr. Wattoo, the organisation would fold. They felt that a basic difference between FAUP and ASB was that the later was an organisation/institution, while ASB was critically dependent on the efforts of Mr. Wattoo alone. Moreover, questions were raised about what ASB would do next and about how the organisation would sustain itself after most or all of the houses in its project area had been provided with sanitation services.

Some FAUP staff were more critical of the way their organisation has interacted with OPP than with OPP's philosophy. They felt that OPP which has a representative on the FAUP Steering Committee, has never really acknowledged the work of FAUP; OPP's representative has also not turned up at any Steering Committee meeting (except possibly once). A major criticism of OPP articulated by those interviewed, was the feeling that OPP 'never acknowledges any of its weaknesses'. With reference to Arif Hasan's book 'Working With Government', it was felt that nowhere are the problems faced by OPP mentioned and nor are the organisation's failures. Moreover, there was a perception that OPP does not believe in working with government, while FAUP wanted to emphasise the fact that communities should develop initiative, be empowered but also accept government as a partner. It was said that 'FAUP was doing very little on OPP's lines' and also that OPP works in alienation with government and does not need to depend on line departments for operation and maintenance due to OPP's topography. A concern was also expressed by interviewees that OPP was very dismissive of FAUP's work. They felt that senior OPP members visit Faisalabad, but never visit FAUP.

It was articulated that OPP was essentially like ASB, also a 'one man show', and not an institution like FAUP, and that the OPP model could not be replicated and therefore had weaknesses. (FAUP was seen to be a replicable model.) OPP and ASB were seen as 'the same thing' and since OPP was backing and 'selling' ASB, donors had become interested in ASB. Much of the success of ASB was seen to be due to the support of OPP. However, it was felt that ASB's credit programme was a major achievement and a mechanism which allowed ASB access to a potentially large number of households. FAUP's credit programme was awaiting approval of funds for Phase 2 of the project.

FAUP staff felt that ASB never acknowledged the contribution and help given by FAUP staff to ASB. It was mentioned that at least three FAUP staff (all consultants, rather than FDA/FAUP staff) had helped ASB in preparing presentation material and otherwise, but FAUP had not been given any credit for this.

8.4 Discussions with WASA

Those met and interviewed were Aftab Masood, Director Revenue; Majeed, Director Hydrogeology; and Gul Hafiz Khokar, Community Infrastructure Unit.

It seemed that these two directors at WASA did not really know much about the activities of ASB but, nevertheless, felt that it was doing a 'good job'. Director Revenue said that ASB had helped WASA generate a large amount of revenue by bringing on-line numerous new consumers. He felt that whatever infrastructure ASB undertook, WASA was bound to take it over and is responsible for all operation and maintenance costs, as long as basic standards and specifications are maintained.

Director Hydrogeology felt that ASB does not have the technical capability like FAUP, and while FAUP which being a government department is supposed to have its development projects vetted for material and specifications, ASB is exempt from this. He felt that FAUP was changing a system of delivery in the government sector, while ASB's initiative was just an independent initiative. The long term maintenance capacity of ASB was also questioned and it was felt that there is no guaranteed reliability of ASB's interventions. There was also concern about ASB's sustainability and the Director felt that there was no certification of its specifications either. He was also concerned about the subsequent transfer of ASB's schemes to WASA, suggesting that it was not clear how these schemes will be incorporated in WASA's overall system.

The Director Hydrogeology and the official from the Community Infrastructure Unit had heard of OPP and Dr. Akhtar Hameed Khan, but were not aware of the nature of work undertaken by OPP other than that it worked in a low income area of Karachi. They accepted the fact that they had learnt a great deal from NGOs in the water and sanitation sector and that these NGOs will have to take over some of the load from WASA which was facing a shortage of funds. However, they felt that the roles and responsibilities of NGOs and of WASA in a new relationship will need to be well defined, and that they were working on a concept which clarified these Terms of Partnership between WASA and NGOs. However, they really were not aware of what and how NGOs work and may have been repeating the 'working with NGOs' attitude increasingly found in government departments.

8.5 Discussions with FDA

Meeting with Randhawa, Director Town Planning and Parvez Zahid, Public Relations Officer, FDA and WASA.

There was even less knowledge about ASB or OPP amongst these two FDA employees than at WASA. They had only heard about the work of both OPP and ASB, but knew none of the details and areas in which the two worked. They also felt that FAUP was not taken seriously at the senior level in FDA and that it existed only because of donor insistence. Both these officials were far more interested in discussing FAUP and its failings, than the issues put to them.

8.6 Some Observations

It is important to stress the fact that the comments presented above are not completely representative of the views and opinions of the institution to which the officials belong; it may be that they are, but too few officials were interviewed in WASA and FDA to provide a 'representative sample'. (Attempts were made to talk to the heads of both institutions, but

neither was available.) However, it is quite possible that they do represent the general perception held by many.

It seems then, that other than officials and consultants at FAUP, which is probably perceived to be a direct competitor of ASB, very little information or knowledge exists in relevant government departments about the work of either ASB or OPP. They may be familiar with the names of both organisations but little else seems to be known. Hence, the questions posed above regarding government perceptions, suggest that there is either no interest in government regarding initiatives like ASB, or then ASB has not tried to advertise its accomplishments and seems to have side-stepped government altogether. In either case, it seems that while ASB has achieved much at the level of Hasanpura, it is perhaps not yet in a position to influence government. Perhaps extending the project area or working in other areas and development sectors would be a first step for government to take real interest in the work of ASB.

9. RELEVANCE, CONSTRAINTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

9.1 Relevance

The ASB model consists of the following: i) Community built and financed sewers and water supply distribution lines in the lanes; ii) ASB built collector sewers and neighbourhood main water lines financed through a revolving fund and recovered from the community; and iii) WASA developed trunk sewers and disposal points and water source development and main lines.

Given the financial and technical constraints of the government agencies as described in sections 2 and 3 of this report and the ground realities described in section 4, Faisalabad cannot acquire a proper water and sanitation system for its existing and rapidly expanding population for at least the next two decades. The ASB model points a way out if it can become a part of official planning policy. Figures in the appendices to sections 2 and 3 clearly point out that lateral and collector sewers and water distribution lines form a major part of the funds required for water supply and sanitation development. Also, the funds required for an ASB type of organisation are very modest. The model also increases knowledge about local infrastructure related conditions and creates community organisations and activists. These community organisations and activists are not created as a result of pressure from ASB or through the promises of a subsidy. They are created because people need water and sanitation and as such the programme is entirely demand driven. The model, through support from the OPP, also develops technical skills within the community and as such promotes self-reliance and creates a more equitable relationship between government agencies and local communities.

9.2 Constraints

The ASB model is closely linked to the personality and competence of Nazir Ahmed Wattoo. He is the moving spirit behind it and the ASB institution. For the model to grow and to become sustainable, it is necessary that new people or existing activists should be trained to take over the roles and responsibilities of Nazir Ahmed Wattoo. This training should be done consciously and OPP support should be sought for it. The ASB has to become an institution if its work has to survive and grow

The demand that the ASB has to now deal with requires an increasing number of technical people. These people can be trained at the local level by Aziz Ahmed with support from the

OPP. When work begins in areas other than Dhuddiwala, Hasanpura and Rasool Nagar, persons who can undergo this training should be identified and supported. The OPP has a history of doing this and it can pass on its knowledge and know-how to the ASB. However, for relating local planning to city level plans, the services of a consultant will be required when the work expands beyond the neighbourhood level. Dialogues with WASA will also be necessary and for this documentation and understanding of existing infrastructure and its condition is essential.

9.3 Recommendations for Future Directions

9.3.1 Documenting Existing Infrastructure

For meeting the demand from communities for sewage and water supply, the ASB will need to identify disposal points and water sources. This can only be done by identifying the locations of WASA trunks and water mains. Also, to integrate existing neighbourhood infrastructure into its planning, surveys of settlements will also need to be done. Visits made to various settlements indicate that if their existing infrastructure and its problems can be mapped, then the whole approach to infrastructure provision for Faisalabad will undergo a change. A similar exercise in Karachi carried out by the OPP has resulted in initiation of new policy directions. It is recommended that young men of metric and or intermediate education should be recruited by the ASB and trained at the OPP for this purpose. This documentation may take two to three years, and should be analysed and the analysis shared with WASA and FDA staff.

9.3.2 Further Study on Informal Development

For the foreseeable future, Faisalabad is going to continue to develop housing through the informal development of agricultural land, simply because formal development as structured at present, is not affordable to the lower income groups and also because the FDA has no funds or land for it. This informal development can be directed by the FDA through appropriate development of trunk infrastructure. For this a further study on informal development patterns and locations is required. The investigations on this subject that form part of this report are simply a modest beginning. Also, work needs to be done on developing small decentralised and affordable sewage treatment facilities for the informal schemes as it is going to be difficult and very expensive to integrate them into a larger sewage master plan for the city. The informal schemes also need to be integrated into a larger city plan and for this their documentation is essential.

9.3.3 Links with Academic Institutions / FAUP

The documentation of existing infrastructure, continuous research on informal settlements, relating WASA plans to ground and community realities, and the integration of informal development into a larger city plan, can all be aided by linking up the ASB work to research work of an academic institution of a relevant discipline. Possible institutions who can work with ASB are the Departments of Architecture and Planning at the University of Engineering and Technology, and the National College of Arts, both in Lahore. A meeting between the ASB and the National College of Arts on the subject has already been held in September 1999 and the possibility of their collaboration has been explored.

The possibility of FAUP developing missing trunk and secondary infrastructure and the ASB helping to develop neighbourhood infrastructure, has already been explored. This idea should be pursued and further dialogue on it should be carried out.

9.3.4 Developing the ASB into a Demonstration and Training Area

The ASB Project Area has already become a demonstration and training area for CBOs and NGOs from other parts of the Punjab. However, it is necessary to see how this aspect can be supported and made more effective. Both the OPP and the ASB have suggestions on this subject but it is necessary to involve other ASB and OPP partners in setting out directions. It is recommended that a workshop involving the ASB, OPP, AFB, Omeed Multan, EPS Swat, CRC Uch and the Lodhran Pilot Project should be held for this purpose.

APPENDICES

Persons Met and Places Visited by Salim Aleemuddin and Arif Hasan

Date	Time	Persons	Description of person	Place
12.03.99	0930-1030	Nazir Ahmed Wattoo	Coordinator ASB	ASB Office
	1400-1900	Nazirr Ahmed Wattoo	Coordinator ASB	ASB Office
13.03.99	0940-1010	Community Meeting	Community members	Railway Colony No. 1
	1020-1040	Inayatullah	Industrialist	Maqbool Road Industrial Area
	1045-1100	Ejaz Ahmed	Ch. Iron Store	Dodo Bara Market
	1105-1115	Community Meeting	Community	Mominabad
	1115-1140	Community Meeting	Community	Sir Sayed Town
	1145-1215	Javed and community members	Resident	Raja's Land, Shaikhanwala
	1220-1240	Liaqath Ali	Resident	Samanabad garbage dump along Railway colony
	1245-1320	Mohd Manzoor	Scrap Dealer	Scrap Market
	1400-1510	Reza Ali	Community Member	Mohammadi Colony
	1545-1700	Nazir Wattoo	Coordinator ASB	ASB Office
	1700-1750	Dr. Naseer	Resident	Hasan Pura
	1810-1845	Noor Mohd , Ch. Mushtaq	Broker, owner of informal housing scheme	Mehran Colony
	1900-2000	Rana Bashir Ahmed and community members	Residents	Hasan Pura
14.03.99	1045-1120	Mohd..Hanif and community members	Resident s	Farid Ganj
	1140-1200	Talib Hussain	Residents	Bahadur Singh Walla
	1220-1325	Ch, Gulam Rasool Cheema	Developer	At his office
	1335-1355	Inayat Ali Shah and community members	House owner and community members	Islampura
	1355-1430	Meeting community members	Community members	Faisal Town
	1430-1515	Shabir	Resident	Ilyas Town
	2030-2200	Zaman Khan	Journalist	
15.03.99	0940-1020	Community Meeting		Zulfiqar Colony
	1045-1130	Liaqath Ali Randhwa	Director Town Planning	FDA
	1240-1300	Arif Hassan & Nazir Wattoo	ASB	ASB Office (Data Collection)

	1300-1425	Nazir Ahmed	Interview (on problems of local govt)	ASB office
	1110-1145	Danial & Nazir Wattoo	Earth fill contractor	ASB office
	1325-1345	Mujeeb Shamsi	Accounts Officer	FMC
	1345-1355	Chief accounts Officer		FMC
	1400-1435	Munir Badar	Addl, Director	FDA
	1445-1500	Aftab Masood	Director Rev	WASA
	1525-1540	Ejaz Chohan		FAUP
	1715-1730	Arshad	Brick seller	At his shop
	1740-1750	Noorani iron Store		T-girder Shop
	1755-1810	Mohd,,Yasin		T-girder Shop
	1815-1830	Ghulam Yasin	Earth fill contractor	
	1850-1900	Toor Khan	Earth fill contractor	
11.04.99	1210-1225	Niamat Ali	Owner	Informal subdivision
	1245-1255	Mohd,Rafiq	Owner	Informal subdivision
	1310-1405	Kabir Hussain	owner	Informal subdivision
	1420-1430	Abdul Majeed	owner	Informal subdivision
	1430-1445	Ghulam Sarwar Cheema	owner	Informal subdivision
12.04.99	1100-1110	Abdul Ghaffar Passha	Dy. Director Engg	FDA
	1115-1200	Mujeed Shami	Accounts Officer	FMC
	1215-1230	Wasim Mehmood Khan	Addl. DG	FDA
	1240	Rana Ghaffar	Director Finance	FDA
	1300	Ahmed Khan		
	1350	Mohd. Rafiq Gul	Director estate	FDA
	1445	Munawar Hussain	Head Clerk Katchi Abadi Cell	FDA

Persons Met and Places Visited By Akbar Zaidi In Faisalabad

Date	Time	Persons	Description of Person	Place
Between 12.3.99 and 15.3.99		Wajid Hasan	Senior social organiser FAUP, FDA staff on deputation	FAUP
		Ejaz Ahmed	Consultant (GHKI)	FAUP Office
		Khalid Alam	Consultant (GHKI)	FAUP Office
		Attaullah Khan	Project Director FAUP (FDA staff on deputation)	FAUP office
		Aftab Masood	Director Hydrogeology (WASA)	
		Mr .Majeed	(WASA)	
		Gul Hafiz Khokar	(WASA)	Community Information Unit
		Mr Randhawa	Dir. Town Planning	FDA
		Parvez Zahid	Public Relations Officer FDA & WASA	FDA & WASA

1994 MASTER PLAN PROPOSAL

Table – 1

City Roads

Sr. No.	Scheme	Cost (Rs in million)	Self-Financing Through NGOs	Government Financing (Rs in million)	
				Short Term Execution	Long Term Execution
1.	Inter-city roads	1,475.20	-	400.00	1,075.20
2.	Intra-city roads	382.45	-	78.20	304.25
3.	Construction of over-passes	371.80	-	123.94	247.86
4.	Construction of under-passes	19.12	-	19.12	-
5.	Faisalabad by-passes	291.79	-	291.79	-
6.	Dual carriage way Faisalabad-Sheikhupura	870.24	-	870.00	-
7.	Improvement of traffic junctions and overhead bridge	95.20	-	95.20	-
	Sub Total	3,505.80	-	1,878.49	1,627.31

Source: FDA reports

Table – 2

Environment Improvement Plan

Sr. No.	Scheme	Cost (Rs in million)	Self-Financing Through NGOs	Government Financing (Rs in million)	
				Short Term Execution	Long Term Execution
1.	Shifting and development of hide and skin market / slaughter house	10.00	10.00	-	-
2.	Shifting of: - Fruit & vegetable market - Grain Market	72.60 80.00	72.60 80.00	- -	- -
3.	Shifting of General Bus Stand	96.00	96.00	-	-
4.	Development of parks and open spaces	44.50	-	44.50	-
5.	Establishment of an industrial estate	Not worked out	Self-funding	-	-
6.	Solid waste management	-do-	-do-	-	-
7.	Establishment of gawala colonies	-do-	-do-	-	-
8.	Commercial plazas	-do-	-do-	-	-
9.	Hatted factories	-	132.00	44.00	88.00
10.	Warehouses	Not worked out	Self-funding	-	-
11.	Public latrines	-do-	-do-	-	-
12.	Public utility services	-do-	-do-	-	-
13.	Bulk oil depot	-do-	-do-	-	-
14.	Army welfare food industry	-do-	-do-	-	-
	Sub total	435.10	258.60	88.50	88.00

Source: FDA reports

Table – 3

Social / Institutional Buildings

Sr. No.	Scheme	Cost (Rs in million)	Self-Financing Through NGOs	Government Financing (Rs in million)	
				Short Term Execution	Long Term Execution
1.	High Court Bench	12.78	-	12.78	-
2.	University at Faisalabad	665.87	-	-	665.87
3.	Radio / TV station	58.84	-	58.84	-
4.	Parking plaza and office complex	314.04	314.04	-	-
5.	Export display centre	81.28	81.28	-	-
6.	Sports complexes	34.28	34.28	-	-
7.	Civic Centre	94.05	94.05	-	-
8.	Children's complex	9.00	9.00	-	-
9.	Science city	-	-	72.58	-
10.	Urban transport system	-	-	-	-
	Sub total	1,270.66	533.17	71.62	665.87

Source: FDA reports

DETAILS OF WATER AND SEWERAGE MASTER PLAN

Table – 1

Phase – 1 Targets

Water Supply:	
- Construction of tube-wells	25 Nos.
- Collector main	11.85 kms
- Transmission main	17.2 kms
- Primary distribution main	41.15 kms
- Construction of in-line booster station	15,000 m ³ per hour
- Construction of terminal reservoir	10.5 mgd
- Construction of elevated reservoir	0.5 mgd
- Secondary distribution mains	70.5 kms
Sewerage:	
- Trunk sewers	14 kms
- Branch sewers	53.4 kms
- Sewerage pump stations	5 Nos.
- Sewerage treatment plants	2 Nos.
Drainage:	
- Drainage channels	20 kms

Source: WASA reports

Table – 2
Remaining Water Supply Works – Phase I

Sr. No.	Description	Funds required to complete the civil works (Rs in lacs)
1.	Installation of electrical / mechanical equipment at 18 and in-line booster pump station (6W)	26.50
2.	Construction of 25 No. tube wells and allied works	30.00
3.	Construction of in-line booster pump station and chlorination building	21.90
4.	Construction of collector / transmission main	135.38
5.	Construction of arterial main, 14W	9.00
6.	Provision and laying of 12, 5 AC pipe 15W	19.69
7.	Making connection with existing system 15WC and 15 WB	78.78
8.	Construction of 1R and attached pumping station, 16W	27.37
9.	Construction of storage room of chlorine cylinders.	2.30
10.	Construction of telecommunication building	15.10
11.	Construction of storage shed at 1R.	4.30
12.	Construction of main valve chambers for collector / transmission main	50.00
13.	Construction of mechanical workshop at 1R.	25.00
14.	Construction of quarters for mechanical / electrical staff (15 Nos.)	35.00
15.	Construction of resident engineer's residences at 1R and in-line booster pump station	25.00
16.	Repair of special valves	50.00
17.	Monitoring of wells	6.00
	Total	56.13 million

Source: WASA reports

Table – 3

Remaining Sewerage Works - Phase I

Sr. No.	Description	Expenditure upto 30.11.1993 (Rs in lacs)	Funds required to complete the balance work (Rs in lacs)
1.	Construction of western domestic trunk sewer (35B)	377.77	140.00
2.	Construction of sewage pump station no. 3 & 30 (6.5)	116.60	59.00
3.	Construction of sewage pump station no. 28 and effluent pump station contract 6.5	62.71	58.00
4.	Construction of sewage pump station no. 34 & 35 (65C)	88.35	50.00
5.	P/L trunk sewer from PS 35 to PS 36 (35D)	...	121.00
6.	Construction of trunk sewer Samanabad (35C)	31.04	80.00
7.	Construction of sewage pump station No. 36.	...	300.00
8.	Construction of western industrial trunk sewer (35A)	222.87	4.00
9.	WAPDA charges for all pumping stations	6.17	53.83
10.	Construction of western domestic treatment pounds (55A-1)	112.17	400.00
11.	Construction of western domestic treatment pounds (55A-2)	196.47	359.00
12.	Construction of western domestic treatment pounds (55B)	...	278.60
13.	Cost of land for domestic treatment pounds 9,455 acres payable to Revenue Department, government of Punjab	241.00	931.00
14.	Cost of land for industrial treatment pounds (55B)	202.23	...
	Total	1,657.92	2,834.43
			283.44 million

Source: WASA reports

Table – 4

Summary of Water Supply Development Needs – Short Term

Sr. No.	Description	Cost (Rs in million)
1.	Water TP at Jhal Khanuana water works	263
2.	Replacement/rehabilitation of existing tube wells, R.B. Canal	26
3.	Pipe line to Industrial Area	19
4.	Improvement/extension of distribution	155
	Total	463

Source: WASA reports

Table - 5

Summary of Water Supply Development Needs – Long Term

- New tube wells along R.B. Canal
- Extension of existing Chenab well-field
- Development of new well-field near Chenab River and second transmission
- Development of well-field at Chenab River and third transmission

Source: WASA reports

Table – 6

New Areas to be Served Water Supply

Sr. No.	Name of Area	Length to be laid (Rft.)
1.	Jamil Town	10,000
2.	Ijaz Town	10,000
3.	Rehmat Town	10,000
4.	Iqbal Town	10,000
5.	Ahmadabad	10,000
6.	Nasirabad, Manzoor Park, Mughalpura, Nestrabad, Leamandabad	49,000
7.	Nishatabad	22,000
8.	Usmanabad	10,000
9.	Ghausiabad	2,000
10.	Ayub Colony (katchi abadi)	5,000
11.	Dhuddiwala and adjoining areas	20,000
12.	Chak No. 224	2,500
13.	Hajiabad, Ashrafabad, Saddiqueabad, Garden Mohalla, Jamilabad, Mattopura	30,000
14.	Islamia Park	5,000
15.	G.M. Abad	10,000
16.	Nigehbanpura	2,500
17.	Nisar Colony	2,000
18.	Shadabad, Millat Road, areas around Noorpur	10,000
	Total	200,000

Source: WASA reports

Table – 7

Immediate Improvement Needs – Water Supply

Sr. No.	Name of Work	Cost (Rs in million)
1.	Replacement of undersized and defective distribution lines. 100,000 Rft.	36.00
2.	Extension in distribution system. 200,000 Rft.	18.00
3.	Rehabilitation of existing tube wells along Rakh Branch Canan. 22 Nos.	12.00
4.	Laying of 800 mm water supply for industrial area Nishatabad. 5 km	23.00
	Total	89.00

Source: WASA reports

Table – 8

Short Term Requirement: Proposed Trunk Sewers for Western Zone

Sr. No.	Area	Length (kms)
1.	M/Wala Railway crossing – Sargodha Road-View Colony-G.M. Abad-WDTP	14.00
2.	Millat Town to Western Industrial Treatment Plant	2.00
3.	Central Sewer along Circular Road	6.25

Source: WASA reports

Table – 9

Short Term Requirement: Proposed Trunk Sewers for Eastern Zone

Sr. No.	Area	Length (Kms)
1.	Mushtaq Dyeing-Abdullahpur Tezab Textile Mill-Pump Station along Satiana Road	20.00
2.	Pump Station along Satiana Road-Proposed Pump Station at Dhuddi Minor	0.60
3.	Peoples Colony to D-Type Colony-Yasinabad-Muhammadi Colony-Proposed Pump Station	5.25
4.	Samanabad to proposed pump station	2.00
5.	Sullage carrier from pump station at Dhuddi Minor-proposed treatment plant	9.91
	Total	37.76

Source: WASA reports

Table – 10

Cost Estimates (Short Term Development Works)

Sr. No.	Description	Cost (Rs in million)
1.	Trunk Sewers	391.22
2.	Lateral sewers/sullage carriers	281.60
3.	Sewage pumping stations	204.55
	Total	877.37

Source: WASA reports

Table – 11

Areas without Sewerage System

Sr. No.	Description	Areas (ha)
1.	Naseerabad, Ahmedabad, Manzoorpura, Nishatabad, Luamanabad, Mohallah, Baghbanpura, Sharifpura, Mughalpura	227
2.	Siddupura, Namil Town, Rehmat Town, Ijaz Town, Iqbal Town, Faizabad, Muftipura	128
3.	Munirabad, Kamalpura, Madina Town, Ilyas Park, Rehmanabad	100
4.	Nasirabad, Liaquatabad 1 & 2, Liaquat Town, Saifabad, Rashidabad, Sheikh Colony, Farid Town, Ayub Colony, Qasimabad	182
5.	Hasanpura, Madinaabad, Badar Colony, Kehkushan Colony, Dhuddiwala	146
6.	Farooqabad, Mohalla Korla, Sohailabad, Murad Colony, Basti Abdullahpur	126
7.	Chak No. 224 (Fateh Din Wali), Karim Park, Haideri Mohallah, Khan Model Colony, Gulzarpura, Chak No. 224 (Wazir Khan), Basti Allah Hule area along disposal water drain Jaranwala Road to Qasim Shah Chowk	252
	Total	1,161

Source: WASA reports

Note on Long Term Requirements for Sewage

It is planned to expand the area served by sewage through the construction of about 53.2 kms of trunk sewers and 110 kms of laterals during Phase III (year 2001 – 2010). Further, this proposal for Phase III also includes an open 9.9 kms sewage drain. Works will be required on 4 pumping stations (1.3 – 5.5 m³/s capacity).

During Phase IV (year 2011 – 2018) the development programme is proposed to comprise 58.4 kms of trunk sewers, 220 kms of laterals and two open sewage drains totalling 15.9 kms. Works will be required on 4 pumping stations (0.6 – 9.0 m³/s capacity).

Source: WASA reports

Table - 12

Faisalabad Sewage and Drainage Project: Components of Part - 1

- Construction of sullage carrier from Satiana Road **Pumping Station to Madhuana** Drain (27,000 rft.).
- Construction of trunk sewer from Abdullahpur Pumping Station to Satiana Road via Jaranwala Road, Passport Office Road and Satiana Road (36" to 72" dia).
- Construction of sewage pumping station 75 cusec capacity at Satiana Road.

Source: WASA reports

Table - 13

Faisalabad Sewage and Drainage Project: Components of Part - 2

- Construction of trunk sewer from Gunit Rail Bazaar to main pumping station Ghulam Muhammad Abad (G.M. Abad) (36" to 54" dia).
- Construction of trunk sewer along Sulan Road, Tezab Mills Road, Warispura, D-Type are and other lateral sewers in different areas of the city.
- Rehabilitation / upgradation of pumping station, Mansoorabad, Tariqabad and D-Type Colony.

Its estimated cost is Rs 65.01 million.

Source: WASA reports

FDA, WASA AND FMC BUDGET**Table – 1****Faisalabad Development Authority****Development Budget (Rs in million)**

1996-97	Proposed	Actual
- Tameer-e-Watan (Punjab government)	74.196	15.653
- Deposit works	68.445	13.776
- Own sources	91.380	13.067
- Non-development	43.796	39.213
1997-98		
- Tameer-e-Watan (Punjab government)	51.906	22.962
- Deposit works	17.444	6.022
- Own sources	148.332	16.592
- Non-development	53.877	43.790
1998-99		
- Tameer-e-Watan (Punjab government)	120.845	15.199
- Deposit works	12.118	1.055
- Own sources	133.222	2.460
- Non-development	50.719	30.193

Source: FDA budget reports

Table – 2.1

**Statement Showing the WASA Annual Non-Development Budget and Actual
Income and Expenditure for the Year 1996-97 and 1997-98**

(Rupees in Million)				
Particulars	1996 – 97		1997 -98	
	Budget	Revised	Budget	Revised
A. Opening Balance	71.424	71.424	50.740	50.740
B. Receipts:				
- Water supply sale	57.500	52.920	70.000	50.670
- Share of property tax	30.000	30.000	35.000	-
- Sewerage	37.500	29.250	45.000	36.780
- Hire charges of machinery	0.100	0.030	0.100	0.040
- Sale of waste water	0.500	0.420	0.500	0.290
- Establishment charges from development schemes	-	2.600	15.000	14.970
- Interest on investment	5.000	5.360	1.500	3.560
- Others	10.226	3.826	4.500	2.810
Total:	140.826	124.406	171.600	109.120
C: Expenditure:				
- Salary and wages	73.565	67.805	77.090	71.980
- Employees other benefits	6.480	7.673	10.000	10.570
- Repair and maintenance of water supply and sewerage	7.520	10.430	11.500	15.330
- Material and store	1.450	1.460	1.600	2.050
- Travelling vehicle running expenses	2.695	2.642	2.830	2.940
- Establishment charges	1.610	1.430	1.540	1.840
- Existing system electrical expenditure	100.000	30.060	100.00	29.192
- Office electricity, gas and oil for pumping station	4.290	4.960	4.780	6.810
- Rent, rate and taxes	0.500	0.120	0.500	-
- Anti-water logging	1.450	1.170	-	-
- Consumer survey	0.070	-	-	-
- Legal charges and audit fee	0.500	0.800	0.500	0.294
- Repair and maintenance of project	4.600	4.040	5.000	4.322
- Funds transfer to development budget	12.500	12.500	12.500	7.630
- Other charges	3.820	-	3.370	1.252
Total:	221.050	145.090	231.210	154.210
D. Surplus/Deficit (B-C)	80.224	20.684	59.610	45.090

Opening balance for the year 1996-97	71.424
Less shortfall during the year 1996-97	20.684

Opening balance for the year 1997-98	50.740
Less shortfall during the year 1997-98	45.090

Opening balance for the year 1998-99	5.650

Source: FDA budgets

Table - 2.2

**Statement Showing the WASA's Operating Income and Expenditure
for the Year 1998-99**

(Rs in million)		
Particulars	Budget Prov: 1998-99	Actual up to 28.02.99
A. Opening Balance	5.650	5.650
B. Operating Receipts		
- Water supply	85.000	36.173
- Sewerage	60.000	24.369
- Share of property tax	65.000	4.014
- Sale of sullage	2.000	0.030
- Hire charges of machinery	0.100	0.077
- Interest of investment	4.000	2.058
- Share from development scheme	15.000	4.075
- Others	4.600	1.116
Total:	235.700	71.912
C. A plus B	241.350	77.562
D. Operating Expenditure		
- Salaries and wages	79.900	49.600
- Employees / other benefits	12.080	6.892
- Repair and maintenance of W/S	3.300	1.742
- R/M sewerage and drainage	10.200	6.679
- Material store	1.300	0.847
- Travelling vehicle running expenditure	2.400	2.099
- Establishment expenditures	1.350	0.900
- Existing system elect; expenditure	90.000	9.510
- Office elect; gas and oil for pumping stations	4.580	3.909
- Rent, rate and taxes	0.500	0.025
- Legal charges and audit fee	0.500	0.095
- Repair and maintenance of project	4.800	2.168
- Funds transfer to development budget	26.400	0.640
- Others	3.220	0.308
Total:	240.530	85.214
Surplus / Deficits (C minus D)	0.820	(-) 7.652

Source: WASA budget reports

Table - 3

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION FAISALABAD

BUDGET AT A GLANCE

Major Heads	1998-99		1997-98		1996-97		1995-96	
	Budgeted	Actual	Budget ed	Actual	Budgeted	Actual	Budgeted	Actual
A. Income:								
1. Octroi	252	-	480	-	440	438.48	450	432.78
2. Urban immovable property tax	80	-	60.1	-	5	50.45	40.3	48.34
	153.34	-	133.35	-	181.77	161.64	121.8	114.01
3. Others	758.34	-	673.45	-	672.27	650.57	612.1	595.13
Total								
B. Expenditure:								
1. Development:								
- Original works	127	-	90	-	160.86	86.43	107	98.95
- Repair	113	-	90	-	95	54.59	93	88.93
- Health & Sanitation	NA	-	120	-	106.5	10.93	121.08	103.96
- Education	NA	-	143.25	-	128.8	127.87	128.9	124.72
Total			443.25	-	491.16	370.82	449.98	416.56
2. Non-development:								
- Pay & allowances	389	-	123.5	-	106.82	100.01	82.89	102.61
- Contingencies	102	-	91.24	-	70.29	63.47	50	33.26
- Others	21.26	-	15.41	-	14.85	15.31	13.47	11.73
Total	512.26	-	230	-	191.96	178.79	146.36	147.59
Grand Total	-	-	673.25	-	683.12	549.61	596.34	564.16

(Rs in Million)

Source: FMC budgets

BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL CENTRES BUILT BY THE GOVERNMENT SINCE 1947

Faisal Market:

This project covering an area of 15 *kanals* is situated on Dijkot Road. Project cost was estimated at Rs 50 lacs for the construction of 116 shops.

Gulistan Shopping Centre 1, 2:

This shopping centre is planned over an area of 110 acres consisting of 171 shops.

Chenab Market:

This market is situated in Madina Town in an area of 6 acres. Besides shops, this market consists of mosque and auditorium etc. Construction cost was estimated at Rs 3 crore.

Dosobara Market:

This market has wide roads and a park. Height of the shops is 16'-8". On top of the shops 3 storey residential apartments are constructed. Estimated cost of 144 shops and 126 flats was Rs 2 crore.

Faizabad Market:

In this scheme shops are provided with a 14'-0" wide verandah in front. On top of the shops there are flats for middle income groups.

Iran Market:

Illegal shops over Samundari Road were settled in this market which was located adjacent to D-Type Colony on an area of 13 acres. The market has 484 shops with wide roads, mosque, bank and post office.

Source: FDA publications

Details of Government Housing Schemes

Housing Supply:

Between 1947 and 1991 FDA has developed only 38,785 plots and houses. This includes 4,700 nuclear houses and 22 flats developed for bulldozed *katchi abadi* residents.

a) Housing Schemes / Resettlement Schemes:

Gulistan Colony No. 2:

This scheme was developed on 110 acre land on Millat Road. Besides 100 residential plots, scheme consisted of school, dispensary, park etc. at a cost of Rs 234 lacs.

Dosobara Part I and II:

This scheme was spread over an area of 21 acres consisting of 494 plots for lower and middle income groups. A *katchi abadi* situated adjacent to this new scheme was also included in this scheme, 3 and 7 marls plots were provided to the *katchi abadi* dwellers.

Dosobara Part III:

This was a resettlement scheme for *katchi abadi* factory area. Scheme was spread over an area of 139 acres. All modern civic services were provided at a cost of Rs 3 crore 30 lacs with FDA's own resources. Scheme also included a market.

Millat Town:

This scheme was initiated on Millat Road, some 9 kms away from city. Area of scheme was 386 acres. Development works were estimated to cost 10 crore 76 lacs. Scheme consisted of 5,700 plots.

Weaver Colony:

This scheme was planned adjacent to Ghulam Muhammadabad. Planned area was 27 acres consisting 621 plots. Estimated cost of development works was Rs 87 lacs. Scheme was developed to shift the loom industries in Ghulam Muhammadabad.

Ahmed Nagar:

This scheme is situated at 225 R.B. on area of 92 acres. Scheme was planned to rehabilitate resident from different *katchi abadis* of the city which were affected in the process of development works carried out these. Estimated cost for the development of this scheme was Rs 2 crore. Scheme consists of mostly 3 marla plots.

Allama Iqbal Colony:

This resettlement scheme was developed in 1976 to shift 10,500 families from Punjab's largest *katchi abadi*, factory area. Up till 1983 Rs 9 crore 30 lacs were spent by FDA for the development of this scheme. (More information in Draft 1)

Khararyanwala Township:

This township was planned 20 kms away from Faisalabad, spread over an area of 3,700 acres. This scheme also includes a business and industrial area within it.

Millat Town Extension:

In addition to existing Millat Town scheme of 366 acres, Millat Town Extension was planned adjacent to it with an area of 387 acres.

Islamnagar Flats:

In 1980, FDA initiated this project. Government land adjacent to Islamnagar was selected for this purpose. This three-storey building consisting of 96 flats had a estimated cost of Rs 50 lac.

Source: FDA publications

List of *Katchi Abadis*
(Declared According to 1985 Criteria)

Sr. No.	Name of <i>Katchi Abadis</i>	No. of Houses / Survey units	Popula-tion	Area		
				Kanal	Marla	Gunta
	<i>I. Katchi abadis improved:</i>					
1.	Mandar Seeta Ram Chak No. 212/RB	50	250	1	12	0
2.	Basti Essian No. 2	250	1,155	54	3	0
3.	Gujar Basti	187	1,122	35	2	0
4.	Gurunankpura	52	312	8	0	0
5.	Partab Nagar	638	3,828	90	6	3
6.	Gaushalla	300	1,800	12	8	0
7.	Murrian	341	2,046	32	8	0
8.	Rafiqabad near Premier Mills	144	920	16	14	0
9.	Near Premier Mills	474	2,370	21	9	0
10.	Risale Wala No. 12	200	1,200	24	0	0
11.	Basti Essian, Jhang Road	85	510			
12.	Punj Pir, Jhang Road	40	246			
13.	Nasirabad, Jhang Road	90	540			
14.	Chak No. 279/RB, Sq. No. 17 & 18	888	5,228	291	12	0
15.	Sher Singwala Kalan	121	726	58	0	0
16.	Sher Singwala Khurd	70	420	13	3	0
17.	Judgwala	234	1,404	85	9	0
18.	Kookianwala	43	258	5	10	0
19.	Chak No. 279/RB Khurd	73	438			
20.	Near A.B.C. Cinema	41	280	4	0	0
21.	Nadir Khan Wali 279/RB	285	1,710			
22.	Rehmanpura near A.B.C. Cinema	51	255			
23.	Madanpura near Slaughter House					
24.	Madanpura (St. No. 7)	152	912	15	6	0
25.	Yang Wala near Agri. University	168	904	34	2	0
26.	Nasirabad/Akbarabad – I	266	1,596	36	8	0
27.	Gole Bhatta/Fish Farm	414	2,484	41	0	0
28.	Faizabad near Graveyard	79	450	10	0	0
29.	Ganda Nala	322	1,610	38	16	0
30.	Chur Majra with Konnawali Gali – I	882	4,530	60	0	0
31.	Chur Majra with Konnawali Gali – II	47	262	6	0	0
32.	Kashir Road near Punnu Chowk	55	330	25	0	0
33.	New Islamnagar	106	330	24	0	
34.	Baselines Islamnagar	211	1,266	32	12	
35.	Bole-di-Jhuggi	86	516	21	11	
36.	Taj Colony	114	590	16	5	
37.	Mai-di-Jhuggi	74	330	0	9	
38.	Noorpur – II	112	712	44	3	
39.	Gokhuwal Millat Road	296	1,776	87	8	0
40.	Near Crescent Sugar Mills	272	1,500	83	9	6
41.	Farooqabad near Mansoorabad	111	666	14	17	5
42.	Waheed Park	53	318	6	3	5
43.	Railway Pul Tariq Abad I and II	408	2,040	4	10	0

44.	Opposite Muslim High School Tariqabad	41	246	5	8	0
45.	Sarwala Distributory	300	1,500	47	6	0
46.	Hussainabad	173	1,030			
47.	Shaheenabad I & II near Railway Quarters	110	660	24	3	0
48.	Saad Bela	162	810	20	18	0
49.	Kohinoor Flats	53	318	24	5	0
50.	Bahadar Singhwala	93	570	8	10	0
51.	Bishan Singhwala	40	240			
52.	Shamash Nagar	63	378	17	12	0
53.	Eisa Nagri	64	384	12	6	0
54.	Maskeenabad near Old Railway Line	126	736	26	10	0
55.	Rasool Nagar	258	1,250	3	9	0
56.	Usmanabad	80	480	19	0	8
57.	Suhailabad	42	252	8	18	0
58.	Ganda Singhwala near Batala Colony	93	570	21	16	0
59.	New Kausarabad near Peoples Colony	77	660	7	18	0
60.	Near Siddique Textile Mills	40	200		9	0
61.	Railway Crossing – 8	252	1,632	36	0	0
62.	Gharibad Godown No. II	66	396	24	0	0
63.	Railway Crossing-II Dijkot Road	55	330	3		
64.	Old Central Jail	634				
65.	Near Railway			4	15	0
66.	Chowk Choudhry Flour Mills	64	394	52	17	0
67.	Kausar Abad near Jhang Road	164	984	4	0	0
68.	Mananwala Sq. No. 80	180	1,480		0	
69.	Talabwali	190	1,140			
	II Katchi abadis with less than 40 units:					
70.	Railway Rest House	5				
71.	Railway Quarters Near Mosque	22				
72.	Ginash Flour Mills Road 212/RB	26				
73.	Ayub Colony	12				
74.	Opposite Civil Hospital	17				
75.	Railway Colony near Janbaz Force	28				
76.	Millat Road attached Sargodha Road	12				
77.	Jamia Chishtia	1				
78.	Near Bahari Colony	5				
79.	Near Weaver Colony	15				
80.	Near Race Course Islamnagar	33				
81.	Awami Colony	36				
82.	Farid Court	26				
83.	Mansoorabad near Graveyard	21				
84.	Railway Gate No. 9 Lal Mills Chowk	30				
85.	Ilyas Park					
86.	Near Municipal Degree College	26				
87.	Harcharnpura	38				
	III Katchi abadis (extended municipal limits unimproved)					
88.	Changar Mohallah/Himmat Pura (Jaranwala Road)	-	113	0		
89.	Dhup Sari (Sargodha Road)	95	20	11	0	
90.	Chak No.7/JB (Sargodha Road)	1,993	598	3	0	
91.	Marzi Pura (Narwala Road)	430	89	4	0	
92.	Rasool Nagar (Jaranwala Road)	258	64	11	0	

Low Income Unserved Areas**FAISALABAD: LOW-UN-SERVED AREAS ON PRIVATE LAND****(Based on FDA Sample Survey 1989)**

Sr. No.	Name of Area	Housing Units (Nos.)	Area (Acres)
1.	Bhatta Colony Sargodha Road	100	10
2.	Chak No. 7 Punjward	2,000	75
3.	Hussain Abad Millat Road	300	25
4.	Haider Abad near Johar Colony	300	15
5.	Lugman Abad Sanat Sing Road	800	25
6.	Dastgir Colony near Muhammad Khan Town	250	30
7.	Jamil Town near Faiz Abad	300	25
8.	Medina Abad near Chotee 79	700	50
9.	Shadab Colony Jhang Road	3,000	175
10.	Jamil Park near Kookianwala	700	50
11.	Nusrat Colony near Latif Park	400	12
12.	Fareed Town Jhang Road	500	30
13.	Saifabad near Octri Post Jhang Road	1,200	50
14.	Altaf Ganj Jhang Road	500	30
15.	Muzaffar Colony Nawabanwala	500	50
16.	Masoodabad Nawabanwala	600	40
17.	Minan Town Nawabanwala	400	50
18.	Sohailabad near Iron Market	170	25
19.	Sindhu Town (old chak) Summandry Road	200	30
20.	Gousia Abad Chak No. 224/R.B	400	75
21.	Wazir Khan Wali (Mohallah Nisar Abad)	650	120
22.	Barket Pura	400	50
23.	Dawood Nagar near Church	200	25
24.	Ahmad Abad near Kareem Park	250	50
25.	Noor Pur (Dhuddi Wala)	350	50
26.	Hussan Pura Jaranwala Road	2,500	100
27.	Small Dhuddiwala	670	25
28.	Himmat Pura/Changar Mohallah	700	37

Shadab Town: Promotional Leaflet

(Urdu original)

ایٹمی دھماکے کے بعد فیصل آباد میں دھماکے

جنرل سہیل کے قریب ترین

شاداب ٹاؤن

جبریتی شدہ قریب

جبریتی شدہ قریب

جبریتی شدہ قریب

جبریتی شدہ قریب

خاکسار ڈویلپرز

کی طرف سے فیصل آباد میں 71+5 سال کی نہایت آسان یعنی صرف 300 روپے فی پلاٹ

ماہر اداکار پلاٹ حاصل کر کے شہری موقع واقع ملک ہر جگہ سے ایک

فیصل آباد سے صرف دس سٹریٹ کی مسافت پر شاداب ٹاؤن، راجہ جرنال وارڈ 10،

نے ایٹمی دھماکے کے بعد ملحق ہوئی صورت حال اور ترقی پزیر ماحول کے دور میں جبکہ نئی روٹی

پوری کرنا ہی مشکل نظر آ رہا ہے۔ اپنا گھر بنا کر توجہ دینا ہے مگر خاکسار ڈویلپرز نے اپنی سادہ

دس سالہ ریٹ کو کم کر کے ہونے اس ناممکن کو ممکن میں بدل دیا ہے۔ کم از کم ہنگامی کامیابی

کر کے ملک کی آمدنی اور اخراجات کو نظر سے ہوتے ہوئے شاداب ٹاؤن میں رہنا آسان بنایا

کی قیمتوں اور ماحول کو شہر کو نہایت آسان کر دیا ہے تاکہ ہر خاص و عام اپنا گھر بنا سکے۔

محل وقوع

ابن سینہ میڈیکل شہید رفیق سٹریٹ ہسپتال سڑکی ہسپتال پر رول پیپ

سبز مٹی گورنمنٹ ہائی سکول نیشنل بینک پریس اسٹیشن فیڈری ایریا انٹرن

صوبائی زندگی کی تمام بنیادی سہولتوں کے جملہ بنیادی ٹاؤن کی بجنگ

شروع ہے پہلے آئیں اور کم قیمت میں فرنیچر پر اچھا پلاٹ حاصل کریں

بیانہ پر جبریتی حاصل کریں

ان دوستوں کیلئے جو گھر بیٹھے یہ سمجھتے ہیں کہ ملک پر اپنی غیر فلاح کرتے ہیں۔ دوستوں

سارا جہان ایک مہیا نہیں ہم دس سال سے آپ کے اعتماد پر بھرا آ رہے ہیں دس ٹاؤن اور ایک

کوئل مارکیٹ کی شاندار سیلابی کے بعد آپ کے اعتماد کو مزید بحال کرنے کیلئے سمندر ذیل

گاہری کیسٹ ایک بار پھر آپ کی خدمت میں حاضر ہوئے ہیں۔ خاکسار ڈویلپرز

نے جبریت انگریزوں کے ہاتھ سے آپ کی طرف سے ایلڈ اسٹریٹس بیٹھے ہیں پلاٹ کا قبضہ

آپ کے حوالے کر دیا اور گھر کی بنیاد کی اجازت ہوگی

آج ہی رقم ادا کر کے فوری جبریتی اور باقی رقم ماہانہ اقساط کی صورت میں

خوشخبری

اگر آپ بذریعہ سرمد اندازی مفت پلاٹ حاصل کرنا چاہتے ہیں

تو صرف ایک مہرہ دوسرا ادا کر کے جمع کر کے ترقی پزیر ماحول میں حصہ لے سکتے ہیں

خوش قسمت امیدوار کو پلاٹ مفت الاٹ کیا جائے گا۔ ٹاؤن کی سبیل مکمل ہوئے پر

پانچ سرسٹ پلاٹ اور پچاس کاٹھ بذریعہ سرمد اندازی مفت دیا جائے گا

ٹاؤن ورثہ ہر وارڈ میں نو بیٹے سے یکساں ہونے چاہئے تاکہ ٹاؤن دکھایا جاسکے۔

نوٹ دفتر ہر روز کھلا رہتا ہے ○ ایک نمبر 71+5 آگے

قرض کی سہولت اگر آپ فوری طور پر گھر بنانا چاہتے ہیں رسائل بھی نہیں ہیں

تو ادارہ آپ کو قرض برائے گھر کیلئے کیلئے آپ کی مدد کرے گا۔

رابطہ

خاکسار ڈویلپرز

مجموعی مارکیٹ نیشنل کالونی شاداب جرنال وارڈ فیصل آباد

فون آفس 729460 پبلی 714189

تعمیل پلاٹ 10638 625754

English Translation of Shadab Town Promotional Leaflet

Following the atomic blasts in India and Pakistan

A blast in Faisalabad

NEW SHADAB TOWN

Registered piece of land, electricity, paved roads and sewage system available!

Khaksar (dust of one's feet) Developer's offer a golden opportunity to the less fortunate of society to own land and build houses. In this time of inflation when it is even difficult to provide for the bare necessities of your children, 'Khaksar Developers' have launched an affordable housing scheme adjacent to Jaranwala Road.

The introduction of this scheme is in keeping with the Khaksar Developers decade old tradition of making the impossible, possible. In these times of back breaking expenses they have the foresight and sensitivity to keep in view income and affordability of the poor people in spite of the fact that the prices and monthly instalment of residential plots are rising every day. Living is made easy for the poor and rich alike by the scheme of the Khaksar Developers.

Location

The scheme is situated near an urban public transport stand, taxi stand, Shaheed Rafiq Trust Hospital, government hospital, petrol pump, Sabzi Mandi (vegetable market), government high school, national bank, police station and factory area. Shadab Town stands midst all these facilities catering to the basic needs of life.

Booking is in progress on first come first served basis. Do not miss your chance to get the best deal.

Get your registration done on down payment.

Guarantee

For those friends and patrons, who do not have trust in the integrity and honesty of property dealers: dear friends, the whole world is not alike. We (Khaksar Developers) have been your trustworthy servants for the past 10 years. A proof of which is the successful completion of 10 housing schemes and a commercial market. To keep your trust intact we are here once again to serve your interests with a guarantee of developing Shadab Town.

Khaksar Developers has an amazing offer of giving ownership rights and the permission to construct on advance payment.

Immediate registration on half payment, the rest to be paid in instalments

Good News

If you want to win a free plot through balloting, pay Rs 1,000 and be a contestant. The lucky one will be allotted a free plot.

On the completion of sale of the whole scheme, a 5 marla plot and a Umra (pilgrimage to Mecca) ticket will also be given free through balloting.

Town Visit

Every day from 9 in the morning to 12 noon.

Note

The office is open each day.

Loan Facility

If you want to build immediately and do not have the resources, Khaksar Developers can offer you a loan for house building.

Contact : **KHAKSAR DEVELOPERS**
Jalvi Market, National Colony Stop
Jaranwala Road, Faisalabad

Tel: 72 9460
71 4189

List of Visitors to ASB from 01 October 1998 to 31 March 1999

Organisation	Persons	Designation
UNDP	Ms. Mehjabeen Abidi	Provincial coordinator
OPP	Dr. Akhthar Hameed Khan	Founder OPP
SKAA Karachi	Tasneem Ahmed Siddiqui	Director General
Faisalabad Social Welfare Department	Rana Abdul Sattar	Deputy Director
Omeed (NGO), Multan	Khwaja Zia –ul- Haq	
WASA Faisalabad	Gul Hafeez Khokar	CIU WASA
UNDP Quetta	Karim Nawaz	Provincial Coordinator
Social Welfare Department Faisalabad	Sarfraz Cheema	Officer
Al-Hilal Welfare Society (NGO) Faisalabad	CH. Qaimdin Wirak	President
MCF Hajvery Town, Faisalabad	Faryad Ali Asad	Municipal Councillor
WASA Faisalabad (O&M)	CH. Muhammad Anwar	Assist Director
Taraqee (NGO) Quetta	Qurban Garshin	
Social Welfare & Special Education Department, Women's Development Division, Govt. of Pakistan	Muzafar Mehmood Qureshi	Federal Secretary
Social Welfare Department	Rana Abdul Sattar	Deputy Director
“	Abdul Quddous	Assistant Director
“	Sarfraz Ahmed	Officer
Family planning Association of Pakistan, Faisalabad	Ms. Umtal Hafeez	Field Director
Punjab Municipal Development Fund Company, Lahore	Khalid Sultan	Manager
PMDFC	Mohd .Saleem .Akhthar	Technical Advisor
PMDFC	Zafar Iqbal Qureshi	Director
LG&RD Department, Lahore	Imtiaz Ahmed	DG Katchi Abadis
WASA, Lahore	Mian Mohd Amin	Managing Director
TVO, Lahore	Sayed H. Bukhari	Regional Programme Officer
YCHR, Lahore	Shazia Khan	Executive Director
Housing Urban Development & Public Health Engineering Department, Lahore	Kareem Bukhsh	Technical Advisor
Municipal Corporation, Rawalpindi	Tariq Iqbal Khan	Chief Engineer
Charitable Society, Rawalpindi (NGO)	Dr. Manzoor Ahmed Butt	
AFB, Rawalpindi (NGO)	Hameed Ullah	General Secretary
Pan Environment, Gujranwala (NGO)	Sajjad Ismaeel	
OPD Gujranwala (NGO)	Aliya Warraich & Qurban Raza	
Municipal Corporation, Multan	Azhar Mehboob Mlik	Chief Engineer
Awaz Foundation (NGO)	Mohd Zia Ur Rehman	Executive
SEPHE CIRCLE (NGO), Multan	Ch.Abdul Javed Majeed	
Municipal Corporation, Multan	Ajmal Hussain	Chief Medical Officer

Omeed (NGO), Multan	Khawaja Zia ul Haq	
PSRF (NGO), Multan	Haidar Iqbal	Chairman
AAGAH (NGO), Multan	Faisal Khwaja	Programme Officer
DCET, Karachi	Noman Ahmed	Professor
Natural Resource Management Project, Balochistan Forest Department, Quetta	Nayyar Iqbal	Sociologist
Govt. Municipal Degree College	Students Group	
Bangladesh Action Aid (NGO)	Shahabbudin Ahmed	Programme Manager
AFB (NGO), Rawalpindi	Members	
	Mian Anees Ahmed	Advocate Faisalabad
Welfare Society Gurunanak Pura, Faisalabad ((NGO)	Members from Ameer Hamza	
Imagine Films, Karachi	Hasan Zaidi	Director
Action Aid Haripur	Members	
FAUP, Faisalabad	S.M. Khatheeb Alam	Director
FAUP, Faisalabad	Ijaz Ahmed	Consultant
Planner Lahore	Raza Ali	Consultant
AIM (NGO)	Rubina Mughal	
Anjuman-e-Tameere-e-Watan (NGO)	Saifullah Aziz Dr. Muhammad Younus	Officer bearers
CAP, Faisalabad (NGO)	Shahid	Executive Director
WASA, Faisalabad	Gulam Yazdani	Director O&M
WASA, Faisalabad	Gul Hafeez Khokar	CIU
SPDI, Islamabad	Asad Naqvi	Research Associate
Local Govt & Rural Dev Govt of Pakistan Islamabad	Naeem Akhthar	Director
UNICEF, Islamabad	Raja Sher Afzal	Project Officer
Action Aid	Members + 2 Action Aid staff	Staff

Source: ASB records